Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey

High Court of Australia · 1970

TortsNegligence

Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383

An engineer helped a burned workmate down to an ambulance. Four weeks later he developed schizophrenia, a reaction an experienced psychiatrist had seen once in eighteen years. Could his employer be liable for an illness so rare?

Qualified by legislation: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)

In New South Wales, Part 3 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 applies to any claim for damages for mental harm resulting from negligence, however the claim is brought, except civil liability excluded by s 3B (s 28). Section 32(1) provides that a defendant does not owe a duty of care to take care not to cause the plaintiff mental harm “unless the defendant ought to have foreseen that a person of normal fortitude might, in the circumstances of the case, suffer a recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care were not taken”, and s 32(4) provides that the section “does not require the court to disregard what the defendant knew or ought to have known about the fortitude of the plaintiff”. So for a claim within Part 3, the duty test is the statute’s and it is framed by reference to a person of normal fortitude, which is the question Windeyer J and Walsh J left open at common law.

Clarified by Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd [2005] HCA 15

In the joint reasons of McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ in Koehler, a claim by an employee for psychiatric injury from her workload, the Court said at [33] that in Tame v New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd “the Court held that ‘normal fortitude’ was not a precondition to liability for negligently inflicting psychiatric injury”, that the concept “is not now to be reintroduced into the field of liability as between employer and employee”, and that the central inquiry “remains whether, in all the circumstances, the risk of a plaintiff ... sustaining a recognisable psychiatric illness was reasonably foreseeable, in the sense that the risk was not far fetched or fanciful”. That bears on the susceptibility question that Windeyer J and Walsh J did not decide here, and the statement was made in the employment context.

What happened?

Mr Pusey was an engineer employed in the powerhouse of Mount Isa Mines Ltd. Two electricians, Kuskopf and Docherty, were testing a switchboard with a multi-meter when a short circuit caused an electric arc and both were severely burned (at 387). Mr Pusey heard the noise, hastened to the scene, found Kuskopf badly burned, and helped him down to an ambulance (at 387). Docherty died the day after the incident and Kuskopf about nine days later (at 387). Mr Pusey worked for about four weeks without apparent consequence and then developed a serious mental disturbance, described in the medical evidence as schizophrenia (at 387).

The trial judge, Skerman J, found that the company was in breach of its duty as an employer in failing to instruct the electricians in the proper use of the multi-meter, and gave Mr Pusey judgment for $10,000 (at 388, 392). He did not find that the specific psychological reaction was itself foreseeable (at 388). An experienced psychiatrist had seen only one other case like it in eighteen years of practice but said that a reaction of this kind was not “unexpected” (at 390). The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland dismissed the company’s appeal (at 387).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court dismissed the appeal with costs. Barwick CJ, McTiernan J, Menzies J, Windeyer J and Walsh J each gave separate reasons, and there were no joint reasons.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Barwick CJ, “[a]ccepting for the purposes of this case that liability is all one question depending solely on foreseeability” (at 390), said that “the rarity of such an injury in the circumstances does not in my opinion deny the foreseeability of an injury of the class of which it forms one”, and that “it is sufficient that the class of injury as distinct from the particular injury ought to be foreseen as a possible consequence of particular conduct in order to establish liability for damages for the particular injury” (at 390). He said that the appellant’s point that the respondent’s own make-up contributed to the disturbance “is clearly no answer to the respondent’s claim for damages” (at 390). He found no need to discuss the implications of The Wagon Mound (No 1) (at 389).

Windeyer J described reasonable foreseeability, since The Wagon Mound (No 1), as “a single test for both the existence of liability in negligence and the extent of recoverable damage” (at 396-397). “Foreseeability does not mean foresight of the particular course of events causing the harm. Nor does it suppose foresight of the particular harm which occurred, but only of some harm of a like kind”, an approach which “leaves the criterion for classification of kinds or types of harm undefined and at large” (at 401-402).

He said that “Liability for nervous shock depends on foreseeability of nervous shock”, describing that as a “fixed and definite line”, and that “The particular pathological condition which the shock produced need not have been foreseeable. It is enough that it is a ‘recognizable psychiatric illness’” (at 402-403). “[R]easonable foreseeability is not measured by statistical probability”; the question was “whether there was a real risk that a foreseeable accident such as occurred would cause a man in the powerhouse to suffer a nervous shock having lasting mental consequences” (at 403).

He confined his reasons to “only one kind of occurrence causing nervous shock”, a plaintiff employee in a factory seeing at the scene of an accident the consequences for another man (at 407).

Walsh J said that “it is not a condition of liability that either the precise character of the damage or the extent of it should have been foreseen. It is necessary only that the damage suffered should not be different in kind from that which was foreseeable” (at 414). Accepting the statement in The Wagon Mound (No 1) that the test of liability for shock is foreseeability of injury by shock, he said that “all forms of mental or psychological disorder which are capable of resulting from shock are to be regarded as being, for the purposes of the foreseeability test of liability, damage of the same kind” (at 414).

The case required “the general test of reasonable foresight” and no special rule limiting liability for nervous shock (at 415-416), and there was no rule of law that the plaintiff must be a close relative of the person injured (at 417).

