Re Judiciary Act 1903-1920 and Re Navigation Act 1912-1920

High Court of Australia · 1921

Australian Legal SystemConstitutional LawCourt Hierarchies And JurisdictionSeparation Of Powers

Re Judiciary Act 1903-1920 and Re Navigation Act 1912-1920 [1921] HCA 20; (1921) 29 CLR 257

A Commonwealth law let the Governor-General refer any question about the validity of a Commonwealth Act to the High Court for a final answer. Victoria objected to the reference itself. Could Parliament give the Court that work?

What happened?

Part XII of the Judiciary Act 1903-1920 (ss 88 to 94) purported to confer on the High Court “jurisdiction to hear and determine” “any question of law as to the validity of any Act or enactment of the Parliament” which “the Governor-General refers to the High Court for hearing and determination” (s 88, as the joint judgment sets it out, p 263). Any matter so referred was to be heard and determined by a Full Court of all the available Justices (s 89), the Attorney-General of each State was to have notice and a right to appear (s 90), the Court could direct that notice be given to other persons (s 91) and could request counsel to argue as to an interest it thought affected (s 92), and its determination “upon the matter shall be final and conclusive and not subject to any appeal” (s 93) (pp 263 to 264).

The Governor-General in Council referred to the Court the question whether, and to what extent, certain sections of the Navigation Act 1912-1920 were valid enactments of the Parliament of the Commonwealth (p 263; Higgins J, p 268). Higgins J said that the Navigation Act had been enacted but not yet proclaimed, that it contained “drastic provisions for manning and accommodation, involving grave structural alterations in the ships”, and that the Government and the shipowners wanted to know how far the shipowners were obliged to obey the provisions and how far the Government could enforce them (pp 268 to 269).

Counsel for the Attorney-General of Victoria objected that Part XII was beyond the powers of the Commonwealth Parliament, and the Court heard argument on that question before proceeding to the question referred (p 263). Counsel for the Commonwealth contended that a determination under Part XII was “merely advisory and not judicial” (p 264). The State of Western Australia and a number of shipowners supported Part XII as valid (Higgins J, p 268).

What did the Court decide?

The reporter’s headnote records that the Court held, Higgins J dissenting, that Part XII of the Judiciary Act 1903-1920 was “not a valid exercise of the legislative power conferred on the Parliament by the Constitution” (p 257). The reasons in the report do not reach the validity of the Navigation Act sections that were referred.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The joint judgment began with what Part XII asked of the Court. It rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that a determination would be advisory only: “In our opinion this contention is untenable. After carefully considering the provisions of Part XII., we have come to the conclusion that Parliament desired to obtain from this Court not merely an opinion but an authoritative declaration of the law” (p 264). It added: “To make such a declaration is clearly a judicial function, and such a function is not competent to this Court unless its exercise is an exercise of part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth” (p 264).

Whether Parliament could impose on the Court or its members duties other than judicial duties was a question they put aside: “it is not within our province in this case to inquire whether Parliament can impose on this Court or on its members any, and if so what, duties other than judicial duties, and we refrain from expressing any opinion on that question” (p 264).

The next question was the limit of the judicial power. The joint judgment said that the Constitution “is based upon a separation of the functions of government” (p 264). It treated ss 71 and 75 to 77, which state the matters in which and the courts by which the judicial power may be exercised, as “clearly intended as a delimitation of the whole of the original jurisdiction which may be exercised under the judicial power of the Commonwealth, and as a necessary exclusion of any other exercise of original jurisdiction” (p 265). The incidental power could not fill the gap: s 51(xxxix) “does not extend the power to confer original jurisdiction on the High Court contained in sec. 76”, and “does not enable it to extend the ambit of any such power” (p 265).

That left s 76 and the word “matter”. The joint judgment accepted that “the answer to the question submitted for our determination does involve the interpretation of the Constitution”, but asked “is there a matter within the meaning of sec. 76 ?” and answered “We think not.” (p 265). It rejected an argument that Parliament might at its discretion create a legal proceeding in which the Court could interpret the Constitution by a declaration at large, and said that “matter” does not mean a legal proceeding but “the subject matter for determination in a legal proceeding” (p 265).

