Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs
Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1
Two days before a court was to hear their applications for release, Parliament passed a law requiring the Executive to hold a group of boat arrivals in custody, and directing the courts not to order their release. Could it?
Affirmed by NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 37
In NZYQ the High Court, in reasons given jointly by Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ, treated three statements of background principle in Lim as authoritative: that the Executive may detain an alien only under valid statutory authority, that exceptional cases aside the involuntary detention of a citizen by the State is penal or punitive, and that the relevant difference for an alien lies in vulnerability to exclusion or deportation ([27]-[29]). It said that, although Lim’s statement of principle referred to a citizen, the principle has been held to apply to an alien whose status, rights and immunities differ ([28]). It applied the Lim criterion, that detention must be limited to what is reasonably capable of being seen as necessary for the purposes of deportation or of enabling an entry application to be made and considered ([30]), to hold that the constitutional holding in Al-Kateb must be overruled where there is no real prospect of removal becoming practicable in the reasonably foreseeable future ([44]-[45]); Edelman J reached that conclusion by a slightly different approach ([43], [51]).
What happened?
Chu Kheng Lim and 35 other Cambodian nationals were plaintiffs. All but one, a child born in Australia, arrived by boat in Australian territorial waters in late 1989 and early 1990. None held an entry permit. Each was detained on arrival and sought refugee status. Delegates refused the applications in April 1992.
On 15 April 1992 the Federal Court set the refusals aside and sent the matters back. It adjourned the release applications to a hearing starting 7 May 1992.
Two days before that hearing, Parliament inserted Division 4B into the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). It required designated persons to be kept in custody, and s 54R said a court was not to order their release.
The Court held the earlier custody under s 88 was unlawful. Mason CJ stated a case for the Full Court.
What did the Court decide?
Seven Justices gave five judgments. The case asked if ss 54L, 54N, 54R were invalid.
The Court held ss 54L and 54N valid, s 54R invalid. The second question did not arise.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ, in their joint reasons, said some functions are essentially judicial. The most important is adjudging and punishing criminal guilt under Commonwealth law. Chapter III stops Parliament giving any part of that function to the Executive.
The Constitution looks at substance, not form. Parliament cannot give the Executive an arbitrary power to detain citizens, even if the law separates detention from guilt and punishment. This is because, apart from exceptional cases, involuntary detention of a citizen is penal in character. It belongs only to the judicial function.
Their Honours recognised some exceptions. Executive warrant can authorise arrest and detention of an accused person, to ensure they face court. Courts usually supervise this, including through bail. Involuntary detention is also allowed for mental illness or infectious disease.
Aliens are treated differently. Because an alien can be excluded or deported, Chapter III protects them less than citizens against non-judicial detention. The joint reasons held that detaining an alien for deportation, or while an entry permit application is decided, is part of executive power. This kind of detention is not punitive and not judicial power. Parliament can validly give it to the Executive.
Sections 54L and 54N would be valid only if detention was reasonably necessary for deportation, or for making and considering an entry permit application. Otherwise, the detention would be punitive and breach Chapter III. The joint judges found this limit was met, because of time limits in ss 54P and 54Q. Especially important was s 54P(1), letting a designated person end detention anytime by requesting removal in writing. Mason CJ, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ also held ss 54L and 54N valid.
Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ then considered s 54R, which directed courts not to order...
Why does this case matter?
Students who meet a detention statute often answer from one of two slogans: executive detention is lawful whenever Parliament has authorised it, or unlawful whenever a court has not ordered it. An examiner rewards the student who sees that neither slogan is the question, and who takes account of what was pending in the courts when Parliament acted.
Check your understanding
What function is exclusively judicial, and what must Chapter III block?
Detention is usually punitive—when not?
What test applied to ss 54L and 54N?
Which judges held s 54R invalid, and what could courts not do?