Tame v New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd

High Court of Australia · 2002

TortsNegligence

Tame v New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (2002) 211 CLR 317

One plaintiff became ill after learning of a police clerical error about her. Two others were told by telephone that their son was missing, and months later that he had died in the desert. Which of them could be owed a duty of care?

Qualified by legislation: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) ss 5A, 5D, 28, 32

In New South Wales, Part 3 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 applies to any claim for damages for mental harm resulting from negligence, however the claim is brought, except civil liability excluded by s 3B (s 28). Section 32(1) provides that a defendant does not owe a duty of care to take care not to cause the plaintiff mental harm “unless the defendant ought to have foreseen that a person of normal fortitude might, in the circumstances of the case, suffer a recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care were not taken”, and s 32(4) provides that the section “does not require the court to disregard what the defendant knew or ought to have known about the fortitude of the plaintiff”. So for a claim within Part 3, the statute, not the common law position stated in this case, sets the duty test, and it is framed by reference to a person of normal fortitude.

Clarified by Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd [2005] HCA 15

In the joint reasons of McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ in Koehler, a claim by an employee for psychiatric injury from her workload, the Court said at [33] that in Tame “the Court held that ‘normal fortitude’ was not a precondition to liability for negligently inflicting psychiatric injury”, that the concept “is not now to be reintroduced into the field of liability as between employer and employee”, and that the central inquiry “remains whether, in all the circumstances, the risk of a plaintiff ... sustaining a recognisable psychiatric illness was reasonably foreseeable, in the sense that the risk was not far fetched or fanciful”. Two of those Justices, McHugh and Hayne JJ, had been among the three in Tame who would have kept normal fortitude as a limit. So at common law, cite Koehler at [33] for the proposition that Tame decided this.

Qualified by legislation: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)

In New South Wales, for a claim within Part 3 of the Civil Liability Act 2002, the matters this case rejected as preconditions return in two different forms. Under s 32(2), in a case of pure mental harm the circumstances relevant to the statutory duty test include whether the harm was suffered as the result of a sudden shock, whether the plaintiff witnessed at the scene a person being killed, injured or put in peril, the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and any such person, and whether there was a pre-existing relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant: circumstances to weigh, not conditions. Section 30 goes further for pure mental harm arising wholly or partly from mental or nervous shock in connection with another person being killed, injured or put in peril by the defendant’s act or omission: the plaintiff “is not entitled to recover damages for pure mental harm unless” the plaintiff “witnessed, at the scene, the victim being killed, injured or put in peril” or “is a close member of the family of the victim”, a term s 30(5) defines (parents and others with parental responsibility, spouses and partners, children, stepchildren and others for whom the victim has parental responsibility, and siblings, half-siblings and step-siblings). So in such a claim, a plaintiff who is not a close family member must have witnessed the event at the scene.

What happened?

The Court heard two cases together, both about psychiatric harm alleged to have been negligently caused independently of any physical injury ([1]).

Tame. On 11 January 1991 Clare Tame’s car collided with one driven by Mr Lavender, who was clearly at fault; his blood alcohol reading was 0.14 and hers was nil ([151]). In February 1991 Acting Sergeant Beardsley, completing the police accident report, mistakenly recorded both drivers’ readings as 0.14; he noticed and corrected the error by late March 1991 ([152]), but the insurer handling her claim, which admitted liability in June 1991, obtained a copy in its uncorrected form ([21], [83], [153]).

In June 1992 her solicitor asked whether she had been drinking and told her what the copy said. She telephoned the police and was told it was a mistake, and in early 1993 the Police Service apologised formally and confirmed the correction. She became obsessed with the error, and in 1995 a psychiatrist diagnosed psychotic depressive illness ([154]-[155]). Garling DCJ in the District Court awarded her $115,692 against the State; the Court of Appeal allowed the State’s appeal unanimously ([156]-[157]).

Annetts. In August 1986 James Annetts, aged 16, left his parents’ home in New South Wales to work as a jackaroo for the respondent at Flora Valley station in the Kimberley. Before he left, his mother telephoned the station manager’s wife and was told he would work under constant supervision and be well looked after ([160]). On 13 October 1986 he was sent to work alone as caretaker of another station about 100 kilometres away. On 6 December a police officer telephoned Mr Annetts to say that James was missing, apparently having run away, and Mr Annetts collapsed ([161]).

