Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd
Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd [2005] HCA 15
A part-time employee repeatedly told her employer she could not do her workload in the time given, then became psychiatrically ill. Her complaints were about the work, never her health. Could the employer have foreseen the risk?
Qualified by legislation: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), from 6 December 2002
In New South Wales, Part 3 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 applies to any claim for damages for mental harm resulting from negligence, however the claim is brought, except civil liability excluded by s 3B (s 28). Section 32(1) provides that a defendant does not owe a duty of care to take care not to cause the plaintiff mental harm “unless the defendant ought to have foreseen that a person of normal fortitude might, in the circumstances of the case, suffer a recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care were not taken”, and s 32(4) provides that the section “does not require the court to disregard what the defendant knew or ought to have known about the fortitude of the plaintiff”. So for a claim within Part 3, the statute, not the common law position stated in this case, sets the duty test, and it is framed by reference to a person of normal fortitude. Part 3 was inserted in 2002 and so was already in force when this Western Australian appeal was decided in 2005.
What happened?
Mrs Koehler worked full-time as a sales representative for Cerebos (Australia) Ltd from November 1994 to April 1996 ([7]). In March 1996 she was retrenched and offered re-engagement from 29 April 1996 as a part-time merchandising representative working Monday to Wednesday, 24 hours a week ([8]). She accepted. On her first day she said at once that there was “no way” she could “do this in 24 hours” and was told to try it for a month ([9]). She complained orally and in writing on many occasions that she had too big an area, too many stores and very little time, and suggested removing stores from her list or working a fourth day ([10]). The employer took neither step ([10]). None of her complaints suggested that the difficulties were affecting her health ([10]).
On 2 October 1996 she went to her doctor with aches and pains, which she thought were caused by the physical demands of the job ([12]). She was diagnosed with a major depressive illness together with a fibromyalgia syndrome, and it was not disputed that she suffered a recognised psychiatric illness of which her work was a cause ([13]-[14]). Commissioner Greaves in the District Court of Western Australia found the workload excessive and that the employer needed no particular expertise to foresee a risk of injury to her, and gave judgment for her ([4], [16]). The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia (Malcolm CJ, McKechnie and Hasluck JJ) allowed the employer’s appeal ([5], [17]).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court dismissed Mrs Koehler’s appeal with costs. McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ gave joint reasons ([1]-[42]), and Callinan J gave separate reasons ([43]-[58]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
In the joint reasons of McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ, “the Court held that ‘normal fortitude’ was not a precondition to liability for negligently inflicting psychiatric injury” in Tame v New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd, and “That concept is not now to be reintroduced into the field of liability as between employer and employee” ([33]). “The central inquiry remains whether, in all the circumstances, the risk of a plaintiff ... sustaining a recognisable psychiatric illness was reasonably foreseeable, in the sense that the risk was not far fetched or fanciful” ([33]). “The duty which an employer owes is owed to each employee. The relevant duty of care is engaged if psychiatric injury to the particular employee is reasonably foreseeable” ([35]), which invites attention to the nature and extent of the work being done by the particular employee and the signs given by that employee ([35]).
The joint reasons held that the Full Court was right to conclude that a reasonable person in the employer’s position would not have foreseen the risk of psychiatric injury to the appellant ([26]), for two reasons: the appellant agreed to perform the duties that were a cause of her injury, and the employer had no reason to suspect that she was at risk of psychiatric injury ([27]). They attributed “only limited significance” to her agreement in this case ([28]) and found no indication, explicit or implicit, of any particular vulnerability: her many complaints were directed to whether the work could be done and none suggested that her health was at risk ([41]).
The employer, “entitled to assume, in the absence of evident signs warning of the possibility of psychiatric injury, that the employee considers that he or she is able to do the job” ([36]). They rejected the submission that the only question to be considered in such a claim is whether this kind of harm to this particular employee was reasonably foreseeable, because the content of the duty cannot be considered without taking account of the other obligations between the parties, including those under the contract of employment ([21]-[24]). They left open whether an employee’s agreement could be conclusive and the effect of a variation of duties ([37]-[40]).