McTiernan J said that “it was not necessary in order to hold the appellant liable that, as a prudent employer, he should foresee” the precise damage that would occur (at 392). Menzies J decided the case “upon the minor premise”, the appellant’s contention that the risk of the plaintiff’s schizophrenia was not of a kind a reasonable employer would have foreseen, and, finding no sufficient ground for differing from the trial judge’s findings, held that the appeal should be dismissed (at 392-393).

Windeyer J said that “it is still for us the law that a tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him” in relation to physical harm (at 406), but that whether nervous shock caused to a person prone to such shock is compensable when a similar occurrence harming a “normal” person would be “should remain for us an open question” (at 405). As at present advised he was “not convinced that a defendant in cases of this sort can escape liability simply by shewing that, unknown to him, a person who suffered harm was easily harmed” (at 406). Walsh J said that on the findings made it was “not necessary to consider whether liability for nervous shock is limited to cases in which the plaintiff had no unusual susceptibility to shock or had an unusual susceptibility which was known or ought to be known to the defendant” (at 417).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Barwick CJ

Read judgment: pp 389–390 (opens in a new tab)

On the foreseeability basis accepted for this appeal, the foreseeable class of mental disturbance was sufficient although the particular illness was rare. This reasoning answered the employer’s challenge and sustained the damages award. His rejection of the argument about Pusey’s make-up answered the remaining causation submission; it did not resolve every question about unusually susceptible plaintiffs.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Windeyer J

Read judgment: pp 401–403 (opens in a new tab), p 407 (opens in a new tab)

Windeyer J needed to identify the foreseeable kind of harm to uphold liability for this rare psychiatric illness. He required a real risk of nervous shock with lasting mental consequences, rather than foresight of the particular diagnosis or its statistical likelihood. This is the ground applied to an employee witnessing the aftermath of an industrial accident, the setting to which he expressly confined his reasons.

Proposition 3

Ratio · Walsh J

Read judgment: pp 413–417 (opens in a new tab)

Walsh J upheld the finding of foreseeable psychiatric injury by treating disorders resulting from shock as damage of the same kind, without requiring foresight of the precise illness or extent. He also rejected a special restriction requiring close kinship, because Pusey was not a relative. These steps supported his dismissal of the appeal. He adopted the general reasonable-foresight approach expressed by Burbury CJ in Storm v Geeves and applied it to these facts.

Proposition 4

Ratio · McTiernan J

Read judgment: pp 391–392 (opens in a new tab)

McTiernan J held that the shock fell within reasonable foreseeability and rejected the contention that the rarity of the schizophrenic reaction defeated liability. Foresight of the precise damage was unnecessary to his decision to dismiss the appeal.

Separate reasoning · Menzies J

Read judgment: pp 392–393 (opens in a new tab)

Menzies J concurred in dismissing the appeal by rejecting the employer’s factual minor premise: he found no sufficient ground to disturb the trial judge’s findings that the shock and resulting illness were of a foreseeable kind. He expressly left the comprehensiveness of the employer’s proposed duty formulation unexamined. The trial findings reproduced on page 393 are Skerman J’s words, accepted by Menzies J, rather than a joint judgment.

Proposition 5

Obiter · Windeyer J

Read judgment: pp 405–406 (opens in a new tab)

Windeyer J expressly said that the susceptibility issue did not arise because Pusey was not shown to have been unusually prone to shock. His doubts about denying recovery to an unusually susceptible person, including the analogy with the physical egg-shell-skull rule, were therefore unnecessary observations. He reserved the question rather than deciding that the physical-injury rule governed psychiatric injury.

Classification unresolved · Walsh J

Read judgment: p 417 (opens in a new tab)

Walsh J expressly found it unnecessary on the trial findings to decide whether recovery required ordinary susceptibility or knowledge of unusual susceptibility. This passage records a reservation, not a holding imposing or rejecting such a condition.

Why does this case matter?

Problems about psychiatric injury after witnessing an accident often stress how rare or severe the plaintiff’s illness was, and this is the usual High Court starting point on that.

Exam and application relevance

Attribute each statement to the Justice who made it, and say which Justice’s reasons you are using.

Windeyer J expressly limited his reasons to the kind of occurrence before the Court (at 407), so apply them with the facts of that occurrence in view: an employee at his place of work, at the scene of an industrial accident.

The case was decided at common law in Queensland in 1970. Whether a statute governs the duty of care for mental harm in the jurisdiction you are answering on depends on that statute’s own terms.

Check your understanding

1. What did the trial judge find, and what did he not find, about the foreseeability of the psychological reaction (at 388)?

2. What did Barwick CJ say about the rarity of the plaintiff’s illness (at 390)?

3. What did Windeyer J say foreseeability does not mean, and what difficulty did he identify (at 401-402)?

4. According to Walsh J, what is it necessary to show about the kind of damage, and what did he say about all mental or psychological disorders capable of resulting from shock (at 414)?

5. Which question did Windeyer J and Walsh J leave open (at 405-406, 417)?

6. On what footing did Menzies J decide the case (at 392-393)?