The parents were later shown James’s belongings, including a hat covered in blood, and in April 1987 Mr Annetts was told by telephone that James’s vehicle and two sets of remains had been found; he identified James from a photograph of a skeleton ([162]). James had died in the Gibson Desert on or about 4 December 1986 of dehydration, exhaustion and hypothermia ([162]). On a preliminary issue tried on assumed facts, Heenan J held that the respondent owed the parents no duty of care to avoid psychiatric injury, and the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia dismissed their appeal ([159], [165]-[166]).

What did the Court decide?

Seven Justices gave six sets of reasons, Gummow and Kirby JJ writing jointly, and all seven agreed in both results. Mrs Tame’s appeal was dismissed with costs. In Annetts, special leave was granted, the appeal was allowed, the preliminary question was answered “Yes”, and the respondent was ordered to pay the parents’ costs at first instance, in the Full Court and in the High Court ([242]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Four of the seven Justices held that normal fortitude is not a separate precondition of liability for negligently inflicted psychiatric harm. Gummow and Kirby JJ: “it does not follow that it is a pre-condition to recovery in any action for negligently inflicted psychiatric harm that the plaintiff be a person of ‘normal’ emotional or psychological fortitude or, if peculiarly susceptible, that the defendant know or ought to have known of that susceptibility” ([199]); the concept “should not distract attention from the central inquiry, which is whether, in all the circumstances, the risk of the plaintiff sustaining a recognisable psychiatric illness was reasonably foreseeable, in the sense that the risk was not far-fetched or fanciful”, and “Where the plaintiff’s response to the defendant’s conduct is so extreme or idiosyncratic as to render the risk of that response far-fetched or fanciful, the law does not require the defendant to guard against it” ([201]).

Gleeson CJ said that “normal fortitude” “cannot be regarded as a separate and definitive test of liability”, while the idea it expresses “is valid and remains relevant” ([16]). Gaudron J said it “is not and cannot be the sole criterion of foreseeability”, though ordinarily it “will be a convenient means of determining whether a risk of psychiatric injury is foreseeable” ([62]). McHugh J ([118]), Hayne J ([273]) and Callinan J ([334]) would each have retained normal, or reasonable or ordinary, fortitude as a limit on the duty, subject to qualifications for a defendant’s knowledge or a pre-existing relationship.

Five Justices held that the common law of Australia does not make a sudden shock, or direct perception of a distressing event or its immediate aftermath, a precondition of liability for negligently inflicted psychiatric harm. Gleeson CJ: “I agree with Gummow and Kirby JJ that the common law of Australia should not, and does not, limit liability for damages for psychiatric injury to cases where the injury is caused by a sudden shock, or to cases where a plaintiff has directly perceived a distressing phenomenon or its immediate aftermath” ([18]).

Gummow and Kirby JJ held that “the common law of Australia recognises neither” of those requirements “as pre-conditions to the recovery of damages for negligently inflicted psychiatric harm” ([189]; see [213], [225]). Gaudron J held that the direct perception rule “is not and cannot be determinative” of who may claim ([51]) and that no aspect of the law of negligence makes sudden shock critical to duty or to foreseeability ([66]). Hayne J held that rules requiring “direct impact of events upon the senses of the plaintiff, must likewise be discarded” ([267]), and that a shocking event and closeness of connection “are not ordinarily to be regarded as additional elements confining the class of persons to whom a duty of care to avoid psychiatric injury is owed” ([275]). McHugh J found it unnecessary to decide whether sudden shock must be proved ([72]); Callinan J would have retained both requirements, in a qualified form ([363]-[366]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Gummow and Kirby JJ

Read judgment: [199] (PDF p 70) (opens in a new tab), [201] (PDF p 71) (opens in a new tab), [232]–[233] (PDF p 85) (opens in a new tab)

This is the foreseeability reasoning applied to dismiss Mrs Tame’s appeal. Their Honours rejected normal fortitude as an independent bar, but held that her extreme reaction to the corrected clerical error was a far-fetched or fanciful risk. Removing the separate precondition therefore did not establish liability: the psychiatric illness still had to be reasonably foreseeable in all the circumstances.

