Negligence: the statutory causation test in application

How the statutory causation provisions are applied: factual causation as a but-for question the plaintiff must prove, the exceptional-case limit, and scope of liability as a separate normative question, with the New South Wales, Queensland and Victorian texts compared.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth, nsw, qld, vic
Subjects
torts
Topics
negligence

Learning outcomes

  • Apply the statutory but-for question to an omission by stating the counterfactual and the evidence that proves it, rather than a possibility.
  • Distinguish factual causation, the exceptional-case provision and scope of liability, and say what the High Court has and has not decided about each.
  • Analyse a failure-to-warn problem through factual causation, the evidential rule on the plaintiff’s own statement, and scope of liability.

In New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria, the three jurisdictions whose provisions are set out here, causation in negligence is decided under a statutory provision that splits it into two questions: one of historical fact, and one about whether responsibility should be imposed. A student answering a problem must first ask which of those two questions the facts raise, because one is resolved by proof on the balance of probabilities and the other by reasoned policy argument. This article builds on Negligence: causation by following the High Court’s application of the New South Wales provision, and it leaves duty, breach, remoteness, defences and damages to their own articles.

The provisions in three jurisdictions

Section 5D of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)1, s 11 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld)2 and s 51 of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic)3 each state that a determination that negligence caused particular harm comprises two elements. The first is that the negligence was a necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm (factual causation). The second is that it is appropriate for the scope of the negligent person’s liability to extend to the harm so caused (scope of liability). The Queensland section speaks of a “breach of duty” rather than “negligence”. Each separately places on the plaintiff the onus of proving, on the balance of probabilities, any fact relevant to causation (NSW s 5E, Qld s 12, Vic s 52). Each scheme also excludes some classes of claim, including certain workers compensation and dust disease claims (NSW ss 5A(2) and 3B, Qld s 5, Vic s 45). Those exclusions are not covered here, and a student must first check that the claim falls within the relevant Part.

The three texts differ in two respects that matter to the rest of this article.

  • The case where but-for is not met. NSW s 5D(2) and Qld s 11(2) refer to an “exceptional case”. Vic s 51(2) refers to an “appropriate case” and asks whether negligence that cannot be established as a necessary condition “should be taken to establish” factual causation.
  • What the plaintiff would have done. All three provide that this is determined subjectively in light of all relevant circumstances. NSW s 5D(3)(b) and Qld s 11(3)(b) add that a statement made after suffering the harm about what the person would have done is inadmissible except to the extent that it is against the person’s interest. The text of Vic s 51 contains no equivalent.

Factual causation is a but-for question, and the plaintiff must prove it

In Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak (2009) 239 CLR 4204, a gunman shot two men at a New Year’s Eve function at a licensed restaurant, and each sued the operator for negligently not providing any or any sufficient security. Both succeeded in the courts below. The High Court did not decide breach and allowed the appeals because causation was not established (at [40]). The five Justices, in joint reasons, said that factual causation under s 5D(1)(a) “is determined by the ‘but for’ test: but for the negligent act or omission, would the harm have occurred?” (at [45]). The joint reasons of four Justices in Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 1825 called s 5D(1)(a) “a statutory statement of the ‘but for’ test” (at [18]), and a unanimous Court in Wallace v Kam [2013] HCA 196 said that it involves “nothing more or less than” that test (at [16]).

Three points follow.

  1. A necessary condition need not be the only one. In Strong, the joint reasons said that negligence necessary to complete a set of conditions that are jointly sufficient for the harm meets s 5D(1)(a) (at [20]).
  2. Possibilities are not proof. In Adeels Palace nothing in the evidence showed that security staff would have deterred or prevented the gunman’s re-entry, and the Court said that “neither plaintiff proved factual causation by pointing to possibilities that might have eventuated if circumstances had been different” (at [50]).
  3. Being the kind of harm the duty guarded against does not itself prove factual causation. In Adeels Palace the Court said that describing the injury as “the very kind of thing” the duty was meant to prevent must not obscure the need to prove factual causation, although the observation may bear on scope of liability (at [51]).

For an omission, the plaintiff must prove the probable course of events had the omission not occurred. In Strong a woman using crutches slipped on a chip in a store’s sidewalk sales area, where there was no system of periodic inspection and cleaning. The joint reasons said that she was required to prove that, had a system been in place, the chip would probably have been detected and removed before she approached the store’s entrance (at [32]). The evidence did not show when the chip was dropped, and the joint reasons held that she could still discharge her onus by reasoning from the probabilities, and allowed her appeal (at [34]-[38]). Heydon J, in separate reasons, would have dismissed the appeal. The contrast is this: in Adeels Palace the evidence did not show that the precaution would have made a difference, while in Strong the unresolved question was when the chip was dropped, which the joint reasons resolved by the probabilities.

