The judicial power of the Commonwealth
How Chapter III of the Constitution identifies the judicial power of the Commonwealth, and why s 71 permits that power to be vested only in the High Court, a federal court created by the Parliament, or a court invested with federal jurisdiction.
Learning outcomes
- Decide whether a function conferred by a Commonwealth law is an exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth, using the controversy and binding-determination features of Griffith CJ’s definition.
- Apply s 71 of the Constitution to identify the bodies in which that power may be vested, and s 72 to the terms on which the judges of those courts must hold office.
- Explain why the enforceability of a determination can be decisive, and why a right of review in a court may not answer the objection.
- State the adjudgment and punishment of criminal guilt as an exclusively judicial function, with the qualifications Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ attached to it.
Chapter III of the Constitution deals with the courts, and most questions under it turn on a prior question: is the power in issue the judicial power of the Commonwealth? If it is, s 71 fixes the bodies in which it may be vested, and the list is short. If it is not, the Parliament may confer the function on a Minister, an officer or a tribunal. This article states Commonwealth law and covers the first of Chapter III’s vesting rules: where judicial power may go.
What “judicial power” means
The Constitution does not define the phrase. The starting point is the definition Griffith CJ gave in Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 3302: judicial power is the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property, and its exercise does not begin until a tribunal with power to give a binding and authoritative decision is called on to take action. Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ quoted and applied that passage in Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245.5
Two features do the work: a controversy about existing rights and liabilities rather than a question of what the rules ought to be in future, and a decision that is binding and authoritative on the parties. Dixon CJ and McTiernan J put the first at its narrowest in R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353 at 369 — the ascertainment of existing rights by the judicial determination of issues of fact or law falls exclusively within judicial power, so the Parliament cannot confide that function to any person or body but a court constituted under ss 71 and 72.4
Who may exercise it: sections 71 and 72
Section 71 vests the judicial power of the Commonwealth in the High Court of Australia, in such other federal courts as the Parliament creates, and in such other courts as it invests with federal jurisdiction.1 Those three classes are known as Chapter III courts, and Griffith CJ read s 71 as leaving the Parliament no power to entrust the exercise of judicial power to any other hands.
Davison shows how unforgiving that is. A sequestration order made by a deputy registrar in bankruptcy was void, Dixon CJ and McTiernan J holding that such an order could not be made except by a court constituted in conformity with ss 71 and 72. Fullagar, Kitto and Taylor JJ agreed in the result in separate reasons; Webb J would have upheld the provisions.
Section 72 is why the vesting rule has teeth: it requires the Justices of the High Court and of the other courts created by the Parliament to be appointed by the Governor-General in Council, to be removable by the Governor-General in Council only on an address from both Houses of the Parliament in the same session for proved misbehaviour or incapacity, and to receive remuneration that may not be diminished in office. In Waterside Workers’ Federation of Australia v J W Alexander Ltd (1918) 25 CLR 434 the President of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration held office for seven years; Isaacs and Rich JJ held the provisions conferring power to enforce awards invalid for that reason, the arbitral provisions being severable, and the bench of seven divided four to three.3 Those reasons applied s 72 as it then stood, requiring tenure for life; the section was later altered by the Constitution Alteration (Retirement of Judges) 1977 and now fixes the term by a maximum age (seventy years for a Justice of the High Court).
The hallmark: a binding and enforceable determination
Brandy is the modern illustration. The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission could determine a racial discrimination complaint, and on registration in the Federal Court the determination had effect as if it were an order of that Court. Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ held that the provisions which combined to make a determination binding, authoritative and enforceable invalidly purported to invest judicial power in the Commission. Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ reached the same conclusion in separate joint reasons, and the Court was unanimous in the result.
Enforceability can be decisive: those Justices observed that a tribunal’s power to enforce its own orders has sometimes been seen as an essential element in the exercise of judicial power. Nor does a right of review in a court necessarily answer the objection, because they concluded that the Federal Court’s jurisdiction to review a determination did not provide a sufficient answer.
Functions that are exclusively judicial, and functions that are not
Most functions take their character from their setting. Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ said in Brandy that many decision-making functions take their character from their legislative setting, the decision-maker and the process, but that some are exclusive and inalienable exercises of judicial power.
The clearest member of the exclusive class is the adjudgment and punishment of criminal guilt. In Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ said that some functions have become established as essentially and exclusively judicial in character, the most important being the adjudgment and punishment of criminal guilt under a law of the Commonwealth, and that Chapter III therefore precludes a law vesting any part of that function in the Commonwealth Executive.6 Those Justices treated involuntary detention by the State as penal or punitive and, exceptional cases aside, as an incident of that exclusively judicial function.
The qualifications they stated usually decide a problem. Arrest and detention under executive warrant of a person accused of crime, to ensure the person is available to be dealt with by the courts, is not seen by the law as punitive or as appertaining exclusively to judicial power, and involuntary detention for mental illness or infectious disease can legitimately be seen as non-punitive. Those passages are the reasons of three Justices of a bench of seven that delivered five sets of reasons, and the Court divided four to three on the provision in issue. Later High Court decisions on particular detention schemes are not cited here.
The rest of Chapter III, and where it is stated
Section 71 is one rule of several. The second Chapter III vesting rule — that a federal court created under Chapter III may not be given functions foreign to judicial power — the persona designata exception to it, the limb that constrains State legislatures because s 77(iii) permits federal jurisdiction to be invested in courts of the States, and the entrenched supervisory jurisdiction of State Supreme Courts are stated in Chapter III and state courts.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify the function the statute confers, in the statute’s own words, and ask whether it ascertains existing rights and liabilities or makes rules for the future, using the formulation of Dixon CJ and McTiernan J in Davison. Name the rights.
- Ask whether the decision binds the parties and whether it is enforceable; on Brandy, a right of review does not necessarily answer the objection.
- Test the body on which the function is conferred against the three classes in s 71; for the High Court and the other courts created by the Parliament, also test the office against s 72 as it now reads.
- Where the function is the adjudgment or punishment of criminal guilt under a Commonwealth law, attribute the proposition to Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ in Lim and apply the qualifications those Justices stated, rather than asserting that all detention is punishment.
- If the law in issue is a State law, stop: this article is about limits on the Commonwealth.
Self-check
- Have I asked whether the power is judicial before asking who may exercise it?
- Have I tested both features of Griffith CJ’s definition, a controversy about existing rights and a binding and authoritative decision?
- Have I named the Justices whose reasons I rely on, rather than writing “the Court”, where the bench divided or wrote separately?