Strong v Woolworths Ltd

High Court of Australia · 2012

TortsNegligenceCivil Liability Statutes

Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182

A shopper on crutches slipped on a greasy chip outside a store that had no system for inspecting the floor. Nobody knew when the chip had been dropped. Could she prove the missing cleaning system caused her fall?

What happened?

Kathryn Strong had lost her right leg above the knee and walked with crutches. At about 12.30pm on Friday 24 September 2004 she was in the sidewalk sales area outside the entrance to the Big W store at the Centro Taree Shopping Centre when the tip of her right crutch came into contact with a greasy chip on the floor; the crutch slipped and she fell heavily, suffering a serious spinal injury ([1], [6]). The area was under the care and control of Woolworths, trading as Big W, and on the day Woolworths had no system in place for the periodic inspection and cleaning of it ([1], [3], [8]).

The sales area had been set up for the day’s trading at about 8.00am and was not inspected in the four and a half hours before her fall; it was not disputed that an inspection would have found and removed the chip ([33], [38]). Nearby, the centre’s cleaning contract required inspection of the common areas at intervals of at most 15 minutes, and a cleaner recorded that the adjacent common area had last been cleaned or inspected at 12.10pm ([7], [9]). The fall happened near a food court, at lunchtime, during the hours when a second cleaner was on duty ([7], [15]). There was no evidence of when the chip had been dropped ([15], [38]).

In the District Court of New South Wales Robison DCJ gave judgment against Woolworths for $580,299.12 ([2]). The Court of Appeal (Campbell JA, Handley AJA and Harrison J) allowed Woolworths’ appeal and dismissed the proceedings ([3]). It accepted that reasonable care required periodic inspection, not continuous watching ([13]), and held that there was no basis for concluding that the chip had been on the floor long enough to be detected and removed by a reasonable cleaning system, pointing to the lunchtime, the food court and the second cleaner ([15]).

What did the Court decide?

The appeal was allowed by the joint reasons of French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ. The orders set aside the Court of Appeal’s orders and in their place dismissed Woolworths’ appeal to that Court with costs, restoring the judgment for Ms Strong, and ordered Woolworths to pay her costs in the High Court ([39]-[40]). Heydon J would have dismissed the appeal with costs ([79]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

In the joint reasons of French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ, “The determination of factual causation under s 5D(1)(a) is a statutory statement of the ‘but for’ test of causation” ([18]). It requires proof that the negligence “was a necessary condition of the occurrence of the particular harm”, but “a defendant’s negligent act or omission which is necessary to complete a set of conditions that are jointly sufficient to account for the occurrence of the harm will meet the test of factual causation within s 5D(1)(a)” ([20]).

“Proof of the causal link between an omission and an occurrence requires consideration of the probable course of events had the omission not occurred” ([32]), and the plaintiff’s onus “could be discharged by consideration of the probabilities in circumstances in which the evidence did not establish when the chip was deposited” ([34]). Their Honours noted that whether negligent conduct resulting in a material increase in risk may admit of proof of causation in accordance with established principles under the common law of Australia “has not been considered by this Court” ([26]). Heydon J, dissenting in the result, would have dismissed the appeal because the plaintiff had not proved that the chip fell early enough ([75]-[77]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ

Read judgment: [18] (PDF p 10) (opens in a new tab), [32]–[34] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab), [36]–[38] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab)

The majority applied the statutory but-for requirement by asking whether a reasonable inspection system would probably have removed the chip before the fall. The absence of evidence fixing the deposit time did not prevent proof: after rejecting the suggested lunchtime inference, the majority found the longer period before 12.10pm more probable. That reasoning was necessary to allow the appeal and restore the plaintiff’s judgment; it depends on the evidence about timing and the inspection interval.

Obiter · French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ

Read judgment: [20] (PDF p 11) (opens in a new tab)

The elaboration that negligence completing a jointly sufficient set of conditions can satisfy s 5D(1)(a) explains why a contributing condition need not be the sole necessary condition. That broader explanation answered the appellant’s criticism of the Court of Appeal’s statutory analysis, but was unnecessary to the decisive finding that a reasonable cleaning system would probably have prevented this fall. This classification concerns that elaboration, rather than the basic necessary-condition requirement applied to the claim.

Classification unresolved · French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ

Read judgment: [26] (PDF p 15) (opens in a new tab)

The majority expressly said the High Court had not considered whether a material increase in risk could establish causation under Australian common-law principles. This reserves that question rather than adopting a material-risk test. The plaintiff succeeded through ordinary but-for proof, so the reservation and discussion of exceptional cases do not supply the ground of decision.

Separate reasoning · Heydon J

Read judgment: [75]–[77] (PDF p 35) (opens in a new tab)

Heydon J dissented in the result. He considered the plaintiff’s probability argument unconvincing and was not persuaded that the chip had probably fallen before 12.15pm. Because the plaintiff retained the burden of proving causation, he would have dismissed the appeal. This is his distinct assessment of the evidence, rather than the majority’s ground for allowing the appeal; the quotation from Dixon J in paragraph 76 supports Heydon J’s reasoning and is not his own formulation.

Why does this case matter?

The joint reasons called it “the familiar difficulty” in slipping cases: establishing a causal connection between the absence of an adequate cleaning system and the injury when it is not known when the slippery substance was deposited ([4]). A defendant that had no cleaning system at all can argue that an adequate one might have missed the hazard anyway. Without this case a student is likely to treat the lack of evidence about timing as the end of the plaintiff’s claim.

The division in the Court was over what the evidence proved, and causation problems are often decided the same way. Facts about timing deserve close attention: ask which inferences the evidence actually supports, and which are speculation.

Exam and application relevance

Where the claim is governed by the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), work from ss 5D and 5E of that Act, and then the scope of liability question in s 5D(1)(b), which the joint reasons said presented little difficulty on these facts ([19]).

For an omission, describe the precaution that reasonable care required and how often or how well it would have operated, because that is the counterfactual you have to run: here, inspection at intervals of no more than 20 minutes ([38]). Then marshal what the evidence shows about timing and test each inference the other side draws from it, as the joint reasons tested the second cleaner and the lunchtime ([36]-[37]). The reasoning depends on the evidence: in Spotless Facility Services Pty Ltd v Victorian WorkCover Authority [2025] VSCA 50 the Victorian Court of Appeal distinguished Strong where the evidence showed a spill was much more likely in the crowded minutes just before the fall, so the same style of reasoning could not be used ([87], [90], [92]).

If your facts raise a material increase in risk or more than one sufficient condition, identify s 5D(2) and the exceptional-case inquiry it requires; the joint reasons said that how cases of more than one sufficient condition are accommodated under s 5D “does not call for present consideration” ([28]).

Check your understanding

1. What did Woolworths fail to do, and what was not in dispute about what an inspection would have found ([3], [33])?

2. On what three circumstances did the Court of Appeal rely to conclude that the chip may have been dropped shortly before the fall, and how did the joint reasons deal with them ([35]-[37])?

3. How does the joint reasons’ description of a necessary condition accommodate a case where the defendant’s negligence is only one of several conditions ([20])?

4. What did the joint reasons say about material increase in risk ([26])?

5. Why did Heydon J conclude that the appeal should be dismissed ([75]-[77])?