Its test was: “there can be no matter within the meaning of the section unless there is some immediate right, duty or liability to be established by the determination of the Court” (p 265). Where a matter exists, “the Legislature may no doubt prescribe the means by which the determination of the Court is to be obtained”, and may adopt an existing method of legal procedure or invent a new one, but “it cannot authorize this Court to make a declaration of the law divorced from any attempt to administer that law” (p 266).

The joint judgment said that “matter” is used several times in Chapter III (ss 73 to 77), “always, we think, with the same meaning” (p 266). It drew on the opinions of Griffith CJ, Barton, O’Connor, Isaacs and Higgins JJ in State of South Australia v State of Victoria on the expression “in all matters between States” in s 75, and concluded: “All these opinions indicate that a matter under the judicature provisions of the Constitution must involve some right or privilege or protection given by law, or the prevention, redress or punishment of some act inhibited by law” (p 266).

It added that the adjudication of the Court may be sought in proceedings inter partes or ex parte (p 266), but that it could find nothing in Chapter III “to lend colour to the view that Parliament can confer power or jurisdiction upon the High Court to determine abstract questions of law without the right or duty of any body or person being involved” (p 267).

It was argued that the Court had, in earlier cases, approved of the exercise of original jurisdiction in circumstances like those of the present case (p 267). The joint judgment examined those cases and was “satisfied that in all of them the use of the judicial power was approved only when it was used for the purpose of effecting or assisting in effecting a settlement of existing claims of right under the law of the Commonwealth” (p 267). Section 31 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act concerned “questions of law which affect the rights of parties to an award” (p 267), and the questions under s 21AA all “affect actual existing rights of parties to a dispute which it is sought to determine under the Arbitration Act” (p 268). The Jumbunna case concerned legislative power and “has no relevance, in this respect, to the judicial power of the Commonwealth or its exercise” (p 268).

Higgins J dissented and would have held Part XII valid (p 276). He said that it was valid “whether our determination is to be treated as mere advice or as a judicial decision” (p 269), because s 51(xxxix) supported a law enabling the Government to obtain the Court’s opinion on validity in aid of the executive power in s 61 (pp 269 and 273). He held that a determination under Part XII would be judicial: “It is not judicial in the sense of settling a specific litigation between parties but in the sense of pronouncing the law authoritatively”, and “It is not necessary for a judicial proceeding that there should be opposing parties” (p 271).

He said that vesting the judicial power of the Commonwealth in the High Court “does not imply that no other jurisdiction, or power, shall be vested in the High Court or in the other Courts” (p 271). On “matter”, he described a definition of it as a claim of right as “too broad, I think, in that it omits the idea of some curial proceeding” and “too narrow, in that it assumes that there must be a contest between parties” (p 272), and said that the legal proceeding that “matter” probably implies is “not necessarily a proceeding where some immediate right, duty or liability is to be established by the determination of the Court” (p 274).

He held that an application under Part XII was within s 76 (pp 272 and 276) and added that, even if it were not, “there is nothing in the Constitution to prohibit Parliament from giving other functions to the High Court” (p 276).

Later High Court judgments apply the case. In Unions NSW v New South Wales [2023] HCA 4, Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Gordon, Gleeson and Jagot JJ said in their joint reasons that, exceptional categories aside, there can be no matter within the meaning of Ch III of the Constitution unless there is some immediate right, duty or liability to be established by the determination of the Court in the administration of a law, citing Re Judiciary at 265 to 266 ([15]), and that the function of the Court is the resolution of a controversy about a legal right, duty or liability and not the giving of legal answers ([14]).