Separate reasoning · McHugh J

Read judgment: [118]–[120] (PDF p 42) (opens in a new tab)

McHugh J concurred in dismissing Mrs Tame’s appeal by a different route on normal fortitude. He retained that standard where duty turns on foreseeability, held that the trial judge had used the wrong standard by referring to a vulnerable personality, and concluded that psychiatric injury to a person of normal fortitude was not reasonably foreseeable. Agreement in the result did not amount to agreement with the rejection of a separate normal-fortitude limit.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Gummow and Kirby JJ

Read judgment: [213] (PDF p 77) (opens in a new tab), [225] (PDF p 82) (opens in a new tab), [236] (PDF p 86) (opens in a new tab)

Rejecting sudden shock and direct perception as preconditions was part of their stated ground for allowing the Annetts appeal. At paragraph 236 they applied those conclusions to hold that neither the parents’ absence from their son’s death and its immediate aftermath nor the possible absence of sudden shock defeated the duty claim on the assumed facts. Distance and means of communication could still bear on foreseeability, causation and remoteness; the decision on the preliminary issue did not finally establish every element of liability.

Separate reasoning · Callinan J

Read judgment: [363]–[364] (PDF p 131) (opens in a new tab), [365]–[366] (PDF p 132) (opens in a new tab)

Callinan J concurred in allowing the Annetts appeal while retaining qualified shock and perception requirements. He adopted Brennan J’s definition of shock, treated the successive communications and viewing as capable of satisfying it, and allowed direct perception to include practicable communication to a person in a special bilateral relationship before a settled state of mind had been reached. His route was satisfaction of qualified requirements, rather than their rejection as preconditions.

Why does this case matter?

It is a leading High Court authority on negligently inflicted psychiatric harm at common law, and problem questions are often built on facts like those in Annetts: news received by telephone, an illness that developed over months, a plaintiff far from the event. Those facts cannot be dealt with properly without it.

The case also shows the limits of a claim for psychiatric harm, because Mrs Tame’s claim still failed. The Justices variously held that the risk of psychiatric illness to her was not reasonably foreseeable ([29], [120], [233], [300], [331]), or that a police officer completing an accident report owed her no such duty ([23]-[27], [55]-[57], [298]-[299]), and three of them pointed to the law of defamation as the more coherent home for a complaint about what others had been told ([28], [58], [122]-[123]).

Exam and application relevance

Identify the jurisdiction first. In New South Wales a claim for mental harm resulting from negligence falls within Part 3 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), unless the liability is excluded by s 3B, and Part 3 sets its own duty test and its own limits on recovery for pure mental harm. Outside New South Wales, read the civil liability statute of the jurisdiction you are answering on for its mental harm provisions before relying on the common law in this case.

At common law, sort the facts into those that bear on the relationship between the parties and those that bear on what a reasonable person in the defendant’s position could foresee. In Annetts the relationship facts included the parents’ inquiries about James’s safety and the assurances they were given; in Tame the foreseeability facts included the obviousness of the error, its prompt correction and the apology ([232]-[233]).

Check that the harm claimed is a recognisable psychiatric illness. Gummow and Kirby JJ said that “Grief and sorrow are among the ‘ordinary and inevitable incidents of life’”, and that fright, distress or embarrassment without more will not ground an action in negligence ([193]).

Where a defendant is the person who conveyed bad news, note Gummow and Kirby JJ’s view that, absent a malign intention, no action lies against the bearer of bad news for the manner in which it is conveyed, and that “There can be no legal duty to break bad news gently” ([228]).

Check your understanding

1. How did Mrs Tame learn of the error in the police report, and what had happened to the error by then ([152]-[155])?

2. What had the respondent told the Annetts parents before James left home, and how did they learn of his disappearance and death ([160]-[162])?

3. Which four Justices rejected normal fortitude as a separate precondition of liability, and how did Gleeson CJ and Gaudron J each describe the role it still plays ([16], [62])?

4. Which Justices held that sudden shock and direct perception are not preconditions of liability, what did McHugh J decide on sudden shock, and what was Callinan J’s position ([18], [72], [363]-[366])?

5. In what different ways did the Justices explain why Mrs Tame’s claim failed?