Bodney v Bennell

Federal Court of Australia (Full Court) · 2008

First Nations And Australian LawFirst Nations Law And Native Title Framework

Bodney v Bennell [2008] FCAFC 63

Noongar claimants won a favourable answer to a separate question on native title in the Perth area, after a finding that a Noongar community survived from 1829. What must a court find has continued, and what must it ask about the area?

Clarified by Blucher on behalf of the Gaangalu Nation People v State of Queensland [2025] FCAFC 177

Murphy, Sarah C Derrington and Bennett JJ relied on Bodney at [74] for the point that it is not the society as such that produces rights and interests ([66]), set out Bodney at [120] and [121] ([119]-[120]), and said that the enquiry remains as identified in Bodney at [120]: whether the rights and interests find their origin in pre-sovereignty law and custom ([165]). Applying that enquiry, they held that claimants need not establish that traditional law or custom itself permitted an adaptation, and that requiring an explanation of how the adaptation was permissible by reference to traditional law added an unnecessary step ([122]-[124], [151]). They cited Bodney at [79] for the point that adaptation can raise difficult questions of fact and degree ([128]). They did not criticise Bodney.

What happened?

On 10 September 2003 eighty named applicants began the Single Noongar Application under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) for a determination of native title over about 186,000 square kilometres of land and adjoining waters in the south-west of Western Australia, including the area in and around Perth, “on behalf of all Noongar people” ([1]). The application was divided into Part A, covering the Perth area, and Part B, the balance, and Part A overlapped five claims by Mr Christopher Bodney ([2]).

The Court directed that Part A and Mr Bodney’s claims be heard together in a separate proceeding, and that a separate question be tried so that the existence of native title in that area, the Perth Metropolitan Area, could be decided before and apart from extinguishment ([3]). The separate question asked whether native title exists in the area, who holds it, and what its nature and extent are ([26]).

On 19 September 2006 the primary judge, Wilcox J, determined that, subject to extinguishment, the Noongar people hold native title rights and interests in the area, other than off-shore islands and waters below the low-water mark, and dismissed Mr Bodney’s claims ([5]). He had found a single Noongar community in the claim area in 1829 and had found that it had continued from 1829 to the present, so that, although European settlement had a profound effect, the contemporary normative system was that of the society existing in 1829 ([28]-[29]).

He had also found that the Noongar people were connected with the whole claim area, and so with the area of the separate question, because “the whole includes its parts” ([29]). The State of Western Australia, the Commonwealth and the Western Australian Fishing Industry Council (WAFIC) obtained leave to appeal, and Mr Bodney appealed from the dismissal of his claims ([6]). Mr Bodney, who appeared for himself, had claimed that two clans, the Ballaruk and Didjarruk, held the native title in the areas of his five applications ([35], [221]).

What did the Court decide?

The Full Court (Finn, Sundberg and Mansfield JJ) gave one set of reasons on 23 April 2008. It granted the Commonwealth, WAFIC and the State leave to appeal and allowed their appeals ([209]-[214]). It set aside orders 1 and 5 of the primary judge’s orders and remitted the separate question to the Western Australian native title provisional docket judge, leaving that judge to decide whether that question, or some other separate question, should be heard and whether the separate proceeding should be consolidated with Part B ([211]-[212]).

The Commonwealth and the State had asked the Full Court to answer part (i) of the separate question itself, in the negative, and it was not prepared to take that course ([210]). In WAFIC’s appeal it set aside order 1 as it related to part (iii) of the separate question and remitted that part ([206], [214]). It made no order as to costs of the appeals, subject to submissions ([213]). It dismissed Mr Bodney’s appeal, agreeing that no recognised community or group identified as Ballaruk, or Ballaruk and Didjarruk, held rights and interests in the area of his largest claim, although its reasons differed somewhat from the primary judge’s ([234], [238]).

The Full Court assumed, without deciding, that the primary judge was correct in finding a single Noongar society in the area of the Single Noongar Application at sovereignty ([43], [237]). It expressed no concluded view on the State’s procedural fairness ground ([194]), or on the Commonwealth’s and the State’s challenges to the native title rights the primary judge found ([207]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The Full Court held that the continuity question under s 223(1)(a) of the Native Title Act is whether acknowledgment and observance of the traditional laws and customs has continued substantially uninterrupted by each generation since sovereignty, the approach the High Court’s joint reasons took in Yorta Yorta at [87] ([70]-[72]). The primary judge had instead asked whether the community that existed in 1829 had continued to exist, with its members acknowledging and observing at least some of the traditional laws and customs relating to land ([49], [73]).

