Negligence: classifying the kind of harm, and the vulnerable plaintiff

Foreseeability marks a limit and does not test cause

In Chapman v Hearse, Chapman negligently crashed and was thrown unconscious onto the road. Dr Cherry stopped to help him, and was killed by Hearse’s negligent driving. The question was whether Chapman could be liable for Cherry’s death, so as to contribute to Hearse’s damages.

The Court said foreseeability is not itself a test of causation. Instead, it marks the limit of a wrongdoer’s responsibility for harm from their act. The Court held it was reasonably foreseeable that rescuers helping after a highway collision might be hit by passing traffic.

In Wagon Mound (No 1), the Privy Council heard an appeal from New South Wales. The trial judge found the defendant could not reasonably expect its spilled oil to catch fire on water. The Board said liability turns on whether the damage is of a kind a reasonable person should have foreseen, and dismissed the fire-damage claim.

This is a Privy Council decision, not a High Court one. Its authority in Australia depends on how the High Court has used it. In Mount Isa Mines v Pusey, Windeyer J and Walsh J applied it, while Barwick CJ did not discuss its implications.

Classifying the kind of harm

In Pusey, an engineer developed a schizophrenic reaction after helping a badly burned colleague. The trial judge found that some mental disturbance was foreseeable, even though this exact condition was rare. The High Court agreed, but the five Justices gave separate reasons.

Barwick CJ said rarity does not stop an injury being foreseeable, if it belongs to a foreseeable class of injury.

Walsh J said the law does not require foreseeing the exact damage, only damage of the same “kind”. He treated all mental or psychological disorders caused by shock as one kind of damage, without deciding whether all personal injury counts as a single kind.

Windeyer J said foreseeability “is not measured by statistical probability”, but also admitted that the law leaves the test for classifying “kinds” of harm undefined.

The Justices also framed the legal question differently. Menzies J treated it as a question about duty of care. Windeyer J treated it as one test covering both whether liability exists and how much damage can be recovered. Students should identify which step of the negligence inquiry a question is really addressing.

Hughes v Lord Advocate, a House of Lords case from Scotland, shows this classification process at work. It is only persuasive in Australia, not binding, though both Windeyer J and Walsh J cited it in Pusey. A boy was burned when a lamp, left by workmen beside an open manhole, fell in and caused an explosion. The explosion itself was accepted as unforeseeable, yet the House of Lords allowed the appeal.

Lord Guest said burning by explosion and burning by paraffin liquid were “both burning accidents” — treating them as the same kind of harm. Lord Reid said a defendant escapes liability only if the actual damage differs in kind from what was foreseeable. He added that, in another case, a new and unexpected event might instead be treated as the real cause of the harm.

Extent of harm and the vulnerable plaintiff

Courts treat the extent of harm differently from its kind. Lord Reid in Hughes said a defendant is liable even if the damage turns out much greater than foreseeable.

In Pusey, Barwick CJ rejected the argument that the plaintiff’s own “particular make-up” defeated the claim. Windeyer J, in the same nervous shock case, said the egg-shell skull rule still applies: a tortfeasor takes the victim as found. This was only one Justice’s view, in that case.

Windeyer J and Walsh J left open a harder question: what if the plaintiff had an unusual susceptibility to shock, unknown to the defendant? Both judges said this point remained undecided.

The High Court later addressed this for psychiatric harm. In Koehler, four Justices said Tame had held that “normal fortitude” is not a precondition for liability in psychiatric injury cases. Instead, the key question is whether the risk of psychiatric illness to the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable — meaning not far-fetched or fanciful.

In Tame, Gummow and Kirby JJ added that a defendant need not guard against a response so extreme or idiosyncratic that the risk becomes far-fetched or fanciful. Koehler treats this foreseeability question as going to whether a duty of care exists at all. This article does not explore that issue further.

Once liability is established, the egg-shell skull rule still governs the assessment of damages. But for psychiatric illness, the court first asks whether the risk of that illness to this particular plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable.

Where the New South Wales statute fits

In New South Wales, Pt 1A of the Civil Liability Act 2002 covers negligence damages claims. This applies whether the claim is in tort, contract or under statute, unless s 3B excludes it (s 5A).

Section 5D(1)(b) says the “scope of liability” must be appropriate for it to extend to the harm caused. Section 5D(4) tells courts to ask whether, and why, responsibility for the harm should fall on the negligent party. The section never uses “foreseeable” or “remote”, so it doesn’t tell us where the common law draws this line.

For mental harm, Pt 3 applies similarly (subject to s 3B), under s 28(1) and (3). Section 32(1) says there’s no duty to avoid causing mental harm unless the defendant ought to have foreseen a person of normal fortitude might suffer a recognised psychiatric illness. Section 32(4) adds that courts need not ignore what the defendant actually knew about this particular plaintiff’s fortitude. How s 32 relates to Koehler at [33] isn’t covered here.

In Wallace v Kam [2013] HCA 19, the High Court said s 5D “guides but does not displace common law methodology” (at [22]). It described a common law limiting principle: liability for breach doesn’t extend beyond harm foreseeable at the time of breach (at [24]), citing Wagon Mound and Pusey at 397–400.

That case involved one of two unwarned risks materialising, and didn’t resolve a remoteness question. Decisions after 2013 aren’t discussed here.

This reasoning suggests foreseeability of the kind of harm is one factor relevant to the scope question under common law. But the Court didn’t decide exactly how this fits into a court’s reasoning under s 5D(4).

The Court also noted s 5D is “substantially replicated” in other States and the ACT (at [12]), though those provisions aren’t examined here and may differ.

Applying this in a problem question

Start by identifying the jurisdiction and the harm the plaintiff actually suffered. Keep factual causation separate from foreseeability, which only marks a limit on liability, not a test of cause (Chapman, at 122).

Then state the kind of harm that was reasonably foreseeable when the breach occurred. Argue both a broader and a narrower description, and say which the facts support. Windeyer J noted in 1970 that there is no settled test for classifying “kinds” of harm.

Next compare the harm suffered with that foreseeable kind. Barwick CJ (looking at rarity) and Walsh J (looking at precise character and extent) in Pusey, and Hughes (persuasive only) on mechanism, show the exact manner need not have been foreseen. But harm of a genuinely different kind falls outside the limit, following the Privy Council’s reasoning in Wagon Mound and Walsh J’s approach.

If the plaintiff was unusually susceptible, apply Barwick CJ and Windeyer J’s statements in Pusey to the extent of harm suffered. For psychiatric illness, ask whether the risk of that illness to this particular plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable (Koehler, at [33]). In New South Wales, also consider Pt 3, including s 32.

In New South Wales, apply s 5D(1)(b) and (4). Wallace v Kam treats foreseeability as a common law limiting principle, but does not decide how s 5D(4) takes that principle into account.

Where the authority sits

Some cases here are joint reasons of the High Court: Chapman v Hearse, Koehler, and Wallace v Kam. These count as the Court’s actual holding.

Pusey and Tame are different. The Justices wrote separate reasons in each. A point made by just one Justice is not automatically the Court’s holding.

High Court decisions bind lower Australian courts. But the High Court itself can later reconsider and change its own past decisions.

The Wagon Mound (No 1) comes from the Privy Council, not the High Court. Hughes comes from the House of Lords. Both are persuasive only in Australia, not binding.

The New South Wales statutory provisions mentioned are current from 30 July 2026. Civil liability legislation from other Australian states and territories is not covered here.

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