Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd

High Court of Australia · 2005

TortsNegligence

Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd [2005] HCA 15

A part-time employee repeatedly told her employer she could not do her workload in the time given, then became psychiatrically ill. Her complaints were about the work, never her health. Could the employer have foreseen the risk?

Qualified by legislation: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), from 6 December 2002

In New South Wales, Part 3 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 applies to any claim for damages for mental harm resulting from negligence, however the claim is brought, except civil liability excluded by s 3B (s 28). Section 32(1) provides that a defendant does not owe a duty of care to take care not to cause the plaintiff mental harm “unless the defendant ought to have foreseen that a person of normal fortitude might, in the circumstances of the case, suffer a recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care were not taken”, and s 32(4) provides that the section “does not require the court to disregard what the defendant knew or ought to have known about the fortitude of the plaintiff”. So for a claim within Part 3, the statute, not the common law position stated in this case, sets the duty test, and it is framed by reference to a person of normal fortitude. Part 3 was inserted in 2002 and so was already in force when this Western Australian appeal was decided in 2005.

What happened?

Mrs Koehler worked full-time for Cerebos from 1994. In 1996 she was retrenched, then re-engaged part-time (three days, 24 hours), and accepted. She immediately said the role couldn’t be done in 24 hours, then repeatedly complained about workload, without ever linking this to her health. In October 1996 she was diagnosed with a psychiatric illness, work-caused. The District Court (WA) found for her; the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia allowed Cerebos’s appeal.

What did the Court decide?

The High Court dismissed Mrs Koehler’s appeal with costs. McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ gave joint reasons ([1]-[42]), and Callinan J gave separate reasons ([43]-[58]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The joint judges (McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ) said “normal fortitude” is not required for psychiatric injury claims generally. They said this idea should not return in employer-employee cases either.

The key question is whether psychiatric injury to the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable, not far-fetched or fanciful. This duty applies to each employee individually, based on their work and any signs they show.

The Full Court was right: a reasonable employer would not have foreseen this appellant’s psychiatric injury. The appellant had agreed to the duties, and nothing suggested she was at risk. Employers may assume employees can manage their job, absent warning signs.

The judges rejected the idea that foreseeability alone decides such claims. The employment contract’s other terms matter too. They left open whether an employee’s agreement is always conclusive.

Callinan J, separately, held the appeal failed at the foreseeability threshold. He found psychiatric injury in a seemingly well, competent appellant unforeseeable within six months.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ

Read judgment: [33] (PDF p 13) (opens in a new tab), [35] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab)

These passages supply the employee-specific foreseeability test used to decide whether this employer should have anticipated psychiatric injury. The joint reasons adopt Tame and Annetts in rejecting normal fortitude as a precondition, then examine the work and the signs from this employee. This is part of the reasoning necessary to the finding of no reasonably foreseeable psychiatric injury, rather than a rule that stress at work alone establishes liability.

Proposition 2

Ratio · McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ

Read judgment: [26]–[28] (PDF p 11) (opens in a new tab), [36] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab), [40]–[41] (PDF p 15) (opens in a new tab)

The joint reasons dismiss the claim because psychiatric injury to this employee was not reasonably foreseeable. Her agreement to undertake the work had limited significance as evidence against an apparent risk, and her complaints gave no warning of danger to her psychiatric health. The assumption in paragraph 36 supports that conclusion in these circumstances; paragraph 40 expressly declines to treat her agreement as conclusive against her claim.

Obiter · McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ

Read judgment: [22]–[25] (PDF p 10) (opens in a new tab)

The wider instruction to examine contractual and other obligations when defining the duty, including the rejection of foreseeability as a complete account of every relevant consideration, goes beyond the ground needed to dismiss this appeal. Paragraph 25 expressly identifies reasonable foreseeability as determinative. This discussion guides the content of the duty in other cases; it does not establish a contractual defence that decided this one.

Classification unresolved · McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ

Read judgment: [37]–[40] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab)

The joint reasons reserve the possible consequences of varying contractual duties and questions about construction of the employment contract. They expressly find it unnecessary to decide whether agreement to the duties could be conclusive against the claim. These caveats limit the contractual discussion; they are not decided rules that an employee always accepts the risk of psychiatric injury by agreeing to work.

Proposition 3

Separate reasoning · Callinan J

Read judgment: [54]–[56] (PDF p 22) (opens in a new tab)

Callinan J concurs in dismissing the appeal through separate reasons. He applies Shirt as binding despite his doubts, then finds psychiatric injury to this employee unforeseeable, using her apparent health and the absence of observable symptoms. His assessment concerns the actual employee rather than a notional person of normal fortitude. Agreement in the result does not make his separate reasoning part of the four Justices’ joint reasons.

Obiter · Callinan J

Read judgment: [54] (PDF p 22) (opens in a new tab)

Callinan J’s criticism of Shirt and of the difficulty of distinguishing remote risks from far-fetched risks was unnecessary to the dismissal. Neither party challenged Shirt, and he expressly applied it as binding. The criticism therefore does not change the foreseeability test applied in deciding this appeal.

Why does this case matter?

Workplace stress problems often present an employee who complained loudly about the job and then became ill, and a student is tempted to treat the complaints and the illness as enough. Koehler is the High Court case against which that answer is tested.

Exam and application relevance

Check what the employer knew before the illness, and its source.

The passage notes points at [33] and [35] come from two separate judgments: joint reasons, and Callinan J’s reasons.

Consider whether “evident signs” at [36] states the whole duty. Kiefel CJ and Keane J later discussed inherently dangerous work in Kozarov v Victoria.

Check your understanding

What did Mrs Koehler’s complaints to her employer concern?

Why did the joint reasons agree with the Full Court? How did Callinan J reach dismissal?

Consider how the parties’ other obligations affected the duty question.

A Quick Read uses simpler language and may leave out detail. The full case note is the complete statement.