Blucher on behalf of the Gaangalu Nation People v State of Queensland

Federal Court of Australia (Full Court) · 2025

First Nations And Australian LawFirst Nations Law And Native Title Framework

Blucher on behalf of the Gaangalu Nation People v State of Queensland [2025] FCAFC 177

Gaangalu claimants lost at trial after the judge found that their present system differed in important ways from earlier practice. What must a court work out before it can say that changed practices are, or are not, traditional?

What happened?

In August 2012 Lynette Blucher and others, on behalf of the Gaangalu Nation People (the Gaangalu), filed a proceeding for a determination of native title over about 25,506 square kilometres of land and waters west and south-west of Rockhampton in Central Queensland (the claim area) ([1]). It was not in dispute that at sovereignty the Gaangalu people occupied and had rights and interests in the whole of the claim area west of the Dawson River and in parts east of it ([14]). The dispute was about whether the Gaangalu still hold rights and interests under traditional laws and customs, and whether they are connected with the claim area by those laws and customs ([8], [17]).

Only the Gaangalu and the State of Queensland took part in the hearing of a separate question, and in June 2023 the primary judge answered no to the question whether native title exists in the claim area ([2]-[3]). The Gaangalu had put their case on the footing that they were part of a broader regional society of Gaangalu, Garingbal and Wadja people, which was part of the evidence from which the normative system of the Gaangalu could be identified, although the way they put the point at trial was ambiguous ([70], [77]-[83]).

The primary judge required the Gaangalu to show that the regional society still existed, and found that they had not shown it ([71]-[73]). He accepted that the claim group continued to observe several traditional laws and customs, including inalienability of land and communal ownership, customary use of natural resources and a spiritual connection with the land ([94]), but concluded that the evidence did not establish that acknowledgment and observance of traditional laws and customs had continued substantially uninterrupted since sovereignty ([96]).

He held that the shift from patrilineal inheritance of primary rights to inheritance from either parent had been adopted since sovereignty and could not be described as an adaptation ([99]), and he was not satisfied that rights held by the claim group as a whole, in place of small clan estates, were a permissible adaptation ([152]). Two respondents, the Woorabinda parties, then sought a negative determination, and orders were made declaring that native title does not exist in any part of the claim area west of the Dawson River (the Negative Determination) ([4]-[5]). The Gaangalu appealed on five grounds ([6]).

What did the Court decide?

The Full Court (Murphy, Sarah C Derrington and Bennett JJ) gave joint reasons on 5 December 2025. It upheld ground two, which concerned whether the Gaangalu hold rights and interests under traditional laws and customs ([169]-[171]), and found that the primary judge’s approach to connection under ground three was affected by the same error and was also in error ([192], [200]). Under ground one it found error in the primary judge’s treatment of the evidence about Mount Morgan ([245], [249]), and under ground four it found that his analysis miscarried for some, but not all, of the excluded apical ancestors ([344]). It considered that, given those errors, a negative determination was not appropriate ([347]).

It ordered that the Negative Determination dated 30 April 2024 be set aside, and that the parties file submissions of no more than 20 pages by 13 February 2026 on the appropriate disposition of the appeal, including costs ([353]). It did not remit the matter. It said that there were compelling reasons not to remit it, expressed concern about deciding connection without full findings, and noted options for the parties that included a consent determination, agreed facts, or further written submissions on the evidence ([349]-[352]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The Full Court said that a law or custom is traditional under s 223(1)(a) of the Native Title Act where it has its origin in the normative rules of the society that existed before sovereignty, and that identifying a normative body of laws and customs is linked to identifying a society ([64]). It added that it is not the society as such that produces the rights and interests, and that the function of the concept of society is to assist in analysing whether the normative system is traditional in the relevant sense ([66]).

It noted that a range of cases have acknowledged that identifying a society requires no more than identifying a group of persons united by their acknowledgment and observance of a body of laws and customs ([68]), and said that to suggest that some other element makes the group a society is to misstate Yorta Yorta ([93]). The Full Court joined earlier decisions in expressing concern at an oversized emphasis on the concept, which can distract from the questions the Act requires to be determined ([69]).

The Full Court held that treating the continued existence of the regional society as a precondition of the claim was an error ([73], [185]): identifying a group that has continuously, from sovereignty, observed the traditional laws and customs is to identify a society, and requiring that the group also be part of a broader society that observed them interposed a further step ([95]). The question was whether the Gaangalu people have continued as a group to hold rights and interests in land and waters under the normative system they acknowledge and observe ([169]).

That conclusion was sufficient to uphold ground two ([170]). The Full Court rejected Queensland’s argument that the Gaangalu could not run the point on appeal because of how the case was put at trial ([90]).

The Full Court held that the inquiry into whether a changed practice is an adaptation is whether it finds its origin in pre-sovereignty law and custom ([123], [128], [164]-[165]), the enquiry it said remains as identified in Bodney v Bennell at [120] ([165]). It held that claimants need not establish that traditional law or custom permitted the adaptation, because there is no reason for a society to have laws or customs to respond to the catastrophic disruption caused by colonisation ([122]), and that adaptation need not occur conformably with traditional laws and customs, because it is a response to upheaval that may occur outside the strictures of the earlier laws and customs ([151]).

