The Wagon Mound (No 1)

Judicial Committee of the Privy Council · 1961

TortsNegligence

The Wagon Mound (No 1) [1961] AC 388

Furnace oil escaped into a bay through the act of a shipping company’s employees and was set alight. The trial judge found the company could not reasonably have known that it would burn on water. Should it pay for the fire?

Affirmed by Wallace v Kam [2013] HCA 19

The Wagon Mound is a Privy Council decision, so its force in Australian law comes through the High Court’s treatment of it. In Wallace v Kam the joint reasons of French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ described as a limiting principle of the common law that the scope of liability in negligence normally does not extend beyond liability for harm the risk of which it was the duty of the negligent party to exercise reasonable care and skill to avoid, so that liability for breach of a duty to avoid foreseeable harm does not extend beyond harm that was foreseeable at the time of breach ([24]), citing The Wagon Mound with Mount Isa Mines v Pusey at 397-400. Wallace v Kam concerned the materialisation of one of two unwarned risks under s 5D of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) and did not decide a remoteness question.

What happened?

The appeal, Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd, came to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council from the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The respondents claimed for damage by fire; Manning J of the Full Court considered that an ordinary person asked the cause of the fire at Mort’s Dock would assign it to the spillage of oil by the appellants’ employees. The respondents had maintained at the trial that the appellants had discharged petrol into the bay, on the ground that, as the spillage was set alight, it could not be furnace oil.

The Board recorded the trial judge’s finding, made after a wealth of evidence, that the appellants did not know and could not reasonably be expected to have known that the furnace oil was capable of being set afire when spread on water. It treated that finding as intended to cover precisely the event that happened. The trial judge also found that the oil had got upon the respondents’ slip-ways, where it congealed and interfered with their use, which he described as slight damage that was a direct result of the escape of the oil. No claim for compensation was made for it. The Full Court, applying Re Polemis, decided in the respondents’ favour.

What did the Court decide?

On 18 January 1961 the Board advised Her Majesty that the appeal should be allowed. The respondents’ action, so far as it related to damage caused by the appellants’ negligence, was to be dismissed with costs. The action, so far as it related to damage caused by nuisance, was to be remitted to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales to be dealt with as that court thought fit. The respondents were to pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal and in the courts below.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (Viscount Simonds, Lord Reid, Lord Radcliffe, Lord Tucker and Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest), in the judgment of the Board delivered by Viscount Simonds, held that the rule in Re Polemis and Furness Withy & Co Ltd [1921] 3 KB 560, under which a negligent actor is responsible for all the direct consequences of the act whether or not they were reasonably foreseeable, should no longer be regarded as good law. The Board said that it did not seem consonant with current ideas of justice or morality that, for an act of negligence however slight or venial that results in some trivial foreseeable damage, the actor should be liable for all consequences however unforeseeable and however grave, so long as they can be said to be direct.

It treated it as a principle of civil liability, subject to qualifications that had no present relevance, that a man must be considered responsible for the probable consequences of his act. On its reasoning, a man is responsible for the natural, necessary or probable consequences of his act because, judged by the standard of the reasonable man, he ought to have foreseen them; where those descriptions do not coincide, the test of reasonable foreseeability, which corresponds with the common conscience of mankind, should prevail over the test of direct consequence, which leads to the insoluble problems of causation.

The Board said that the essential factor in determining liability is whether the damage is of such a kind as the reasonable man should have foreseen, that a man should not escape liability, however indirect the damage, if he foresaw or could reasonably foresee the intervening events which led to it, and that foreseeability becomes the effective test.

The Board also considered the proposition, associated with Lord Sumner’s dictum in Weld-Blundell v Stephens that what a defendant ought to have anticipated as a reasonable man goes to culpability and not to compensation, and found itself bound to state that this proposition is fundamentally false. It said that tortious liability is founded not on the act but on its consequences, and that if a defendant’s liability depends on the reasonable foreseeability of the consequent damage, that must be determined by the foreseeability of the damage which in fact happened, the damage in suit.

It rejected the argument that the position differs where the careless act has caused some foreseeable damage to the plaintiff: it is irrelevant to whether the defendant is liable for unforeseeable damage that he is liable for foreseeable damage, each claim resting on its own bottom and failing if the damage could not reasonably be foreseen. The Board substituted the word fire for shock in the statement of Denning LJ in King v Phillips that the test of liability for shock is foreseeability of injury by shock, and endorsed it. It added that it had not found it necessary to consider the rule of strict liability exemplified in Rylands v Fletcher.

Why does this case matter?

Students often reduce this case to a single slogan about foreseeability. The reasons contain more than one point, and an answer that uses the case should say which point it is relying on and keep what the Board said apart from what later courts have made of it.

Exam and application relevance

Separate three things in a problem: the damage that happened, the damage that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position could have foreseen at the time of the breach, and any other damage the same act caused. Then say how the Board’s reasons treat the relationship between them. Attribute the points to the Board, and say that this is not a High Court decision.

The Board did not set out criteria for deciding when damage is of a particular kind. Statute now governs the scope of liability for negligence in most Australian jurisdictions, so check whether civil liability legislation applies to the facts and, if it does, what it says before relying on the common law test alone.

Check your understanding

1. What finding did the trial judge make about what the appellants knew or could reasonably be expected to have known?

2. Which other damage did the trial judge find, and how did the Board say it would approach the question of liability for the fire damage in light of that finding?

3. Which earlier decision did the Full Court feel constrained to follow, and what did the Board say about whether it should still be regarded as good law?

4. What did the Board identify as the essential factor in determining liability, and what did it say foreseeability becomes?

5. What did the Board say about the proposition that foreseeability goes to culpability and not to compensation, and about the argument that a different position arises where the careless act has caused some foreseeable damage?

6. Which claim did the Board remit to the Full Court, and why?