Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead
Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330
A customs official could demand answers and documents from anyone he believed knew something about a suspected trade offence. Could Parliament give that power to an official rather than a court?
Clarified by Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245
In Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ began from Griffith CJ’s statement that the exercise of judicial power does not begin until a tribunal with power to give a binding and authoritative decision is called upon to act. Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ called the definition the traditional starting point, but said that not every binding and authoritative decision made in determining a dispute is an exercise of judicial power, because a legislative or administrative decision may answer that description; another important element is that a judicial decision determines existing rights and duties according to law, by applying a pre-existing standard. Use the definition as a starting point, not as a complete test.
What happened?
Huddart, Parker & Co, a company formed under the laws of Victoria, and Appleton, its manager, were convicted in a Victorian Court of Petty Sessions for refusing to answer questions put to them by the Comptroller-General of Customs under s 15B of the Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906 (Cth). The Comptroller-General’s written requirements recited his belief that offences had been committed in connection with the trade in coal: in the company’s case against ss 5 and 8 of the Act, which were directed to foreign corporations and to trading or financial corporations formed within the Commonwealth, and in Appleton’s case against ss 4 and 7, which were confined to trade and commerce with other countries or among the States (Griffith CJ).
Both appealed to the High Court, contending that s 15B was beyond the power of the Commonwealth Parliament; the company also contended that ss 5 and 8 were invalid. One of the arguments against s 15B was that compulsory discovery in aid of criminal proceedings was itself part of the judicial power, which s 71 of the Constitution commits to courts (Griffith CJ).
What did the Court decide?
The company’s appeal was allowed and Appleton’s appeal was dismissed. Griffith CJ, Barton, O’Connor, Isaacs and Higgins JJ each gave separate reasons.
The company succeeded because four Justices held that ss 5 and 8 were invalid, on a reading of the corporations power in s 51(xx) of the Constitution; Isaacs J would have dismissed both appeals. That reading did not last. In New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1 the joint reasons recorded that the foundation of the majority’s reasoning was undermined by the Engineers’ Case in 1920 and that the High Court held in 1971, in Strickland v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd, that Huddart Parker was wrongly decided ([49], [71]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Griffith CJ said that “judicial power” in s 71 means “the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property”, and that “The exercise of this power does not begin until some tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take action” (at 357). Because s 71 vests the judicial power of the Commonwealth in the courts it names, “It follows that the Parliament has no power to entrust the exercise of judicial power to any other hands”; and the Comptroller-General was not such a court.
The definition was the last of three reasons he gave for concluding that the power in s 15B was not judicial. He first likened the Comptroller-General’s inquiry to the examination of witnesses by justices before committal for trial, which Cox v Coleridge showed was not a judicial function, and then observed that no appeal lies from an order of commitment or discharge made by examining justices. Barton J agreed fully with the Chief Justice’s judgment on s 15B.
All five Justices held that s 15B, which allowed the Comptroller-General, where he believed an offence against Part II of the Act had been committed, to require a person to answer questions and produce documents about it, did not confer judicial power. O’Connor J said he had been unable to find in the proceedings “any of the characteristics of the exercise of judicial power no matter how widely that expression may be construed”, and saw the section as a power of inquiry in administering the Act like those in the Customs Act 1901.
Isaacs J, adopting Palles CB’s test that a judicial tribunal has power by its determination to impose liability or affect rights, held the power ministerial, because no determination of the Comptroller-General imposed a liability or affected a right. Higgins J said he could not regard the Comptroller-General’s functions “as being in any sense judicial, still less as being an exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth”.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Only selected propositions are annotated. An unmarked proposition has not been classified.
Proposition 1
Classification unresolved · Griffith CJ (Barton J agreeing with his reasons on s 15B)
Read judgment: p 357 (opens in a new tab)
The definition is one of three cumulative reasons Griffith CJ gave for holding that s 15B conferred no judicial power, and that conclusion supports the dismissal of Appleton’s appeal. But each of the five Justices gave separate reasons, and O’Connor, Isaacs and Higgins JJ reached the same conclusion without adopting the definition, so whether it forms part of the ratio of the Court is not settled by the case itself. Later High Court reasons treat it as the starting point.
Why does this case matter?
Questions about Chapter III usually begin by asking whether a power given to someone other than a court is judicial at all, and students often answer by intuition: the body looks like a court, or it decides something important. Much of the later reasoning on that question starts from this case.
Exam and application relevance
When a statute gives a power to a tribunal, official or commission, begin by asking whether the power is judicial, and then whether the body exercising it is a court within s 71. Test the power against the language the Justices used, and then against the later High Court authority that refines it, before reaching a conclusion. Name the Justice whose words you rely on. If you mention what the case said about the corporations power, say that the High Court later held that part wrongly decided.
Check your understanding
1. What two elements did Griffith CJ identify in his statement of what judicial power is, and when did he say its exercise begins?
2. What were Griffith CJ’s two other reasons for holding that the Comptroller-General’s power under s 15B was not judicial, and how did Barton J respond to his reasons?
3. How did Isaacs J’s test for whether a power is judicial differ from Griffith CJ’s statement, and why did Isaacs J call the power ministerial?
4. Why should you be careful about citing this case for what it said about the corporations power in s 51(xx)?