New South Wales v Robinson

High Court of Australia · 2019

TortsIntentional Torts

New South Wales v Robinson [2019] HCA 46

A man walked into a police station and was arrested. The constable did not think he had enough evidence to charge him, and let him go 78 minutes later without charge. Was the arrest lawful?

What happened?

Mr Robinson was subject to an apprehended violence order that restrained him from, among other things, contacting Ms Singh ([64]). On 20 December 2013 Ms Singh reported to police that he had sent an email to one of her employees ([65]). On the morning of Sunday 22 December 2013 Constable Smith read the police file, formed the opinion that Mr Robinson had breached the order, and decided to go to his address and arrest him ([66]). Officers went there but were told by neighbours that he no longer lived there ([66]). At noon Mr Robinson telephoned the police and said that he was homeless and interstate and that he would not attend a police station before seeking legal representation ([67]).

At 5.00 pm that day Mr Robinson voluntarily entered the Sydney City Police Station and Constable Smith immediately arrested him for breaching the order ([68]). Constable Smith offered an interview, which Mr Robinson accepted, and Mr Robinson was released without charge at 6.18 pm ([68]). Constable Smith gave evidence that he believed the arrest was necessary because of the seriousness of the alleged offence, to prevent repetition and to ensure Mr Robinson’s appearance in court ([70]). He conceded that at the time of the arrest he “did not believe there was enough [evidence] to charge him”, and said that whether to charge depended on what Mr Robinson said in the interview ([71]).

Mr Robinson sued the State of New South Wales in the District Court for damages for wrongful arrest and false imprisonment ([69]). The primary judge found that Constable Smith suspected on reasonable grounds that an offence had been committed and was satisfied that the arrest was reasonably necessary to ensure Mr Robinson’s appearance in court and because of the nature and seriousness of the offence, and held the arrest lawful ([81]-[85]). The Court of Appeal allowed Mr Robinson’s appeal by majority, McColl and Basten JJA in the majority and Emmett A-JA dissenting ([1], [86]-[87]).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court dismissed the State’s appeal with costs, by four Justices to three. Bell, Gageler, Gordon and Edelman JJ gave joint reasons ([62]-[117]). Kiefel CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ gave joint reasons in dissent ([1]-[61]) and would have allowed the appeal.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Bell, Gageler, Gordon and Edelman JJ held that an arrest without warrant under s 99 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) (LEPRA) “can only be for the purpose, as soon as is reasonably practicable, of taking the arrested person before a magistrate (or other authorised officer) to be dealt with according to law to answer a charge for that offence” ([110]). They took that single criterion from Jordan CJ in Bales v Parmeter, approved by this Court in Williams v The Queen, and said that nothing in LEPRA had displaced it ([63], [92], [94]).

Because s 99(3) requires the officer to take the person before an authorised officer as soon as reasonably practicable, a police officer “must at the time of arrest have an intention to take the person, as soon as is reasonably practicable, before an authorised officer to be dealt with according to law to answer a charge for that offence”, and an intention to bring a person before an authorised officer “means, as a matter of substance, a requirement to have an intention to charge that person” ([109]).

“The intention required at the time of arrest is an intention to charge unless it emerges after the arrest that the circumstances do not justify such a decision” ([111]); that is not a requirement to hold at arrest “the mental state required at the time of charging”, and if it emerges after the arrest that there is not sufficient basis to charge, “the arrest should be discontinued pursuant to s 105” ([115]). The investigation period in Pt 9 is not to be taken into account at the time of arrest ([113]).

Constable Smith had no intention at the time of arrest of bringing Mr Robinson before an authorised officer “unless it emerged subsequent to the arrest that there was sufficient reason to charge him”, so the arrest was unlawful ([116]). Kiefel CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ, in dissent, held that “it is not necessary that the arresting police officer have determined at the time of arrest that the arrested person will definitely be taken before an authorised officer to be dealt with according to law or, therefore, charged” ([2]), reading s 99 in the context of s 99(4), s 105 and Pt 9 ([58]-[61]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Bell, Gageler, Gordon and Edelman JJ

Read judgment: [109] (PDF p 57) (opens in a new tab), [115]–[116] (PDF p 60) (opens in a new tab)

The majority construed s 99(3) as requiring an intention at arrest to bring the person before an authorised officer to answer a charge. That requirement was necessary to its decision: Constable Smith lacked the intention to charge, so his arrest of Mr Robinson was unlawful. The qualification at [115] answers the State’s objection: intending to charge does not require the officer already to have the grounds needed for charging; the arrest should be discontinued if an insufficient basis emerges afterwards.

Separate reasoning · Kiefel CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ

Read judgment: [60]–[61] (PDF p 37) (opens in a new tab)

These Justices dissented and would have allowed the State’s appeal. Reading s 99 in the context of s 105 and Part 9, they rejected a requirement for an unqualified decision at arrest to take the person before an authorised officer. They therefore concluded that the absence of an unqualified intention to charge did not make Robinson’s arrest unlawful. This was their competing construction, rather than the reasoning supporting the majority’s order.

Why does this case matter?

In a problem about an arrest, the facts that decide the answer are often what the officer had decided, or not decided, by the moment of arrest, and a student who confines the answer to the officer’s grounds for suspicion and the listed reasons for arresting has not finished the analysis. The case also divided the Court, so how a point is attributed matters.

Exam and application relevance

Where a New South Wales officer arrested without warrant, look for evidence of what the officer intended at the time of arrest, as Constable Smith’s own concession at [71] was treated.

Attribute the reasoning to the four Justices who made the order, and do not present the reasoning of Kiefel CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ as the Court’s.

The joint reasons applied s 99 as it stood on 22 December 2013 ([72]-[105]) and contrasted it with s 365 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), which they described as expressly authorising arrest for questioning about an indictable offence ([108]). A provision framed differently has to be read on its own terms.

Check your understanding

1. What did Constable Smith concede about the evidence at the time of the arrest, and what did he say the decision whether to charge depended on ([71])?

2. How did the District Court and the Court of Appeal each dispose of Mr Robinson’s claim, and how did the Court of Appeal divide ([81]-[87])?

3. What did Bell, Gageler, Gordon and Edelman JJ say an arrest under s 99 can only be for, and whose statement of that criterion did they rely on ([63], [92], [110])?

4. Why did the joint reasons say that requiring an intention to charge at the time of arrest does not require the mental state needed at the time of charging ([115])?

5. What role did the joint reasons give to s 105 ([111], [115])?

6. On what reasoning did Kiefel CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ conclude that no determination to charge was required ([58]-[61])?