Hughes v Lord Advocate
Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] AC 837
Two boys slipped into an unattended roadworks tent in Edinburgh, and one was badly burned when a paraffin lamp exploded in a way the experts agreed nobody would have expected. Must the workmen’s employer have foreseen the explosion itself?
What happened?
On 8 November 1958 Post Office workmen were working on cables under Russell Road, Edinburgh. They reached the cables through a manhole about nine feet deep, which was covered by a weather tent with a tarpaulin and had a ladder in it. Red warning paraffin lamps had been put round the site at about 3.30 pm (Lord Jenkins; Lord Guest). Just after 5 pm the workmen went for a tea break of about a quarter of an hour. Before they left they took the ladder out of the manhole and laid it outside the tent, and they left the lamps burning; a gap of two feet to two feet six inches remained between the tarpaulin and the ground (Lord Jenkins; Lord Guest).
While they were away the appellant, an eight-year-old boy, and his ten-year-old uncle went into the tent. On the Lord Ordinary’s findings they took one of the lamps, brought in the ladder and a rope that was not Post Office property, and lowered themselves into the manhole with the lamp (Lord Guest). The appellant then tripped over the lamp and it fell into the hole. There was an explosion, with flames said by a passer-by to have shot up some thirty feet, and the appellant fell into the hole and was very severely burned (Lord Jenkins; Lord Guest).
The explanation accepted by the Lord Ordinary was that the lamp was so disturbed that paraffin escaped from its tank, formed vapour and was ignited by the flame. The experts rated that as unlikely, but there was no other feasible explanation (Lord Guest), and Lord Reid said the experts agreed that no one would have expected it to happen.
The appellant sued the Lord Advocate as representing the Postmaster General. The Lord Ordinary decided in favour of the Respondent, and a majority of the First Division of the Court of Session, with Lord Carmont dissenting, affirmed that decision (Lord Guest). The point that the boys were trespassers was given up before the House of Lords and the boys’ own conduct was not pursued as contributory negligence (Lord Jenkins; Lord Guest).
What did the Court decide?
The House of Lords allowed the appeal. Lord Reid, Lord Jenkins, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Lord Guest and Lord Pearce each delivered a speech and each would allow it. Lord Reid agreed with Lord Guest that the appeal should be allowed and added observations of his own, and Lord Pearce agreed with Lord Guest’s opinion. Lord Jenkins and Lord Morris gave separate reasons. The decision of the Lord Ordinary and of the majority of the First Division, that the appellant could not recover damages, was not upheld.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
Lord Reid began by saying that the Post Office workmen were in fault in leaving the open manhole unattended and that the accident would not have happened if they had done as they ought. On the argument that the damage was of a kind that was not foreseeable, he said that “the Appellant’s injuries were mainly caused by burns, and it cannot be said that injuries from burns were unforeseeable”. His statement of the principle was: “a defender is liable, although the damage may be a good deal greater in extent than was foreseeable.
He can only escape liability if the damage can be regarded as differing in kind from what was foreseeable.” He added that there could be a case where “the intrusion of a new and unexpected factor could be regarded as the cause of the accident rather than the fault of the defender”, but that this was not such a case: “The cause of this accident was a known source of danger, the lamp, but it behaved in an unpredictable way.” He concluded that an accident “caused by a known source of danger, but caused in a way which could not have been foreseen” affords no defence.
Lord Jenkins found it “impossible to accept the view taken by the Lord Ordinary and the majority of the Court of Session”. He accepted that the duty of care is confined to reasonably foreseeable dangers, but said it “does not necessarily follow that liability is escaped because the danger actually materialising is not identical with the danger reasonably foreseen and guarded against”. Of the distinction drawn between a paraffin fire and an explosion, he said: “To my mind the distinction drawn between burning and explosion is too fine to warrant acceptance.” In an imaginary case in which the boy had himself taken a lamp and upset it over his clothes, he thought the danger would be “a danger of fire of some kind”, and the duty was not prevented from operating “by the presence of the remote possibility of the more serious event of an explosion”.
Lord Morris said that the pursuer’s burns “were, however, none the less burns although there was such an immediate combustion of paraffin vapour that there was an explosion”. He continued: “The fact that the features or developments of an accident may not reasonably have been foreseen does not mean that the accident itself was not foreseeable. The pursuer was in my view injured as a result of the type or kind of accident or occurrence that could reasonably have been foreseen.” He added that the defenders could not avoid liability because they could not have foretold the exact way in which the pursuer would play with the objects left to attract him or “the exact way in which in so doing he might get hurt”.
Lord Guest’s speech gave the most detailed reasoning. He observed that the steps from the children’s play with the lamp to the spilling and ignition of the paraffin seem to have been accepted by all the judges in the courts below as foreseeable. He said: “In order to establish a coherent chain of causation it is not necessary that the precise details leading up to the accident should have been reasonably foreseeable: it is sufficient if the accident which occurred is of a type which should have been foreseeable by a reasonably careful person”.
The courts below had concentrated on “what is really a non-essential element in the dangerous situation created by the allurement”. He reasoned: “An explosion is only one way in which burning can be caused”, and “I cannot see that these are two different types of accident. They are both burning accidents and in both cases the injuries would be burning injuries.” On that view “the explosion was an immaterial event in the chain of causation”. He distinguished Muir v Glasgow Corporation on the ground that a tea urn is not a potentially dangerous object like a paraffin lamp and that the way the tea was spilled was never established.
Lord Pearce added that the dangerous allurement was left unguarded in a public highway, and that “to demand too great precision in the test of foreseeability would be unfair to the pursuer”. For him the question was whether the explosion created an accident and damage of a different type from what could be foreseen, and his answer was: “The accident was but a variant of the foreseeable.” The resulting damage, “though severe, was not greater than or different in kind from that which might have been produced had the lamp spilled and produced a more normal conflagration in the hole”.
Why does this case matter?
Students usually meet this case after learning that a defendant is not answerable for everything that follows from a breach, and a common mistake is to apply it by asking whether the particular event that harmed the claimant was predictable. An examiner reads an answer on remoteness for how the harm that was foreseeable is described, how the harm that occurred is described, and what the comparison between them is made to turn on. The five speeches do not describe the question in identical terms, so the words a student borrows matter.
Exam and application relevance
In a problem that turns on remoteness, set out the harm that the defendant’s breach made foreseeable, then the harm the claimant actually suffered, and ask at what level of description each should be compared. Use the facts of Hughes to test your choice: what did the Law Lords treat as the essential part of the danger, and what did they treat as a detail of how it came about?
Attribute each statement to the Law Lord who made it. The speeches use different words for what is being compared (the damage, the danger, the accident), so say whose formulation you are using.
This is a decision of the House of Lords on appeal from Scotland and is persuasive, not binding, in an Australian court. Where the civil liability legislation of the relevant jurisdiction governs the question, check its provisions on scope of liability before applying a common law foreseeability test.
Check your understanding
1. Which Law Lord said that the boys’ injuries were mainly caused by burns, and what did he say about whether injuries from burns were unforeseeable?
2. On the Lord Ordinary’s findings, how did the appellant’s lamp come to be in the manhole, and what did the experts say about the way the paraffin was ignited (Lord Guest; Lord Reid)?
3. Which Law Lord adopted Lord Guest’s opinion, and which Law Lord described the distinction between burning and explosion as too fine to warrant acceptance?
4. What did Lord Guest say about Muir v Glasgow Corporation?
5. What did Lord Reid say about the case where a new and unexpected factor intrudes, and why did he say that was not this case?