The judicial power of the Commonwealth
What “judicial power” means
The Constitution does not define “judicial power”. Griffith CJ’s definition in Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead is the starting point.
He said judicial power is the power every sovereign authority must have. It lets that authority decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects. This covers rights to life, liberty or property.
This power only begins once a tribunal with authority to give a binding and authoritative decision is actually called on to act. Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ later applied this same definition in Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission.
Two features matter most. First, there must be a controversy about existing rights and liabilities, not just a question about future rules. Second, the decision must be binding and authoritative on the parties involved.
Dixon CJ and McTiernan J stated the narrowest version of the first feature in R v Davison. They held that ascertaining existing rights, through judicial determination of fact or law, falls exclusively within judicial power. Parliament cannot give this function to anyone except a court properly constituted under ss 71 and 72.
Who may exercise it: sections 71 and 72
Section 71 gives the Commonwealth’s judicial power to the High Court, to federal courts Parliament creates, and to other courts Parliament gives federal jurisdiction. These three groups are called Chapter III courts. Griffith CJ read s 71 as stopping Parliament from giving judicial power to anyone else.
The Davison case shows how strict this rule is. A deputy registrar made a sequestration order (an order putting someone’s estate into bankruptcy) in a bankruptcy matter. Dixon CJ and McTiernan J held it was void, because only a court properly formed under ss 71 and 72 could make such an order. Other judges agreed with that outcome for different reasons, though Webb J would have upheld the order.
Section 72 gives the rule its force. It says Justices of the High Court and other federal courts must be appointed by the Governor-General in Council. They can only be removed by the Governor-General in Council if both Houses of Parliament ask for this in the same sitting period, for proven misbehaviour or incapacity. Their pay also cannot be reduced while they hold office.
In Waterside Workers’ Federation v J W Alexander Ltd, a tribunal president held office for only seven years, not for life as s 72 then required. Isaacs and Rich JJ held that the provisions letting him enforce awards were invalid for this reason. They treated the arbitration provisions as separate, so only part of the law fell. The court split four to three on the outcome.
This reasoning used the old version of s 72, which required judges to hold office for life. The Constitution Alteration (Retirement of Judges) 1977 later changed this. Now judges retire at a fixed age, seventy for High Court Justices.
The hallmark: a binding and enforceable determination
Brandy shows this rule in action. The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission could decide racial discrimination complaints. Once registered in the Federal Court, its determination worked just like a court order.
Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ held this was invalid. The combined effect of making the determination binding, authoritative and enforceable gave the Commission judicial power it could not have.
Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ agreed, giving separate joint reasons. All seven judges reached the same result.
These Justices noted that the power to enforce your own orders can itself be a mark of judicial power. This helped show the Commission was exercising judicial power unlawfully.
A right to have a court review the determination did not fix the problem. The judges found that the Federal Court’s power to review the determination was not enough to save the scheme.
Functions that are exclusively judicial, and functions that are not
Most decision-making functions take their character from context - the law, the decision-maker, and the process involved. But some functions are exclusive and inalienable exercises of judicial power, meaning only courts can perform them. Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ said this in Brandy.
The clearest example is adjudging and punishing criminal guilt. In Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ said this function is essentially and exclusively judicial. They said Chapter III stops any law giving part of this function to the Commonwealth Executive.
These Justices treated involuntary detention by the State as punitive. Except in unusual cases, they saw it as part of that exclusively judicial function.
But they also stated exceptions that often decide a case. Arrest and detention under executive warrant, to hold an accused person for the courts, is not seen as punitive. Involuntary detention for mental illness or infectious disease can also be lawfully treated as non-punitive.
These views came from only three of seven Justices, who together delivered five separate sets of reasons. The Court divided four to three on the provision in question. Later High Court decisions on particular detention schemes are not discussed here.
The rest of Chapter III, and where it is stated
Section 71 is just one of several rules about Chapter III. Other important rules are explained in a separate article called Chapter III and state courts.
That article covers four more ideas. First, a federal court cannot usually be given functions outside judicial power, though the persona designata exception can allow this in limited cases.
Second, it explains how s 77(iii) lets State courts be given federal jurisdiction, and how this limits what State parliaments can do. Third, it covers the supervisory jurisdiction of State Supreme Courts, which is protected and cannot be removed.
Applying this in a problem question
Start by finding the function the statute gives, in its own words. Ask whether it just ascertains existing rights and liabilities, or makes rules for the future. Use Dixon CJ and McTiernan J’s test from Davison, and name the rights involved.
Next, ask whether the decision binds the parties and is enforceable. Brandy shows a right of review doesn’t automatically solve this problem.
Then test the body against the three classes in s 71. If it’s the High Court or another federal court, also check the office against s 72 as it currently stands.
Where the function involves judging or punishing criminal guilt under Commonwealth law, attribute this to Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ in Lim. Apply their specific qualifications -- don’t assume all detention counts as punishment.
Finally, if the law involved is a State law, stop. This article deals only with limits on Commonwealth power.
A Quick Read uses simpler language and may leave out detail, including whole topics, to stay short. The full article is the complete statement.