Collins v Wilcock

High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division (Divisional Court) · 1984

TortsIntentional Torts

Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374

A woman constable took hold of a woman’s arm to stop her walking away from police questions, and the woman scratched her. When does an officer’s touch on the street become a legal wrong, and does a good purpose help?

What happened?

Woman Police Constable Wilcock and Police Sergeant Benjamen, on duty in a police vehicle in London on 22 July 1982, saw two women walking along the street, one a known prostitute and the other the defendant, Alexis Collins; both appeared to the officers to be soliciting men (1173). The officers asked both women to get into the police car. One did; the defendant refused, repeated her refusal and walked away. The constable got out and followed her on foot, asking why she did not want to talk to the police and for her name and address, and told the defendant she had not finished talking to her (1173).

The defendant started to walk away again. The constable took hold of her by the left arm to restrain her, and the defendant scratched the constable’s right fore-arm with her finger nails and was then arrested for assaulting a police officer in the execution of her duty (1173).

She was charged under s 51(1) of the Police Act 1964. The magistrate found that the officers had good cause to believe the two women were soliciting, that the constable had a clear duty to persist in her inquiries and to require the defendant to remain with her, and that placing her hand on the defendant’s arm to restrain her was within her duty and not unreasonable (1176). He convicted the defendant and ordered her to pay a fine of 50 pounds (1175-1176). The defendant’s case was that the constable had gone beyond her duty by detaining her in circumstances short of arrest, and the constable’s case was that she had good ground to make inquiries and to administer a caution under the Street Offences Act 1959 (1173, 1175). The defendant appealed by case stated to the Divisional Court.

What did the Court decide?

The Divisional Court (Robert Goff LJ and Mann J) gave one judgment, which Robert Goff LJ read on 16 April 1984 (1174). The court allowed the appeal and quashed the defendant’s conviction (1180). It preferred not to answer the question the magistrate had stated, which it described as drawn in wide general terms (1180-1181), and instead added a further question to the case stated: whether, on the facts found, the constable was acting in the course of her duty when she detained the defendant. It answered that question in the negative (1181). It ordered the defendant’s and the prosecutrix’s costs out of central funds (1181).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The court began from the fundamental principle, “plain and incontestable”, that “every person’s body is inviolate”, and from the long-established position that any touching of another person, however slight, may amount to a battery (1177). It cited Cole v Turner and Blackstone for the breadth of the principle and said that the effect is that everybody is protected against any form of physical molestation, not only against physical injury (1177).

It then said that so widely drawn a principle must inevitably be subject to exceptions: children may be subjected to reasonable punishment, people to the lawful exercise of the power of arrest, and reasonable force may be used in self-defence or to prevent crime (1177). Apart from those cases of lawful control or constraint, “a broader exception has been created to allow for the exigencies of everyday life”. The court said that consent is generally a defence to battery and that most physical contacts of ordinary life are not actionable because they are impliedly consented to by all who move in society, so that nobody can complain of jostling in a supermarket, an underground station or a busy street, or of a hand seized in friendship (1177).

It continued that, although such cases are regarded as examples of implied consent, “it is more common nowadays to treat them as falling within a general exception embracing all physical contact which is generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct of daily life” (1177). It added that, although in the past a battery has sometimes been said to be committed only where the action is “angry, revengeful, rude, or insolent”, it thought it more realistic and more accurate to state “the broad underlying principle, subject to the broad exception” (1177).

Among the conduct long held acceptable is touching a person for the purpose of engaging his attention, using no greater degree of physical contact than is reasonably necessary in the circumstances for that purpose (1177). The court drew on Wiffin v Kincard and Rawlings v Till for a distinction between a touch to draw a man’s attention and a physical restraint, and said that persistent touching to gain attention in the face of obvious disregard may transcend the norms of acceptable behaviour. It did not say that more than one touch is never permitted. “In each case, the test must be whether the physical contact so persisted in has in the circumstances gone beyond generally acceptable standards of conduct; and the answer to that question will depend upon the facts of the particular case” (1178).

