Native title and Yorta Yorta: continuity of traditional laws and customs
What s 223(1) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) requires of claimants as the High Court read it in Yorta Yorta: traditional laws and customs, continuity substantially uninterrupted since sovereignty, and how each Justice reasoned.
Learning outcomes
- State what s 223(1) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) requires of a claim group as the High Court read it in Yorta Yorta, and why the Court held that the common law supplies no separate set of requirements.
- Apply the ‘substantially uninterrupted’ formulation of the joint reasons to a set of findings, separating change in the content of laws and customs from interruption in their acknowledgment and observance.
- Attribute each proposition in Yorta Yorta to the Justices who gave it, and state what later authority and the current text of s 223 add.
This article states Commonwealth law: what a claim group must establish under s 223(1) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), as the High Court of Australia read that provision in Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422.1 Before asking whether a claim group holds native title, a student must ask a prior question: whose pre-sovereignty laws and customs are the claimed rights said to be possessed under, and have those laws and customs been acknowledged and observed by that society from sovereignty to the present? The claim in Yorta Yorta failed on that question, on findings of fact that five of the seven Justices held were not affected by error of law, and the Justices did not all reason in the same way.
The application and the decisions below
The application, made in February 1994 on behalf of the members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal community, sought a determination of native title to land and waters in northern Victoria and southern New South Wales. It was the first such application to be tried after the Act was enacted, with oral evidence from 201 witnesses ([1]–[4]).
On 18 December 1998 Olney J determined that native title did not exist in the claimed areas ([6]). He found that some but not all of the claimants were descended from people who were indigenous inhabitants of part of the area in 1788, and that the evidence did not show that the descendants had continued to acknowledge and observe their forebears’ traditional laws and customs in relation to land. He concluded that before the end of the 19th century the ancestors through whom the claimants claimed had ceased to occupy their traditional lands in accordance with those laws and customs ([22]). Gaudron and Kirby JJ quote his statement that “the tide of history” had washed away any real acknowledgement of those laws and any real observance of those customs ([107]). The claimants’ own application had acknowledged what European settlement brought: depopulation from disease and conflict, the separation of children from their parents, the forbidding of ceremonies and the inhibiting of traditional languages ([14]).
The Full Court of the Federal Court (Branson and Katz JJ, Black CJ dissenting) dismissed the appeal. The High Court, by special leave, dismissed the further appeal with costs: five Justices would dismiss it and two, Gaudron and Kirby JJ, would have allowed it ([7], [97], [125], [136], [192]).
Native title is what the Act defines
The joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ begin from the Act, not the common law: the claimants sought a determination that is a creature of the Act ([32]). Section 223(1) defines native title as the communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders in relation to land or waters, where:
- the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed, by those peoples (par (a));
- those peoples, by those laws and customs, have a connection with the land or waters (par (b)); and
- the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia (par (c)).2
The joint reasons treat all three as elements to be given effect, and say that the first two find their source in traditional law and custom, not the common law ([33]–[34]). The Full Court majority had read par (c) as requiring that the claimant community has continuously since sovereignty been an identifiable community, and as incorporating extinguishment by the “expiry” of native title ([11], [71]). The joint reasons rejected that. Native title is not a creature of the common law, so to speak of “common law requirements” invites error; par (c) emphasises that the two legal systems intersected at sovereignty, and recognition may require refusal to rights antithetical to fundamental tenets of the common law, a point the joint reasons put aside because no such case arose ([75]–[77]). Gaudron and Kirby JJ agreed that the Full Court majority erred in finding a continuity requirement in par (c) ([110]–[111]). McHugh J said he remained unconvinced that this construction matches what Parliament intended, but accepted it as settled by the Court’s earlier decisions ([128]–[129], [134]).
Mabo v Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23 recognised native title at common law.7 The joint reasons observed that Olney J may have given it undue emphasis at the expense of the determinative place of the Act ([70]). The introductory treatment is in Native title: common-law recognition and the statutory framework.
What “traditional” requires
The joint reasons give “traditional” two meanings beyond transmission from generation to generation. First, age: the content of the law or custom must originate in the normative rules of the societies that existed before the assertion of sovereignty ([46]). Secondly, continuity: the normative system must have had a continuous existence and vitality since sovereignty, and a later attempt to revive adherence to a former system does not reconstitute the traditional laws and customs from which native title rights must spring ([47]).
That rests on the view that laws and customs are those of a society, a body of persons united in and by its acknowledgment and observance of a body of law and customs. If that society ceases to exist as such a group, its laws and customs cease to have continued existence; if a later society takes up the same content, the rights are rooted in that later society’s laws and customs, not in pre-sovereignty law and custom ([49]–[50], [53]).
From that the joint reasons conclude that “acknowledgment and observance of those laws and customs must have continued substantially uninterrupted since sovereignty” ([87]). The word “substantially” recognises how difficult it is to prove continuous observance of oral traditions over many years, and that European settlement has had the most profound effects on Aboriginal societies. It does not remove the need to show that the society has continued to exist throughout as a body united by that acknowledgment and observance ([89]). Paragraphs (a) and (b) are in the present tense, but the continuity of the chain of possession and of connection is not irrelevant, and the connection must be a connection by the claimants’ traditional laws and customs ([85]–[86]).
