Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd v Robertson
Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd v Robertson [1906] HCA 83; (1906) 4 CLR 379
A passenger paid a penny to enter a ferry wharf, changed his mind, and was stopped by force at the exit turnstile unless he paid another penny. Was he falsely imprisoned?
Qualified by Robertson v The Balmain New Ferry Company Ltd [1909] UKPC 1; [1910] AC 295
The Privy Council dismissed the plaintiff’s further appeal in the same case, saying that it “entirely” agreed with the High Court’s conclusion. Its reasons are narrower than Griffith CJ’s. It said that when the plaintiff entered “there was nothing agreed as to the terms on which he might go back”, so the company “were entitled to impose a reasonable condition” before letting him through the turnstile, and it called the penny “a quite fair condition”. It relied on the plaintiff having paid to be carried by ferry, on the company having always been ready and willing to carry him, and on his being able to make the journey he had contracted for. So the High Court’s statement that the terms of entry must be examined remains the starting point, but an agreement by the plaintiff to the exit terms, which Griffith CJ found, is not what the Privy Council relied on, and its words about a reasonable condition are narrower than O’Connor J’s statement that the company could impose any terms it thought fit.
What happened?
Mr Robertson paid a penny and entered the ferry wharf through a turnstile, meaning to travel to Balmain. He changed his mind before boarding and tried to leave. The only land exit was the turnstile, which needed another penny. He refused to pay; the company’s officers stopped him by force. He sued for false imprisonment and assault, won before a jury, and the company appealed to the High Court.
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed the appeal. It set aside the plaintiff’s verdict and entered judgment for the defendants. All three judges agreed on this order.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
O’Connor J (Griffith CJ and Barton J agreeing) said restraint on liberty is actionable, prima facie. But if the restraint comes from terms of entry, those terms must be examined first.
The wharf was private property. The company could set any conditions on entering or leaving, since there was no express contract. It could lawfully charge a penny to use the turnstiles, regardless of travel.
The plaintiff could leave anytime by paying. So he had only himself to blame; there was no actionable imprisonment.
O’Connor J noted creditors generally cannot restrain debtors to force payment, but said restraint isn’t always actionable.
Griffith CJ added the plaintiff, knowing the terms, impliedly consented to them, and remained free to leave by water.
Barton J distinguished Butler, since here the carriage contract had been abandoned.
Why does this case matter?
Turnstiles and barriers often suggest false imprisonment. This case tests whether that answer holds, with its Privy Council appeal history noted.
Exam and application relevance
Check what each person knew, paid, or agreed to, and whether another exit existed.
Attribute reasoning to the specific Justice, not the Court generally.
Ask whether the penny condition was reasonable, given the plaintiff could still travel.
Note O’Connor J left open an unreasonable-stay scenario; this case doesn’t settle it.