The Full Court said that the Yorta Yorta formulation concentrates on laws and customs because the rights and interests are the product of the laws and customs of the society, and it is not the society as such that produces them; proof that a society has continued does not necessarily show that the rights and interests are those that existed at sovereignty, and an inquiry into continuity of society, divorced from an inquiry into the pre-sovereignty normative system, may mask unacceptable change ([74]).

Change and adaptation will not necessarily be fatal, so long as the changed or adapted laws and customs continue to sustain the same rights and interests that existed at sovereignty ([74]). The primary judge had found that the home areas of the pre-settlement estates had disappeared and that contemporary boodjas were similar in concept to, though probably larger than, the pre-settlement runs, but he did not ask whether a boodja was a permissible adaptation or an unacceptable change ([78]-[80]). On his findings as they stood, in the absence of any finding of permissible adaptation, the significant change was conclusive of discontinuity ([80]).

The Full Court did not decide for itself whether boodjas are traditional, because the primary judge had made almost no findings about runs with which they could be compared ([83]). These errors supported allowing the Commonwealth’s and the State’s appeals ([123]-[124]). In a discussion of the State’s submission that no new rights can arise after sovereignty, the Full Court said that the proper enquiry is whether rights and interests find their origin in pre-sovereignty law and custom, not whether they are the same as those that existed at sovereignty, and that laws and customs can alter and develop after sovereignty, perhaps significantly, and still be traditional ([120]); it then said that it need not pursue that issue ([122]).

The Full Court held, citing Yorta Yorta at [89], that the reason a law or custom changed, or that acknowledgment and observance of it stopped, does not mitigate the effect of a substantial interruption ([81]-[82], [97]). The primary judge had treated the disappearance of the home areas as a significant change that was readily understandable because white settlement forced it, and had treated changes to the descent rules as inevitable if the Noongar were to survive colonisation ([77]-[78], [81], [97]).

It set out the High Court’s statement that the inquiry about continuity does not require consideration of why acknowledgment and observance stopped, and that examining why is important only to the extent that the presence or absence of reasons might influence the fact-finder’s decision about whether there was an interruption ([96]). It said that European settlement is what justifies the words substantially uninterrupted rather than uninterrupted, and explains why the common law will recognise traditional laws and customs that are not exactly the same as they were at settlement ([97]).

The primary judge’s reasoning was infected by an erroneous belief that the effects of European settlement were to be taken into account, in the claimants’ favour, by way of mitigating the effect of change ([97]). On descent, the Full Court thought his reliance on the significance of European settlement at times went further than Yorta Yorta permits, but held that on the expert evidence he was entitled to conclude that an increase in reliance on matrilineal descent did not mean that the descent rules were no longer traditional ([116]).

The Full Court distinguished s 223(1)(b) from s 223(1)(a): connection is by the claimants’ traditional laws and customs and is not simply an incident of the rights and interests claimed ([161]-[165]). Where it is put in issue whether connection has been maintained to a particular part of a claim area, what is “indispensable” is to examine the traditional laws and customs as they relate to that area and to demonstrate that connection to that area has in reality been substantially maintained since sovereignty ([179]).

On the primary judge’s findings that groups of Noongar people had their own particular country, the Full Court said that those whom the laws and customs connect to a particular part of the claim area, if they have not continued to observe the laws and customs in relation to their country without substantial interruption, cannot succeed in a claim for native title rights and interests even if other Noongar people have continued to acknowledge and observe the Noongar laws and customs ([184], [186]).

The Full Court held that it was not open to the primary judge to subsume the connection issue for the Perth Metropolitan Area within his finding of connection to the whole claim area ([126], [180]-[181]), and that the evidence he had recited was marshalled to find continuity of the Noongar community and not deployed with a particular area, let alone the Perth Metropolitan Area, in mind ([183]). It was satisfied that he misapplied s 223(1)(b) and failed to answer a question necessary to be answered, so that the appeals of the State and the Commonwealth must succeed “on this ground alone” ([190]).

It did not endorse his finding of connection to the whole claim area, and it expressed no conclusion on whether connection was maintained to any other part of it ([181]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Finn, Sundberg and Mansfield JJ (one set of reasons)

Read judgment: [70]–[80] (opens in a new tab), [83] (opens in a new tab), [123]–[124] (opens in a new tab)

The orders allowing the State’s and the Commonwealth’s appeals rest in part on the primary judge’s approach to continuity. The Full Court identified the question ([70]-[72]), held that the primary judge posed a different one ([73], [75]-[77]), explained why the difference mattered ([74]) and found that he made no finding on whether a boodja is a permissible adaptation ([79]-[80], [83]); [123]-[124] list the grounds made out. The reasons on connection ([190]) are a further ground for the same orders, so continuity is not the only route to them.

