Northern Territory v Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust
Northern Territory v Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust [2008] HCA 29
Traditional owners hold a fee simple that runs to the low-water mark, and a licensed fisher wants to fish the bay at high tide. Does the owners’ right to keep people out stop at the water’s edge, and does a fishing licence change that?
What happened?
In 1980 the Governor-General executed deeds of grant under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) to the Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust of two areas, the Mainland Grant of about 90,000 square kilometres and the Islands Grant ([2]). Each grant described the interest as “an Estate in Fee Simple” and extended to low water mark, so that it took in the intertidal zone, the area covered and uncovered by water at different times of the day ([4]-[5]).
Blue Mud Bay in north-east Arnhem Land lies within the Mainland Grant, and the Yolngu people are the traditional owners of parts of it ([3]). Section 70(1) of the Land Rights Act provides that a person shall not enter or remain on Aboriginal land, which is the land the subject of such grants, and there is a defence for a person who enters or remains on the land otherwise in accordance with the Act or a law of the Northern Territory ([6]).
The litigation began from a difference of opinion that arose in about 1996 or 1997 between the Northern Land Council and the Director of Fisheries about whether the Director could grant licences under the Fisheries Act (NT) to persons to fish in and enter the intertidal zone: the Land Council said that the Director could not authorise fishing in waters overlying Aboriginal land, and the Director said that tidal waters over Aboriginal land were not part of the land ([10]).
The Land Trust, the Northern Land Council and the native title holders sought declarations of their rights; Selway J, bound by a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Commonwealth v Yarmirr, held that the grants did not confer the right to exclude persons exercising public rights to fish ([9], [13]). On appeal the Full Court of the Federal Court declared that the Fisheries Act had no application within the boundary lines of the grants, did not confer power to grant a licence that would authorise the holder to enter and take fish from areas subject to the grants, and was invalid in so far as it purported to operate there ([15]). The Northern Territory and the Director of Fisheries appealed to the High Court ([15]).
What did the Court decide?
The appeal was allowed in part. The Full Court’s second order was set aside and replaced by a narrower declaration about ss 10 and 11 of the Fisheries Act (NT), and the appellants were ordered to pay the first, second and third respondents’ costs (Orders; [62]). Four sets of reasons were given: the joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ ([1]-[62]); Kirby J ([63]-[75]); Heydon J ([76]-[109]); and Kiefel J ([110]-[162]). The decision was given on 30 July 2008.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
In the joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ, the premise that the case turned on how a common law public right to fish intersects with the rights given by the grants was wrong ([19]). By necessary implication from the text and structure of the Fisheries Act (NT), and in particular ss 10 and 11, that Act abrogated any public right to fish in tidal waters in the Northern Territory that existed before it was enacted, and whether and how a person may take fish is to be answered by the Act and not by any common law right ([27]-[29]).
Neither a licence nor any provision of the Act confers permission on the holder to enter any particular place or area to fish ([33], [36]), and the debate in the courts below about whether the Fisheries Act “applied” within the boundaries of the grants proceeded from incorrect premises ([39]). The questions then were whether fishing in the intertidal zone or in the tidal waters within the boundaries of the grants is to “enter or remain on Aboriginal land” for s 70(1) of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth), and whether a licence holder does so “otherwise in accordance with ... a law of the Northern Territory” ([8], [17]).
The first was answered yes: because the interest granted is described as a fee simple it is to be understood as granting rights of ownership that are for almost all practical purposes the equivalent of full ownership, and, subject to any relevant common law qualification or statutory provision to the contrary, rights that include the right to exclude others from the area identified in the grant ([50]). The grants are not to be supposed to give a proprietary interest in any particular column of water, and it was neither necessary nor productive to define exhaustively the rights conferred over the intertidal zone when covered by water ([52]-[53]).
The land being defined by metes and bounds, s 70(1) is given effect by reference to those boundaries “without regard to whether the tide is in or out” ([55]), and “Aboriginal land” in s 70(1) extends to so much of the fluid above the land surface within the boundary of the grant as is ordinarily capable of use by an owner of land ([58]). Arguments from public rights of fishing and navigation did not support a narrower reading ([59]-[60]). The second was answered no: holding a licence under the Fisheries Act is not entry “in accordance with ... a law of the Northern Territory”, whereas permission given by a Land Council under the Aboriginal Land Act (NT) would be ([61]).
