The Wagon Mound (No 1)
The Wagon Mound (No 1) [1961] AC 388
Furnace oil escaped into a bay through the act of a shipping company’s employees and was set alight. The trial judge found the company could not reasonably have known that it would burn on water. Should it pay for the fire?
Affirmed by Wallace v Kam [2013] HCA 19
The Wagon Mound is a Privy Council decision, so its force in Australian law comes through the High Court’s treatment of it. In Wallace v Kam the joint reasons of French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ described as a limiting principle of the common law that the scope of liability in negligence normally does not extend beyond liability for harm the risk of which it was the duty of the negligent party to exercise reasonable care and skill to avoid, so that liability for breach of a duty to avoid foreseeable harm does not extend beyond harm that was foreseeable at the time of breach ([24]), citing The Wagon Mound with Mount Isa Mines v Pusey at 397-400. Wallace v Kam concerned the materialisation of one of two unwarned risks under s 5D of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) and did not decide a remoteness question.
What happened?
This appeal, Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd, reached the Privy Council from the NSW Supreme Court. The claim concerned fire damage; the trial judge found the appellants could not reasonably have known the spilled furnace oil might ignite on water. Oil also congealed on the respondents’ slip-ways, causing slight, uncompensated damage. The Full Court, applying Re Polemis, found for the respondents. What should the Board decide on appeal?
What did the Court decide?
The Privy Council allowed the appeal. The negligence claim failed, with costs. The nuisance claim went back to the NSW Full Court for its own decision.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
The Privy Council decided this case. Viscount Simonds delivered the Board’s judgment.
The Board held the old rule in Re Polemis is no longer good law. That rule made a negligent person liable for all direct consequences of an act, even unforeseeable ones.
The Board said this seemed unjust. A small act of negligence should not create liability for all consequences, however unforeseeable, just because they were “direct”.
Instead, the proper test is reasonable foreseeability. A person is responsible for consequences a reasonable person should have foreseen, not merely direct ones.
The Board also rejected a view from Weld-Blundell v Stephens, that foreseeability only affects culpability, not compensation. It called this idea “fundamentally false”.
Liability depends on the damage actually caused, not just the careless act itself. Foreseeability must be judged against the actual damage suffered, not hypothetical harm.
The Board also rejected the argument that foreseeable damage changes this test. Causing some foreseeable harm does not make unforeseeable harm automatically compensable too.
Why does this case matter?
Students often reduce this case to a single slogan about foreseeability. The reasons contain more than one point, and an answer that uses the case should say which point it is relying on and keep what the Board said apart from what later courts have made of it.