Re Judiciary Act 1903-1920 and Re Navigation Act 1912-1920

High Court of Australia · 1921

Australian Legal SystemConstitutional LawCourt Hierarchies And JurisdictionSeparation Of Powers

Re Judiciary Act 1903-1920 and Re Navigation Act 1912-1920 [1921] HCA 20; (1921) 29 CLR 257

A Commonwealth law let the Governor-General refer any question about the validity of a Commonwealth Act to the High Court for a final answer. Victoria objected to the reference itself. Could Parliament give the Court that work?

What happened?

Part XII of the Judiciary Act 1903-1920 (ss 88 to 94) let the Governor-General refer questions about an Act’s validity to the High Court. A Full Court would hear it, State Attorneys-General got notice and could appear, and the decision was final, with no appeal (s 93).

The Governor-General referred a question about the validity of parts of the Navigation Act 1912-1920. Higgins J noted the Act wasn’t yet proclaimed and had strict manning rules affecting ships.

Victoria’s counsel argued Part XII itself was beyond Commonwealth power. The Commonwealth argued any determination would be merely advisory, not judicial. Western Australia and some shipowners argued Part XII was valid.

What did the Court decide?

The reporter’s headnote records that the Court held, Higgins J dissenting, that Part XII of the Judiciary Act 1903-1920 was “not a valid exercise of the legislative power conferred on the Parliament by the Constitution” (p 257). The reasons in the report do not reach the validity of the Navigation Act sections that were referred.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The joint judgment first considered what Part XII required of the Court. It rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that any determination would be merely advisory (just an opinion, not binding).

The Court held Parliament wanted an “authoritative declaration of the law,” not just advice (p 264). Making such a declaration is a judicial function. That function is only open to the Court if it is part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth.

The Court expressly left open whether Parliament could give the Court or its members non-judicial duties. It declined to express any opinion on that separate question (p 264).

Next, the judgment considered the limits of judicial power. It said the Constitution “is based upon a separation of the functions of government” (p 264).

Sections 71 and 75 to 77 set out the matters and courts for exercising judicial power. The Court treated these sections as completely defining the original jurisdiction available under judicial power. They also exclude any other exercise of original jurisdiction.

The incidental power in s 51(xxxix) could not fix this. It does not extend the original jurisdiction power in s 76. Nor does it let Parliament broaden that power’s scope (p 265).

This left the meaning of “matter” in s 76. The Court accepted that answering the referred question did involve interpreting the Constitution. But it asked whether there was a “matter” within s 76, and answered “We think not” (p 265).

The Court rejected an argument that Parliament could simply create a proceeding letting the Court interpret the Constitution by a declaration at large. A “matter,” it said, does not mean a legal proceeding itself.

Instead, “matter” means “the subject matter for determination in a legal proceeding” (p 265). The test: there is no “matter” under s 76 unless there is “some immediate right, duty or liability to be established by the determination of the Court” (p 265).

Where a genuine matter does exist, the judgment noted, the Legislature may prescribe the means for determining it.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Knox CJ, Gavan Duffy, Powers, Rich and Starke JJ (one joint judgment)

Read judgment: pp 264–265 (PDF p 8) (opens in a new tab)

Part XII could stand only if what it asked of the Court was an exercise of part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth, because the joint judgment read it as asking for an authoritative declaration of the law (p 264); Chapter III’s statement of the matters and courts was a delimitation of the whole of the original jurisdiction that may be exercised under that power, and s 51(xxxix) could not enlarge the power in s 76 (p 265). These steps were necessary to the conclusion that Part XII was invalid, and the joint judgment expressly refrained from deciding whether Parliament can impose non-judicial duties on the Court or its members (p 264), so that question forms no part of the reasoning.

Ratio · Knox CJ, Gavan Duffy, Powers, Rich and Starke JJ (one joint judgment)

Read judgment: pp 265–268 (PDF p 9) (opens in a new tab)

The joint judgment held that there was no ‘matter’ within s 76 because there was no immediate right, duty or liability to be established by the determination (p 265), that the Legislature cannot authorise the Court to declare the law divorced from any attempt to administer it (p 266), and that the earlier cases relied on approved the use of judicial power only to effect or assist in effecting a settlement of existing claims of right (pp 267 to 268). That was the ground on which Part XII could not rest on s 76, and so the ground of the decision.

Separate reasoning · Higgins J (dissenting)

Read judgment: pp 269–276 (PDF p 13) (opens in a new tab)

Higgins J dissented from the result. He held Part XII valid under s 51(xxxix) read with s 61 whether the determination was advice or a judicial decision (p 269), held that a determination would be judicial although not settling a specific litigation (p 271), held that a ‘matter’ need not be between parties and that an application under Part XII was within s 76 (pp 272 to 273, 276), and added that even if it were not, nothing in the Constitution prohibited Parliament from giving the High Court other functions (p 276). None of this is the Court’s reasoning.

Why does this case matter?

Exam tip: trace the statute’s words and Constitution provisions, don’t just cite the case name.

Also keep the joint judgment separate from Higgins J’s dissent. He reasoned differently on the constitutional text—mixing them gives a wrong account of the actual holding.

Exam and application relevance

The joint judgment covers pp 264–268; Higgins J dissents at pp 268–276. The Court set aside ss 73–74 (appellate jurisdiction), since Part XII’s duty wasn’t appellate.

Later cases—Unions NSW v New South Wales [2023] HCA 4 and Mellifont v Attorney-General (Q) (1991)—apply this case. Check current Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) provisions, since Part XII here reflects the 1921 Act.

Check your understanding

These questions ask what Part XII required of the Court, what makes a “matter” under s 76, and how Higgins J’s dissent differed on judicial power.

Consider the reasoning behind each before reading the outcome.

A Quick Read uses simpler language and may leave out detail. The full case note is the complete statement.