Obiter · Finn, Sundberg and Mansfield JJ (one set of reasons)

Read judgment: [117]–[122] (opens in a new tab)

The State submitted that a new right can never arise after sovereignty. The Full Court considered Yorta Yorta [43]-[44], said that the proper enquiry is origin in pre-sovereignty law and custom ([119]-[120]), raised the possibility that what cannot be created after sovereignty is a right imposing a greater burden on the Crown’s radical title ([121]), and then said that it need not pursue the issue because the starting point of the State’s submission, exclusively patrilineal descent before sovereignty, was not made out ([122]). The passage was not needed for the orders. A later Full Court has relied on the [120] enquiry (see the subsequent treatment).

Proposition 2

Ratio · Finn, Sundberg and Mansfield JJ (one set of reasons)

Read judgment: [81]–[82] (opens in a new tab), [96]–[97] (opens in a new tab)

The Full Court treated the primary judge’s mitigation of change by reference to white settlement as an error that infected his conclusion that the Noongar laws and customs of today are traditional ([97]). It is one of the errors that support the orders allowing the appeals.

Classification unresolved · Finn, Sundberg and Mansfield JJ (one set of reasons)

Read judgment: [98]–[116] (opens in a new tab)

The Full Court decided one limb of the State’s challenge against the State: on the expert evidence the primary judge was entitled to conclude that the shift to greater reliance on matrilineal descent did not mean the descent rules were no longer traditional ([116]). That was an express decision on a discrete argument, but it was not needed for the orders allowing the appeals, which rest on the other errors, so it is not classed as ratio or obiter without qualification.

Proposition 3

Ratio · Finn, Sundberg and Mansfield JJ (one set of reasons)

Read judgment: [165]–[168] (opens in a new tab), [179] (opens in a new tab), [181]–[187] (opens in a new tab), [190] (opens in a new tab)

[190] states that the primary judge misapplied s 223(1)(b) and that the State’s and the Commonwealth’s appeals must succeed on that ground alone. The principles at [165]-[168] and [179] and the reasoning at [181]-[187] are the steps that conclusion rests on.

Why does this case matter?

A native title appeal can look like a contest over the witnesses’ evidence. Here the Full Court set aside the primary judge’s orders and sent the separate question back to the docket judge instead of answering it ([210]-[212]). In a problem question about an appeal, separate what the orders were from what the reasons said, and say which parts the orders depended on. This is a 2008 Full Court decision: it binds single judges of the Court and is persuasive elsewhere, and later Full Court reasoning on the same topic should be read with it.

Exam and application relevance

In a native title problem about whether claimants’ present laws and customs are traditional, identify which paragraph of s 223(1) each issue falls under, set out the evidence that bears on each, and say what that evidence supports before stating a conclusion. Where the problem concerns one part of a larger claim area, state what the problem says about that part. Attribute each step to the Full Court’s joint reasons and identify the kind of proceeding in which the Full Court gave its reasons.

Be precise about which parts of the reasoning the orders depended on and which were observations. Blucher on behalf of the Gaangalu Nation People v State of Queensland [2025] FCAFC 177 relies on parts of Bodney, and the two decisions should be read together on how a change in a law or custom is assessed.

Currency: the operative words of s 223(1)(a) and (b) quoted at [125] are the words the Full Court set out in Blucher in 2025 ([50]). Check the current text of the whole of s 223 and later Full Court decisions before relying on Bodney.

Check your understanding

1. Which Justices sat on the appeals, how many sets of reasons did they give, and what did they do with the separate question?

2. What question about continuity did the primary judge pose ([49]), and how did the Full Court describe the question that Yorta Yorta formulates ([70]-[74])?

3. What did the primary judge find about the home areas and the boodjas, and what did the Full Court say he had not asked ([78]-[83])?

4. What did the Full Court say about the relevance of the reason why a law or custom changed or stopped being observed, and what did it conclude about the primary judge’s finding on descent ([81], [96]-[97], [116])?

5. How does s 223(1)(b) differ from s 223(1)(a) in the Full Court’s account, and what did the primary judge do with the Perth Metropolitan Area ([165], [180]-[181])?

6. What did the Full Court assume without deciding about the Noongar society, and what did it say about the question of new rights after sovereignty ([43], [122])?

7. Which later Full Court decision relied on Bodney at [120], and what point did it make about adaptation ([165])?

8. What must remain the same, on the wording of [74], and what does the wording of [120] say about whether rights and interests may themselves change?