Callinan J, in separate reasons, held that the appeal “must fail at the threshold, that is on the issue of foreseeability” ([55]): it was “far-fetched and not foreseeable that the appellant, a competent, seemingly well woman would suffer within six months of taking up a part-time position, a disabling psychiatric injury” ([55]). He said that foreseeability “is not to be assessed by reference to a notional person of normal fortitude, but on the basis of the impression created by, and the other overt or foreseeable sensitivities of the actual person affected” ([55]), and applied the foreseeability rule in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt as binding while questioning it ([54]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ
Read judgment: [33] (PDF p 13) (opens in a new tab), [35] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab)
These passages supply the employee-specific foreseeability test used to decide whether this employer should have anticipated psychiatric injury. The joint reasons adopt Tame and Annetts in rejecting normal fortitude as a precondition, then examine the work and the signs from this employee. This is part of the reasoning necessary to the finding of no reasonably foreseeable psychiatric injury, rather than a rule that stress at work alone establishes liability.
Proposition 2
Ratio · McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ
Read judgment: [26]–[28] (PDF p 11) (opens in a new tab), [36] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab), [40]–[41] (PDF p 15) (opens in a new tab)
The joint reasons dismiss the claim because psychiatric injury to this employee was not reasonably foreseeable. Her agreement to undertake the work had limited significance as evidence against an apparent risk, and her complaints gave no warning of danger to her psychiatric health. The assumption in paragraph 36 supports that conclusion in these circumstances; paragraph 40 expressly declines to treat her agreement as conclusive against her claim.
Obiter · McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ
Read judgment: [22]–[25] (PDF p 10) (opens in a new tab)
The wider instruction to examine contractual and other obligations when defining the duty, including the rejection of foreseeability as a complete account of every relevant consideration, goes beyond the ground needed to dismiss this appeal. Paragraph 25 expressly identifies reasonable foreseeability as determinative. This discussion guides the content of the duty in other cases; it does not establish a contractual defence that decided this one.
Classification unresolved · McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ
Read judgment: [37]–[40] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab)
The joint reasons reserve the possible consequences of varying contractual duties and questions about construction of the employment contract. They expressly find it unnecessary to decide whether agreement to the duties could be conclusive against the claim. These caveats limit the contractual discussion; they are not decided rules that an employee always accepts the risk of psychiatric injury by agreeing to work.
Proposition 3
Separate reasoning · Callinan J
Read judgment: [54]–[56] (PDF p 22) (opens in a new tab)
Callinan J concurs in dismissing the appeal through separate reasons. He applies Shirt as binding despite his doubts, then finds psychiatric injury to this employee unforeseeable, using her apparent health and the absence of observable symptoms. His assessment concerns the actual employee rather than a notional person of normal fortitude. Agreement in the result does not make his separate reasoning part of the four Justices’ joint reasons.
Obiter · Callinan J
Read judgment: [54] (PDF p 22) (opens in a new tab)
Callinan J’s criticism of Shirt and of the difficulty of distinguishing remote risks from far-fetched risks was unnecessary to the dismissal. Neither party challenged Shirt, and he expressly applied it as binding. The criticism therefore does not change the foreseeability test applied in deciding this appeal.
Why does this case matter?
Workplace stress problems often present an employee who complained loudly about the job and then became ill, and a student is tempted to treat the complaints and the illness as enough. Koehler is the High Court case against which that answer is tested.
Exam and application relevance
Identify what the employer knew before the illness, and from whom it knew it.
The statements at [33] and [35] were made about an employer’s duty to an employee, in a claim by the employee for psychiatric injury from work. Attribute each point to the Justices whose reasons it is in: the joint reasons and Callinan J’s reasons are separate sets.
The joint reasons’ reference to “evident signs” at [36] is not the whole of the law on an employer’s duty. In Kozarov v Victoria [2022] HCA 12 at [6], Kiefel CJ and Keane J said that the circumstances of a particular type of employment may be such that the work “is inherently and obviously dangerous to the psychiatric health of the employee”, and that in any such case “the employer is duty-bound to be proactive in the provision of measures to enable the work to be performed safely by the employee”.
Check your understanding
1. What did Mrs Koehler’s complaints to her employer concern, and what did none of them suggest ([10], [41])?
2. What did the joint reasons say Tame decided about normal fortitude, and where did they say it was not to be reintroduced ([33])?
3. What question did the joint reasons say invites attention to the nature and extent of the work and the signs given by the employee ([35])?
4. What two reasons did the joint reasons give for agreeing with the Full Court ([27])?
5. What did the joint reasons say about the submission that only one question need be considered ([23]-[24])?
6. How did Callinan J’s reasons reach the dismissal of the appeal ([55])?