Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission

High Court of Australia · 1995

Constitutional LawSeparation Of Powers

Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245

A commission that was not a court decided a racial discrimination complaint and declared that the respondent should pay damages. Registration in the Federal Court then gave its decision the effect of an order of that court.

What happened?

Harry Brandy and John Bell were officers of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC). Mr Bell complained to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission that Mr Brandy had verbally abused and threatened him, in breach of ss 9 and 15 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), and that ATSIC had responded inadequately (Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ). A person appointed to take part in the Commission’s functions held an inquiry and on 22 December 1993 found the complaint substantiated. The determination declared that Mr Brandy should apologise and pay $2,500 to Mr Bell as damages, and that ATSIC should take disciplinary action against Mr Brandy, apologise and pay $10,000 (Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ).

Under the Act, the Commission lodged the determination in the Federal Court’s registry on 23 December 1993, and it was registered the same day. Mr Brandy applied to the Federal Court for review of the determination, and that application went no further. He also brought proceedings in the High Court claiming that the provisions for registering and reviewing determinations were invalid under Chapter III of the Constitution. Gaudron J stated a case reserving the question of which provisions of Pt III of the Act, if any, were invalid (Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ; Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).

What did the Court decide?

The Court answered the question reserved by saying that ss 25ZAA, 25ZAB, 25ZAC and 25ZC of the Act are invalid, and ordered the Commission to pay Mr Brandy’s costs of the case stated. There were two joint judgments, by Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ and by Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ, and no Justice dissented.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ. Their Honours bore in mind Griffith CJ’s definition in Huddart, Parker, under which the exercise of judicial power does not begin until a tribunal “which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision” is called on to act. They said that enforcement by the tribunal itself has sometimes been seen as essential, and that the Commission’s inability to enforce its own determinations weighed against calling its powers judicial, though that is not an exclusive test.

They added that “[a]lthough many decision-making functions may take their character as an exercise of judicial, executive or legislative power from their legislative setting, the character of the decision-maker and the nature of the decision-making process, some decision-making functions are exclusive and inalienable exercises of judicial power”, including a determination, made by applying pre-existing principles and standards, that one person must pay compensation to another for unlawful conduct, where the determination is binding and authoritative in the sense that it creates an immediately enforceable liability.

The Commission’s determinations were of that kind once registered: on registration they became binding and had effect as if they were an order of the Federal Court, although they could not be enforced until the normal application and review period had expired.

The challenge was confined to the registration and enforcement procedure; the inquiry and unregistered determination, which was not binding or conclusive between the parties, were not themselves held to be an exercise of judicial power. Section 25ZAB, however, went beyond machinery: “[a]n exercise of executive power by the Commission and the performance of an administrative function by the Registrar of the Federal Court simply cannot create an order which takes effect as an exercise of judicial power”. The Commonwealth argued that the Federal Court’s review made the process an exercise of that Court’s original jurisdiction.

Their Honours rejected that, because a determination was registered and became enforceable at the end of the review period even when no review was sought, and because the review was of the determination on the evidence before the Commission, not a fresh hearing. They concluded that the Act “purports to provide for an exercise of judicial power by the Commission and that the jurisdiction conferred on the Federal Court to review a determination of the Commission does not provide a sufficient answer to this conclusion”. The invalidity of the registration and enforcement provisions carried with it the review procedure that depended on them, and s 25ZC.

Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ. Their Honours accepted that the Commission was not constituted as a court under Chapter III and so could not exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth. They said that difficulty in defining judicial power arises because the combination of features is not always the same, and that a binding and authoritative decision is not enough, since legislative or administrative decisions may be so too: a judicial decision also determines existing rights and duties according to law, by applying a pre-existing standard.

The Commission’s functions pointed in many respects to judicial power, but “if it were not for the provisions providing for the registration and enforcement of the Commission’s determinations, it would be plain that the Commission does not exercise judicial power”, because a determination under s 25Z(2) was not binding or conclusive. Enforceability is the feature that “may serve to characterize a function as judicial when it is otherwise equivocal”, though “it is not essential to the exercise of judicial power that the tribunal should be called upon to execute its own decision”.

On registration, “[n]othing that the Federal Court does gives a determination the effect of an order”: the legislation does that, and “[t]he determination remains the determination of the Commission and in no sense becomes the determination of the Federal Court”. The existence of a right of review did not bear on whether the determination was made in the exercise of judicial power, and the review, which allowed new evidence only with leave, pointed to an appeal and not to a proceeding in the Federal Court’s original jurisdiction. Their Honours concluded that ss 25ZAA, 25ZAB and 25ZAC, “which combine to make a determination of the Commission binding, authoritative and enforceable, invalidly purport to invest judicial power in the Commission”, and that s 25ZC fell with them.

Why does this case matter?

Brandy is a Chapter III case in which the label on the body (a commission) and the label on its decision (a determination, a declaration) do not settle the answer. Examiners set facts like these to see whether an answer looks past the labels.

It is also a case in which two sets of reasons reach the same result by different emphases, and answers that merge them lose marks for attribution.

Exam and application relevance

When a statute gives a non-court body power to decide a dispute about existing rights, separate two questions. First, what is the body deciding, and by what standard? Second, what legal effect does the statute give to the decision, and who or what gives it that effect?

Locate the step that carries the legal effect before concluding that a scheme fails as a whole.

On the character of judicial power, name the judgment you rely on, because the two joint judgments make different points.

Check your understanding

1. What did the Commission’s determination declare, and what did the Act then require to be done with it?

2. Why did the Commonwealth say that the Federal Court’s review jurisdiction answered the objection, and how did each joint judgment respond?

3. According to Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ, what would the position have been without the registration provisions?

4. Which provisions were declared invalid, and did either joint judgment hold the Commission’s inquiry or unregistered determination invalid?

5. Whose reasons contain the statement that some decision-making functions are exclusive and inalienable exercises of judicial power, and whose contain the statement about enforceability and equivocal functions?