Aboriginal customary law and the general criminal law
How Australian courts treat Aboriginal customary law when a person is prosecuted or sentenced: Walker v New South Wales on customary criminal law, Neal and Munda on cultural background and traditional punishment in sentencing, and ss 16A(2A) and 16AA(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).
Learning outcomes
- State what Walker v New South Wales decided about customary Aboriginal criminal law, and the weight of that authority as the decision of one Justice.
- Apply the principle in Neal v The Queen and Munda v Western Australia to the sentencing of an Aboriginal offender, separating the facts about an offender’s background that a court takes into account from any suggestion that offending is less serious.
- Identify when ss 16A(2A) and 16AA(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) govern sentencing rather than the common law, and state what the High Court left undecided in Munda about traditional punishment.
Rights in land that come from traditional laws and customs are dealt with in Native title: common-law recognition and the statutory framework. This article asks a different question: what a court does with Aboriginal customary law when a person is prosecuted or sentenced under the general criminal law. Before asking whether customary law can help an accused, a student must ask what work it is being asked to do: to take the accused outside the criminal law altogether, or to count as a fact about the offender when a sentence is fixed. The authorities cited here treat the two differently. This article states decisions of the High Court and of its Chief Justice sitting on an application, which are not confined to one State, together with the Commonwealth’s sentencing provisions; it does not state the sentencing statutes of the States and Territories, which a student must read for the jurisdiction concerned.
Customary law is not an alternative criminal law
In Walker v New South Wales (1994) 182 CLR 45, a man charged with an offence against the law of New South Wales pleaded that the Commonwealth and State Parliaments lacked power to legislate affecting Aboriginal people without their request and consent, and alternatively that such laws had no effect until Aboriginal people adopted them.1 Mason CJ, the only Justice named in the report, struck the pleading out: the New South Wales Parliament has power “to make laws for the peace, welfare and good government of New South Wales in all cases whatsoever”, and nothing in Mabo v Queensland (No 2) supported the notion that the application of State or Commonwealth laws to Aboriginal people depends on their acceptance or consent (at [2]).
Counsel then put the point differently in oral argument: that customary Aboriginal criminal law had been recognised by the common law and continued, as the Meriam people’s customary land tenure did in Mabo (No 2), so that the criminal statutes of New South Wales did not apply to people of Aboriginal descent (at [4]). Mason CJ rejected that proposition. He said that “all people should stand equal before the law”, and that a construction that applies different criminal sanctions to different persons for the same conduct offends that principle (at [5]); and that, even on the assumption that the customary criminal law of Aboriginal people survived British settlement, it “was extinguished by the passage of criminal statutes of general application” (at [6]). The analogy with Mabo (No 2) failed: there the Court held that native title held by people of Aboriginal descent was not inconsistent with radical title in the Crown, but “English criminal law did not, and Australian criminal law does not, accommodate an alternative body of law operating alongside it” (at [6]).
Walker is the decision of a single Justice on an application to dismiss or stay an action, not of the Full Court, and it concerns the criminal law of New South Wales. It says nothing about what a sentencing court may do with an offender’s cultural background.
Sentencing: the same principles, and all the material facts
The sentencing question was framed by Neal v The Queen (1982) 149 CLR 305, a Queensland case about a man convicted of assault on a reserve.2 In separate reasons Brennan J said that the same sentencing principles are to be applied “in every case, irrespective of the identity of a particular offender or his membership of an ethnic or other group”, but that courts are bound to take into account all material facts, “including those facts which exist only by reason of the offender’s membership of an ethnic or other group”, because that is essential to the even administration of criminal justice (at 326). The weight of those facts is ordinarily for the sentencing court. The passage is from one Justice’s separate reasons, but it was taken up in Munda v Western Australia [2013] HCA 38.
Munda concerned a Crown appeal against a sentence for the manslaughter of the offender’s de facto spouse in an alcohol-fuelled, sustained assault.3 The Court of Appeal of Western Australia increased a sentence of five years and three months’ imprisonment to seven years and nine months on the ground that it was manifestly inadequate, and the High Court dismissed the offender’s appeal. The joint reasons of six Justices (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ) made three points that bear on this topic:
- Brennan J’s statement in Neal is “the starting point” where there is no specific legislative direction of the kind found in the Canadian decisions the Court discussed (at [50]).