Evidence explaining how an adaptation occurred may be available and appropriate ([123]), but the primary judge, by requiring an explanation of how the shift from patrilineal to cognatic inheritance of primary rights was permissible by reference to traditional law, imposed an unnecessary step ([124], [128]). It also said that the Act does not call for a balancing of extant against lost aspects of traditional law and custom, requiring that more be continuous than lost ([96]), and that, on the shift from clan estates to rights held by the language group, the primary judge erred by focusing on the extent of loss since sovereignty rather than on whether the traditional laws and customs as they are presently practised have continued substantially uninterrupted ([166]).

On the first shift the Full Court concluded, applying the standard of correctness, that the primary judge had erred in finding that the shift was the adoption of a new practice ([136]-[137]) and ought to have found that it was an adaptation of a traditional system with a patrilineal bias, relying in part on the anthropologists’ evidence that it was at most an adaptation ([136]-[137]). On the second it described the question whether the shift was an adaptation as finely balanced, but was persuaded that the primary judge should have found one, on the joint anthropological evidence and uncontradicted lay evidence ([167]-[168]). It acknowledged that adaptation can raise difficult questions of fact and degree ([128], [165]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Murphy, Sarah C Derrington and Bennett JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [90]–[95] (opens in a new tab), [169]–[170] (opens in a new tab)

The Full Court held that the primary judge’s treatment of the regional society as a precondition was an error ([95]) and said that the conclusion at [169] was sufficient to uphold ground two ([170]). [90] rejects the argument that the point was not open on appeal.

Ratio · Murphy, Sarah C Derrington and Bennett JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [64]–[69] (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs state the concept of society on which the conclusion at [95] and [169] rests, including the statement that it is not the society as such that produces rights and interests ([66]) and the statement of concern about the oversized emphasis on the concept ([69]).

Proposition 2

Ratio · Murphy, Sarah C Derrington and Bennett JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [118]–[128] (opens in a new tab), [136]–[137] (opens in a new tab)

The Full Court held that the primary judge erred in the approach he took to the shift from patrilineal to cognatic inheritance ([124], [128], [136]) and, applying the correctness standard, concluded that he ought to have found an adaptation ([137]). The correction of the test is the reasoning on which ground two is upheld ([171]).

Ratio · Murphy, Sarah C Derrington and Bennett JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [151] (opens in a new tab), [164]–[168] (opens in a new tab)

On the second shift the Full Court held that the primary judge’s focus on succession and on the extent of loss was misplaced ([151], [166]) and concluded, on a finely balanced assessment, that he should have found an adaptation ([167]-[168]). [171] records both conclusions as errors.

Ratio · Murphy, Sarah C Derrington and Bennett JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [96]–[97] (opens in a new tab)

The Full Court said that the Act does not call for a balancing of extant against lost aspects of traditional law and custom ([96]) and that the primary judge’s conclusion on loss was infected by the error about society and was the outcome of an analysis of lost laws and customs rather than the analysis the statute requires ([97]).

Why does this case matter?

Blucher is a recent Full Court decision on a claim in which the evidence of pre-sovereignty law is thin and the claimants’ present system has visibly changed, a common setting for questions about whether practices are traditional. The Full Court’s own conclusions on the facts depended on the evidence before it, and a student who treats them as general rules about particular kinds of change will overstate the case. It is a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court: it binds single judges of that Court, is persuasive elsewhere and does not bind the High Court.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem where claimants’ present system differs from what is known of the pre-sovereignty system, set out what the evidence shows existed at sovereignty, what has changed, what has been lost, and what evidence there is of the origin of what remains, and say what each step supports before stating a conclusion. Attribute each step to the Full Court’s joint reasons, and identify the kind of proceeding in which they were given.

The Full Court cited the High Court’s decision in Yorta Yorta and the Full Court’s earlier decision in Bodney v Bennell [2008] FCAFC 63 for points it built on ([66], [119]-[120], [128], [165]). Compare how the two Full Court decisions each treat the concept of society and the reasons for a change.

Currency: the reasons do not record the final disposition of the application, which depended on the submissions called for after the decision. Special leave to appeal to the High Court was refused on 6 August 2026 ([2026] HCADisp 168), and a refusal of special leave is not an endorsement of the Full Court’s reasons. The Full Court set out the text of s 223(1) at [50]; check the current text of the section, and later decisions applying Blucher, before relying on it.

Check your understanding

1. What separate question did the primary judge answer, who took part in that hearing, and what was his answer ([2]-[3])?

2. What did the primary judge require the Gaangalu to show about the regional society, and what did he find ([71]-[73])?

3. How did the Full Court describe the function of the concept of society in the s 223(1)(a) analysis ([64]-[69])?

4. Which two shifts in the Gaangalu system were in issue under ground two, and what did the primary judge find about each ([99], [152])?

5. What did Queensland argue about the lack of an explanation of how the cognatic shift was permissible, and why did the Full Court reject that argument ([101], [122]-[124])?

6. What evidence did the Full Court rely on in concluding that the primary judge should have found each shift to be an adaptation ([136], [168])?

7. What orders did the Full Court make, and why did it not simply remit the matter ([348]-[353])?