When but-for is not met

Adeels Palace said that, as s 5D(1) shows, the but-for test “is now to be (and has hitherto been seen to be) a necessary test of causation in all but the undefined group of exceptional cases contemplated by s 5D(2)” (at [55]). The Court observed that the Act does not expressly give content to “an exceptional case”, so that whether s 5D(2) is engaged depends on whether and to what extent “established principles” countenance departure from the but-for test (at [54]). It said that s 5D(2) may have been enacted for cases exemplified by the House of Lords decision in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2003] 1 AC 32, where plaintiffs with mesothelioma had been exposed to asbestos in successive employments, but did not decide how it would apply to such a case (at [57]). In Strong the joint reasons added that whether a negligent material increase in risk can establish causation under established common law principles “has not been considered by this Court”, and that where the relative contribution of several factors cannot be determined, whether s 5D(1)(a) is satisfied can depend on the scientific or medical evidence, since each factor may be part of a set of conditions necessary to the harm (at [26]-[27]). Those statements were made in 2012, and this article does not trace later decisions. These cases construe the New South Wales wording; neither the Victorian “appropriate case” wording nor the Queensland section was before the Court.

Scope of liability is the normative question

In Wallace v Kam the Court said that the factual-causation determination “is entirely factual” and the scope determination “is entirely normative” (at [14]). Where a case falls within an established class, the Court said that the scope question is answered by precedent, because s 5D “guides but does not displace common law methodology” (at [22]). In a novel case, s 5D(4) makes it incumbent on the court to consider and explain in terms of legal policy whether and why responsibility should be imposed, and the Court said that “directness”, “reality”, “effectiveness” or “proximity” will rarely be adequate to that task and that “common sense” will ordinarily be of limited utility unless the perceptions behind it are explained (at [23]).

Illustration: a failure to warn of two risks

In Wallace v Kam, on the facts found and assumed, a surgeon failed to warn of two distinct risks of surgery: temporary nerve damage, which materialised, and a one-in-twenty risk of permanent paralysis, which did not (at [1]). The Court, in unanimous joint reasons, applied s 5D to a claim it described as one in negligence at common law (at [7] and [12]). It identified three scenarios (at [18]-[20]):

  • if the patient would have chosen to undergo the treatment that was in fact chosen even if warned of all material risks, factual causation can be determined not to exist, leaving aside any exceptional case;
  • if the patient would not have had the treatment at all if fully warned, factual causation is established;
  • if the patient would not have had it then but might later, the Court’s “better analysis” was that factual causation is also established, provided the injury remained a possible but improbable result of the treatment.

Because factual causation turns on what the patient would have done, s 5D(3) governs it, including the rule excluding the patient’s own later statement unless it is against interest (at [17]). On the assumed facts the patient would not have had the surgery at all if warned of the paralysis risk, so factual causation was established (at [29]). The Court nonetheless held that liability for the failure to warn of the paralysis risk should not extend to the nerve damage, because the policy underlying the duty to warn is to protect the patient from physical injury the risk of which is unacceptable to the patient, and the patient would have undergone the surgery if warned only of the nerve-damage risk (at [30], [36]-[39]). The Court distinguished a single injury with several contributing risk factors, where a failure to warn of one factor may be a failure to warn of the extent of the risk, from the materialisation of one of several distinct risks of different physical injuries (at [34]-[35]). The attribution rule it adopted was framed for the latter (at [36]-[37]).

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify the jurisdiction and read its provision. Only the New South Wales, Queensland and Victorian provisions are set out here, and the Victorian text differs from the other two.
  2. State the harm and the particular negligent act or omission, then ask the but-for question on the balance of probabilities, remembering that the plaintiff carries the onus.
  3. For an omission, state what the precaution would probably have achieved, and identify the evidence for that. Treat a mere possibility as insufficient on Adeels Palace, and ask whether the probabilities can fill an evidential gap, as the joint reasons held on the facts in Strong (Heydon J dissenting).
  4. Only if but-for is not met, ask whether the statutory exceptional or appropriate case provision is engaged. Say that the High Court’s discussion in Adeels Palace concerned the New South Wales wording and did not give a general account of when it applies.
  5. If factual causation is established, argue scope separately: precedent for an established class, and an explicit policy explanation in a novel case. The Court in Wallace v Kam treated language such as “directness” as rarely adequate and “common sense” as ordinarily of limited utility unless its basis is explained.
  6. For a failure to warn, decide what this patient would have done, apply the evidential rule on the plaintiff’s later statement in New South Wales or Queensland (the Victorian section has no equivalent), and then address scope, noting that Wallace v Kam concerned distinct risks of different injuries.

Self-check

  • Have I kept factual causation (proved on the evidence) apart from scope of liability (argued as policy)?
  • Have I stated the counterfactual for an omission and identified evidence for it, rather than a possibility?
  • Have I said which jurisdiction’s provision I applied, and that the High Court decisions concern the New South Wales provision?

Where the authority sits

The statutory texts stated here are the New South Wales version current from 30 July 2026, the Queensland in-force version as at October 2026, and Victorian Authorised Version No 130 (amendments as at 25 February 2026). Adeels Palace, Strong and Wallace v Kam are High Court decisions on the New South Wales provision. As High Court decisions they bind lower Australian courts on that provision, to the extent that they decided a point, and the High Court can reconsider its own decisions. In Wallace v Kam the Court described s 5D as “substantially replicated” in each other State and the Australian Capital Territory (at [12]), but the sources cited here do not set out the other jurisdictions’ texts, and the Queensland and Victorian Acts are stated only as to the provisions discussed. A student applying these decisions elsewhere should read the local wording first.

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