The Full Court’s declarations were framed too widely, and the appeal was allowed in part to substitute a declaration that ss 10 and 11 of the Fisheries Act do not confer a power to grant a licence that would, without more, authorise or permit the holder to enter and take fish or aquatic life from areas within the boundary lines of the two grants ([62]). Kirby J agreed in the orders and generally in the joint reasons, and added that questions of meaning should be decided before questions of power ([63], [65], [73]-[75]).
Heydon J (dissenting) held that the grant to low water mark granted the soil and that only the soil was Aboriginal land, so that a person fishing in the waters above it was not in breach of s 70(1) ([101]-[102], [106]), and would have allowed the appeal and restored the order of Mansfield J dismissing the application ([109]). Kiefel J (dissenting) held that the Land Rights Act does not provide for the Land Trust to control entry onto intertidal waters or fishing in them, that the Land Trust does not have the right of an owner to exclude persons from the land the subject of the grant, and that the power to regulate those matters lies in Pt III of the Aboriginal Land Act ([151], [160], [162]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [27]–[29] (PDF p 16) (opens in a new tab), [33]–[36] (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab), [50]–[55] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab), [58]–[61] (PDF p 26) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs hold that the Fisheries Act abrogated the public right to fish and confers no permission to enter any area, that fishing in the tidal waters within the grants is entry on Aboriginal land under s 70(1), and that a licence is not entry in accordance with a law of the Northern Territory; they lead to the orders at [62].
Separate reasoning · Kirby J (agreeing in the orders and generally in the joint reasons)
Read judgment: [63] (PDF p 28) (opens in a new tab), [73]–[75] (PDF p 32) (opens in a new tab)
Kirby J agreed in the orders and generally in the joint reasons, and added his approach of deciding the meaning of the legislation before questions of power.
Separate reasoning · Heydon J (dissenting)
Read judgment: [101]–[102] (PDF p 45) (opens in a new tab), [106]–[109] (PDF p 47) (opens in a new tab)
Heydon J would have held that only the soil, not the tidal waters above it, was Aboriginal land; this is a contrary view and not the Court’s holding.
Separate reasoning · Kiefel J (dissenting)
Read judgment: [151] (PDF p 64) (opens in a new tab), [160]–[162] (PDF p 68) (opens in a new tab)
Kiefel J would have held that the Land Trust cannot exclude persons from fishing in the intertidal zones and that the power to do so lies in Pt III of the Aboriginal Land Act; this is a contrary view and not the Court’s holding.
Why does this case matter?
Problems about land held under a statutory grant often invite an answer that sets the landowner’s right against a public right and asks which is stronger. This case is a standard way of testing whether a student starts instead from the terms of the statute and of the grant.
Exam and application relevance
Name the statute and the date. The Court construed s 70 of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) as it stood in 2008 and the Fisheries Act (NT) as then in force. The Court itself noted that the former s 70(2A) was later amended, and that the substance of the provision is now in s 70(2A)(e) and (h) with changes it described as minor and presently irrelevant ([6] n 6). Check the current text of both Acts before applying the reasoning.
Say whose reasons each step is, using the paragraph numbers, and describe the orders separately from the reasoning that led to them. The Court did not define exhaustively the rights the grants confer over the intertidal zone when it is covered by water ([53]), so describe what it decided about s 70(1) and the Fisheries Act and no more.
Check your understanding
1. What did the Land Trust’s grants extend to, and why does that bear on the intertidal zone ([4]-[5])?
2. What did the joint reasons say about the common law public right to fish in the tidal waters of the Northern Territory, and about what a Fisheries Act licence permits its holder to do ([27]-[28], [33], [36])?
3. How did the joint reasons answer the two questions framed at [8], and what did they say would be entry in accordance with a law of the Northern Territory ([61])?
4. On what reasoning did Heydon J conclude that fishing in the tidal waters was not a breach of s 70(1) ([101]-[102], [106])?
5. What did Kiefel J say about the Land Trust’s power to exclude persons from fishing in the intertidal zone, and where did she say the power to regulate entry lay ([151], [160], [162])?