Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs
Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1
Two days before a court was to hear their applications for release, Parliament passed a law requiring the Executive to hold a group of boat arrivals in custody, and directing the courts not to order their release. Could it?
Affirmed by NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 37
In NZYQ the High Court, in reasons given jointly by Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ, treated three statements of background principle in Lim as authoritative: that the Executive may detain an alien only under valid statutory authority, that exceptional cases aside the involuntary detention of a citizen by the State is penal or punitive, and that the relevant difference for an alien lies in vulnerability to exclusion or deportation ([27]-[29]). It said that, although Lim’s statement of principle referred to a citizen, the principle has been held to apply to an alien whose status, rights and immunities differ ([28]). It applied the Lim criterion, that detention must be limited to what is reasonably capable of being seen as necessary for the purposes of deportation or of enabling an entry application to be made and considered ([30]), to hold that the constitutional holding in Al-Kateb must be overruled where there is no real prospect of removal becoming practicable in the reasonably foreseeable future ([44]-[45]); Edelman J reached that conclusion by a slightly different approach ([43], [51]).
What happened?
Chu Kheng Lim and 35 other Cambodian nationals were the plaintiffs. All but one, a child born in Australia, had arrived by boat in Australian territorial waters, the first group on or about 27 November 1989 and the second on or about 31 March 1990. None had entered with an entry permit, each had been detained in custody since arrival, and each applied to the Minister for refugee status. Delegates refused the applications in April 1992. On 15 April 1992 the Federal Court set the refusals aside and referred the matters back for reconsideration, and adjourned the plaintiffs’ applications for release from custody to a hearing starting on 7 May 1992 (agreed facts in the case stated).
On 5 May 1992, two days before that hearing, Parliament passed the Migration Amendment Act 1992 (Cth), which inserted Division 4B into the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). It applied to “designated persons”: non-citizens who had been on a boat in the territorial sea after 19 November 1989 and before 1 December 1992, had not presented a visa, were in Australia, had not been granted an entry permit and had been given a designation by the Department, and it also included a non-citizen born in Australia whose mother was a designated person.
Section 54L required a designated person to be kept in custody and released “if, and only if” removed from Australia under s 54P or given an entry permit. Section 54N authorised an officer to detain a designated person without warrant, including one whose release a court had ordered before the commencement of the Division. Section 54P(1) required an officer to remove a designated person as soon as practicable if the person asked the Minister in writing to be removed, and s 54Q limited the application of ss 54L and 54P to 273 days in application custody. Section 54R provided: “A court is not to order the release from custody of a designated person.”
The defendants relied only on s 88 of the Act to justify the plaintiffs’ custody before Division 4B. The joint reasons held that the custody s 88 authorised was temporary and ended when the vessels on which the plaintiffs arrived, which had been burned, could no longer depart, so that each plaintiff was unlawfully held when Division 4B commenced. Toohey J likewise held that no sub-section of s 88 authorised the custody. Mason CJ stated a case for the Full Court on 26 June 1992.
What did the Court decide?
Seven Justices sat and gave five sets of reasons: Mason CJ; Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ jointly; Toohey J; Gaudron J; and McHugh J. The case stated asked whether ss 54L, 54N or 54R were invalid in respect of the plaintiffs’ applications for release from custody and, if so, whether the defendants were under a legal duty to decide those applications having regard to the Refugee Convention and Protocol and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The Court answered the first question: ss 54L and 54N are valid; s 54R is invalid. The second question did not arise.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
Executive detention and Chapter III. The joint reasons of Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ held that some functions “have become established as essentially and exclusively judicial in character”, the most important being “the adjudgment and punishment of criminal guilt under a law of the Commonwealth”, so that Chapter III precludes the enactment of any law purporting to vest any part of that function in the Commonwealth Executive. The Constitution is concerned with substance and not form: Parliament could not invest the Executive with an arbitrary power to detain citizens even if the power were conferred in terms that divorced the detention from punishment and guilt, because, exceptional cases aside, “the involuntary detention of a citizen in custody by the State is penal or punitive in character” and exists only as an incident of the exclusively judicial function.
The qualifications they identified were the arrest and detention under executive warrant of a person accused of crime to ensure that the person is available to be dealt with by the courts, which is ordinarily subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts including the jurisdiction to admit to bail, and involuntary detention in cases of mental illness or infectious disease.