- Mitigating factors must be given appropriate weight, but it would be contrary to Neal “to accept that Aboriginal offending is to be viewed systemically as less serious than offending by persons of other ethnicities”, and wrong to treat a victim of violence by an Aboriginal offender as less in need of the protection and vindication the criminal law can provide (at [53]). To impose a lesser punishment because of the victim’s identity “is to create a group of second-class citizens” (at [55]).
- That the offender was affected by an environment in which alcohol abuse is common “must be taken into account in assessing his personal moral culpability”, but it must be balanced with the seriousness of the offending (at [57]).
The offender had disclaimed any contention that Aboriginality of itself warrants leniency, relying instead on the disadvantage associated with the social and economic problems that commonly attend Aboriginal communities (at [48]). Bell J dissented in the result, and would have allowed the appeal and dismissed the prosecution’s appeal to the Court of Appeal (at [138]); Bell J’s reasons are not the Court’s.
Traditional punishment: left open
The sentencing judge in Munda took into account, in the offender’s favour, the prospect that he would suffer traditional “payback” in the form of corporal punishment on his release, and gave it limited weight (at [20], [49]). In the High Court the joint reasons said that “there is something to be said for the view” that the offender’s willingness to submit to traditional punishment is not a material consideration, because punishment for crime is meted out by the state and offenders do not choose its mode (at [61]). But the respondent had accepted that the prospect is a factor relevant to sentencing, and the joint reasons held that the case did not afford an occasion to express a concluded view; it was enough that the offender suffered no injustice from the limited weight given to it (at [62]-[63]). The question is therefore open at the High Court level on the authorities cited here, and a student should not state that a prospect of payback does, or does not, reduce a sentence as though the Court had decided it.
Where Parliament has spoken: the Commonwealth provisions
Parliament has addressed the question for sentencing under Commonwealth law. For a federal offence, s 16A(2A) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) provides that the court “must not take into account under subsection (1) or (2), other than paragraph (2)(ma)”, any form of customary law or cultural practice as a reason for excusing, justifying, authorising, requiring or lessening the seriousness of the criminal behaviour, or for aggravating it. Paragraph (2)(ma) concerns the offender’s standing in the community, where it was used to aid the commission of the offence, as a reason for aggravating its seriousness; the prohibition in s 16A(2A) does not apply to it. Section 16AA(1) imposes a prohibition in the same terms on sentencing for an offence against a law of the Northern Territory, but without that exception.4 Each has its own list of cultural heritage offences to which the prohibition does not apply (s 16A(2AA); s 16AA(2)), and “criminal behaviour” is defined to include conduct, omission, circumstance or result forming part of a physical element of the offence and any fault element relating to such an element (s 16A(2B); s 16AA(3)). The scheme of s 16A is set out in First Nations peoples and Australian law: an overview. Whether the prospect of traditional punishment is caught by either provision is not decided by the authorities cited here.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify the jurisdiction and the offence. Decide whether the sentencing is for a federal offence (Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A) or an offence against a Northern Territory law (s 16AA), or is governed by a State or Territory sentencing statute that must be read before the common law is applied.
- Identify what customary law is said to do. If it is said to take the accused outside the criminal statute, apply Walker, noting that it is the decision of a single Justice, and that customary criminal law is not an alternative to the general criminal law.
- If it is said to bear on sentence, start from the principle in Neal as taken up in Munda: the same principles apply to every offender, and material facts about the offender’s background are to be taken into account.
- State separately what Munda does not permit: treating Aboriginal offending as systemically less serious than offending by persons of other ethnicities, or a victim as less deserving of protection, and letting mitigating factors lead to a penalty disproportionate to the gravity of the offence (at [53]).
- If traditional punishment is raised, say that the High Court left open whether its prospect is material, and check the statute for the jurisdiction before relying on it.
Self-check
- Have I separated the claim that customary law displaces the criminal law (Walker) from the claim that it is relevant to sentence (Neal, Munda)?
- Have I attributed the Neal passage to Brennan J’s separate reasons and the Munda propositions to the joint reasons, not to Bell J?
- Have I said that the High Court expressed no concluded view in Munda on traditional punishment?
- Have I identified the sentencing statute that governs the offence before applying the common law?