As to police officers, the court said that, putting aside the lawful exercise of the power of arrest and certain statutory powers, “police officers have for present purposes no greater rights than ordinary citizens” (1178). An officer who wishes to engage a man’s attention, for example to question him, commits no wrong by laying a hand on his sleeve or tapping his shoulder for that purpose, but if the officer restrains a man, for example by gripping his arm or shoulder, the action is unlawful unless he is lawfully exercising his power of arrest (1178).

The court applied those statements to the facts. It rejected Mr Armstrong’s submissions that the statutory recognition of cautioning in s 2 of the Street Offences Act 1959 implied a power to stop and detain women for that purpose, that the constable’s purpose of carrying out the cautioning procedure meant that her action could not be unlawful, and that whether she was acting in the execution of her duty was a question of fact for the magistrate (1180). The constable took hold of the defendant by the left arm to restrain her and was not proceeding to arrest her; since “her action went beyond the generally acceptable conduct of touching a person to engage his or her attention”, it constituted a battery on the defendant and was therefore unlawful (1180).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Robert Goff LJ and Mann J (one judgment of the court, read by Robert Goff LJ)

Read judgment: pp 1177–1178 (PDF p 3) (opens in a new tab)

The statement of the principle, the general exception for generally acceptable contact and the test of whether persisted contact has gone beyond generally acceptable standards supplied the standard the court then applied to the constable’s conduct; without it the court had no basis to say that taking hold of the defendant’s arm was a battery.

Ratio · Robert Goff LJ and Mann J (one judgment of the court, read by Robert Goff LJ)

Read judgment: p 1180 (PDF p 5) (opens in a new tab)

The application is the ground of decision: the constable took hold of the defendant’s arm to restrain her, was not proceeding to arrest her, went beyond generally acceptable conduct and so committed a battery, with the result that the conviction was quashed.

Obiter · Robert Goff LJ and Mann J (one judgment of the court, read by Robert Goff LJ)

Read judgment: p 1180 (PDF p 5) (opens in a new tab)

The court’s remarks on the word detaining, separating a request backed by actual force (battery) from one backed by the threat of force (false imprisonment), were made in explaining why it would not answer the magistrate’s question as drafted (1180-1181); the decision on the appeal did not depend on them.

Why does this case matter?

Contact problems in torts rarely involve violence: a hand on an arm, a tap on the shoulder, a greeting. Students often decide them by asking whether the other person wanted the contact, or whether the defendant acted in anger. Whether either of those is the right question is what this case answers. It reaches its answer on an official’s conduct on a public street, in a prosecution for assaulting a police officer in the execution of her duty, and not in a claim for damages.

Exam and application relevance

State the contact precisely before analysing it: where on the body, how many times, for what purpose and whether the other person was resisting. Then ask what the Divisional Court compared that contact with, and cite the pages for each step.

Page references in this lesson are to the Weekly Law Reports, [1984] 1 WLR 1172, not to the All ER citation. Keep the court’s general statements at 1177 and 1178 apart from its application to the constable at 1180. This is an English Divisional Court decision, so in an Australian answer it is persuasive authority, and how Australian courts have used it should be checked before it is treated as settled Australian law. The court said that the requisite mental element was of no relevance in the case before it (1177), so it is not a source for the fault required.

Check your understanding

1. What did the constable do immediately before the defendant scratched her, and what had the defendant done each time she was asked to stop or to speak to the police (1173)?

2. Who sat in the Divisional Court, and whose reasons did the report record as read to the court on 16 April 1984 (1174)?

3. What order did the court make, and what did it do with the question the magistrate had stated (1180-1181)?

4. What did the court say about the rights of a police officer, apart from arrest and statutory powers, and about an officer who restrains a person by gripping an arm or shoulder (1178)?

5. What three submissions did Mr Armstrong make for the constable, and how did the court deal with each (1180)?