Aliens. An alien stands differently, because of the alien’s vulnerability to exclusion or deportation, which significantly diminishes the protection Chapter III gives a citizen against imprisonment otherwise than by judicial process. The joint reasons held that authority to detain an alien in custody for the purposes of expulsion or deportation, or of receiving, investigating and determining an application for an entry permit and then admitting or deporting, is an incident of those executive powers, is neither punitive nor part of the judicial power, and can be conferred on the Executive without infringing Chapter III.
Sections 54L and 54N would be valid if the detention they required and authorised was limited to what was “reasonably capable of being seen as necessary for the purposes of deportation or necessary to enable an application for an entry permit to be made and considered”; otherwise it would be punitive and contravene Chapter III. They held that limit satisfied, because of the time limits in ss 54P and 54Q and especially because s 54P(1) allowed a designated person to end detention at any time by asking in writing to be removed. Mason CJ, Toohey J, Gaudron J and McHugh J also held ss 54L and 54N valid.
Section 54R. Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ held that s 54R, which directed courts not to order the release from custody of a designated person, was invalid. A law directing in unqualified terms that no court, including the High Court, shall order the release from custody of a person whom the Executive has imprisoned purports to derogate from the High Court’s directly vested jurisdiction under s 75(iii) and (v) and to remove ultra vires acts of the Executive from the Court’s control. As to other courts, it is one thing for Parliament to grant or withhold jurisdiction and another “to direct the courts as to the manner and outcome of the exercise of their jurisdiction”, which Chapter III vests exclusively in the courts it designates. Section 54R could not be read down without a complete reformulation of its terms, and it was severable from the rest of Division 4B.
Gaudron J agreed that s 54R was invalid. Mason CJ, Toohey J and McHugh J would each have read s 54R as directed only to a designated person lawfully held in custody under Division 4B, so read it did not interfere with the judicial power, and held it valid, so that the Court divided four to three on s 54R. The joint reasons did not decide whether s 54U, which made a Departmental officer’s statement conclusive evidence that a person had been designated, was invalid, observing that it was strongly arguable that the considerations leading to the invalidity of s 54R applied to it, but declining to express a concluded view in the absence of specific argument.
Gaudron J and McHugh J. Gaudron J, in general agreement with the joint reasons, differed on two matters. She considered that “alien” in s 51(xix) is not controlled by statutory citizenship, so that ss 54L and 54N, which applied to any “non-citizen” meeting the definition of a designated person, could be supported as laws with respect to aliens only to the extent that they applied to persons who entered Australia unlawfully or whose entry would have been unlawful but for executive intervention, and to children born to such persons, and only so long as “non-citizen” in s 54K remains synonymous with the constitutional meaning of alien.
And she was not persuaded that legislation authorising detention in circumstances involving no breach of the criminal law and going beyond the accepted categories is “necessarily and inevitably offensive to Ch.III”. McHugh J held that Division 4B, in its ordinary operation, was not an exercise of judicial power and was not a Bill of Pains and Penalties, because its object was not to punish but to keep the persons concerned under supervision and control until their claims were determined; detention that went beyond what was reasonably necessary to achieve that non-punitive object would, he said, be regarded as punitive.
Why does this case matter?
Students who meet a detention statute often answer from one of two slogans: executive detention is lawful whenever Parliament has authorised it, or unlawful whenever a court has not ordered it. An examiner rewards the student who sees that neither slogan is the question, and who takes account of what was pending in the courts when Parliament acted.
Exam and application relevance
In a problem about statutory detention by the Executive, identify the person detained, the purpose the statute gives for the detention, the limits the statute places on its length, and whether the detained person can end it. Treat any provision that addresses what courts may do with an application for release as a separate question from the validity of the detention itself.
State whose reasoning each point is, the joint reasons or the separate reasons of Mason CJ, Toohey J, Gaudron J or McHugh J. The High Court has since applied the principle in this decision to other detention schemes, including in NZYQ [2023] HCA 37; a problem about a scheme other than Division 4B should take account of those later applications.
Check your understanding
1. Which function did the joint reasons identify as the most important of those established as essentially and exclusively judicial, and what did they say Chapter III precludes in relation to it?
2. What qualifications did the joint reasons identify to the proposition that involuntary detention of a citizen by the State is punitive?
3. What test did the joint reasons state for the validity of ss 54L and 54N, and which feature of s 54P(1) did they rely on in holding the test satisfied?
4. Which Justices held s 54R invalid and which would have read it down, and what did Mason CJ understand it to direct the courts not to do?