The same paragraph adds that the determination must be capable of resulting in relief that quells a controversy between parties and is available at the suit of the party seeking it ([15]), so the requirement is stated there as one of two conditions. In Mellifont v Attorney-General (Q) (1991) 173 CLR 289, the joint reasons of Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ, which Unions NSW cites at 303 to 305 as explaining Re Judiciary, described Re Judiciary as a decision that the Court could not give an advisory opinion or abstract declaration in its original jurisdiction; said that answers given to questions reserved in the course of proceedings pending in a court are not an advisory opinion or abstract declaration of that kind, because they are given as part of the process of determining the rights and obligations at stake in those proceedings; and distinguished the Executive’s reference in Re Judiciary as academic, a response to an abstract question and unrelated to any actual controversy between parties.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Knox CJ, Gavan Duffy, Powers, Rich and Starke JJ (one joint judgment)

Read judgment: pp 264–265 (PDF p 8) (opens in a new tab)

Part XII could stand only if what it asked of the Court was an exercise of part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth, because the joint judgment read it as asking for an authoritative declaration of the law (p 264); Chapter III’s statement of the matters and courts was a delimitation of the whole of the original jurisdiction that may be exercised under that power, and s 51(xxxix) could not enlarge the power in s 76 (p 265). These steps were necessary to the conclusion that Part XII was invalid, and the joint judgment expressly refrained from deciding whether Parliament can impose non-judicial duties on the Court or its members (p 264), so that question forms no part of the reasoning.

Ratio · Knox CJ, Gavan Duffy, Powers, Rich and Starke JJ (one joint judgment)

Read judgment: pp 265–268 (PDF p 9) (opens in a new tab)

The joint judgment held that there was no ‘matter’ within s 76 because there was no immediate right, duty or liability to be established by the determination (p 265), that the Legislature cannot authorise the Court to declare the law divorced from any attempt to administer it (p 266), and that the earlier cases relied on approved the use of judicial power only to effect or assist in effecting a settlement of existing claims of right (pp 267 to 268). That was the ground on which Part XII could not rest on s 76, and so the ground of the decision.

Separate reasoning · Higgins J (dissenting)

Read judgment: pp 269–276 (PDF p 13) (opens in a new tab)

Higgins J dissented from the result. He held Part XII valid under s 51(xxxix) read with s 61 whether the determination was advice or a judicial decision (p 269), held that a determination would be judicial although not settling a specific litigation (p 271), held that a ‘matter’ need not be between parties and that an application under Part XII was within s 76 (pp 272 to 273, 276), and added that even if it were not, nothing in the Constitution prohibited Parliament from giving the High Court other functions (p 276). None of this is the Court’s reasoning.

Why does this case matter?

Answers on this topic are usually rewarded when they start from the text of the statute and of the Constitution and not from a general idea of what courts are for. An examiner asking about a statute like Part XII looks for the route: what the statute required of the Court, which provisions of Chapter III bear on that, and how the Court answered the arguments made for the statute. A student who gives only a general principle and the case name has not yet answered the question.

The case is also a test of whether a student keeps the joint judgment and the dissent apart. Higgins J wrote a reasoned alternative, with its own account of the constitutional text, and a student who runs it together with the joint reasons produces an answer that is wrong about what the Court held.

Exam and application relevance

The joint judgment’s formulation of what a “matter” requires is at p 265, its statement of what the Legislature cannot authorise the Court to do is at p 266, and its treatment of the earlier cases is at pp 267 to 268; Higgins J’s reasons run from p 268 to p 276. The joint judgment put the appellate sections, ss 73 and 74, aside because it was not suggested that the duty Part XII imposed was within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court (p 264).

Later High Court decisions, including Unions NSW v New South Wales [2023] HCA 4 and Mellifont v Attorney-General (Q) (1991) 173 CLR 289, apply this case, so an answer about a reference to the Court or a question put to it should also rest on the current authorities and not on the 1921 reasons alone. Check the current provisions of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) before saying anything about the present form of Part XII, which this case concerned as the Act stood in 1921.

Check your understanding

1. What did the joint judgment say that Parliament had wanted from the Court under Part XII, and why did that make it necessary to ask whether the Court’s judicial power was engaged (p 264)?

2. According to the joint judgment, what must exist before there is a “matter” within s 76, and what may the Legislature prescribe once a matter exists (pp 265 to 266)?

3. What did Higgins J say about the argument that the vesting of the judicial power of the Commonwealth in the High Court prevents other functions being given to it, and in what terms did he describe the claim of right definition of “matter” (pp 271 to 272)?