Change, interruption and the reasons for it
Continuity does not mean sameness. The joint reasons said that change or adaptation, or an interruption of enjoyment or exercise between sovereignty and the present, “will not necessarily be fatal” to a claim ([83]). The “key question” is “whether the law and custom can still be seen to be traditional law and traditional custom” ([83]), and account may have to be taken of developments “at least of a kind contemplated by that traditional law and custom” ([44]). They offered no bright-line test ([82]). Interruption of exercise is distinct from change in content: evidence that some claimants or forebears did not exercise native title rights does not inevitably answer the statutory questions, which concern possession and connection, not exercise ([84]).
The reasons for an interruption are a harder point. The joint reasons said that describing the consequence of interruption as “abandonment” is apt to mislead and that “expiry” is unhelpful, and that the inquiry about continuity “does not require consideration of why, if acknowledgment and observance stopped, that happened”; the reasons matter only to the extent that they might influence the finding whether there was an interruption ([90]–[91]). In Bodney v Bennell [2008] FCAFC 63 the Full Court of the Federal Court read this as meaning that European settlement explains why the test is “substantially uninterrupted” rather than “uninterrupted”, but that a substantial interruption, once found, is not mitigated by reference to settlement ([97]).4
How the Justices divided
- Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ (joint reasons, [1]–[97]). The Full Court majority was wrong to place continuity in par (c), but the trial judge’s critical findings were findings about interruption in observance of traditional law and custom, and that the society which once observed them had ceased to do so ([95]). Upon those findings the claimants must fail ([96]).
- Gaudron and Kirby JJ ([98]–[125]). They would have allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to Olney J ([125]). Paragraph (b) requires a present connection by traditional laws and customs, not that traditional connexion with the land be “substantially maintained” since sovereignty, and Olney J’s contrary view was an error of law affecting the reasoning that led to his “tide of history” finding ([104], [123]). Continuity of community bears on whether laws and customs are traditional, and is primarily a question of whether throughout the period there were persons who identified themselves and each other as members of the community ([111], [117]).
- McHugh J ([126]–[136]). The Full Court majority erred, but the trial findings were not influenced by error of law, so the claimants must fail ([134]–[135]).
- Callinan J ([137]–[192]). He dismissed the appeal on separate reasons, saying that tradition requires a high degree of continuity and that physical presence on defined land is essential to the enjoyment of the rights ([186]). Gaudron and Kirby JJ said that par (b) does not require that the connection be physical ([104]).
The order dismissing the appeal binds the parties. The statements of principle quoted above are those of the joint reasons, which are the reasons of three of the seven Justices, and a citation should say which reasons it draws on. The Full Court in Bodney said that the approach in [87] has been adopted on the continuity issue ([71]–[73]).
What has happened since
Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1 was decided on 8 August 2002, before Yorta Yorta, and is not later authority. The joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Ward said that pars (a) and (b) show that native title rights derive from traditional laws and customs, not the common law, and that whether par (a) is satisfied is a question of fact ([18], [20]); Yorta Yorta relies on it.3
In Bodney the Full Court (Finn, Sundberg and Mansfield JJ) allowed appeals against a 2006 answer to a separate question that, subject to extinguishment, native title existed in the Perth metropolitan area. It held that the primary judge had asked whether the community that existed at sovereignty continued, rather than whether the laws and customs had continued substantially uninterrupted ([73]–[74], [123]), and, in an observation it did not need for the decision, that laws and customs may alter and develop, perhaps significantly, and still be traditional if the rights find their origin in pre-sovereignty law and custom ([120], [122]). It binds single judges of the Federal Court below it and does not bind the High Court.
In Stuart v South Australia [2025] HCA 12 the joint reasons of Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Gleeson and Beech-Jones JJ allowed an appeal by Arabana applicants against the dismissal of their claim and remitted the matter. They drew on Yorta Yorta at [83], [85] and [86] for two inquiries: present possession of rights under traditional laws and customs, recognising that some change or adaptation is not necessarily fatal; and connection with land or waters by those laws and customs ([19]–[21], [28]). They held that because the connection is “by” those laws and customs it need not be a physical connection with the claim area, and that a spiritual connection may be sufficient without qualification ([22], [26]). Steward J, in separate reasons, would have held that a spiritual, religious or cultural connection is not what s 223(1)(b) is concerned with, while agreeing that the matter should be remitted ([105]–[106], [152]).5 That is the question on which Gaudron and Kirby JJ and Callinan J had differed in Yorta Yorta ([104], [186]). The Stuart joint reasons do not refer to Callinan J’s reasons, but their holding is not consistent with his statement that physical presence is essential to the enjoyment of the rights, which was his own and not part of the joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ that they drew on.
In Blucher on behalf of the Gaangalu Nation People v State of Queensland [2025] FCAFC 177 the Full Court (Murphy, Sarah C Derrington and Bennett JJ) set aside a negative determination. It described “society” in Yorta Yorta as a concept that assists in analysing whether a normative system is traditional, and joined earlier expressions of concern at an “oversized emphasis” on it. It held that the primary judge erred by asking whether a broader regional society had continued, rather than whether the claimant group had continued to hold rights under the normative system it acknowledges and observes, and by focusing on the degree of change rather than on whether the traditional laws and customs as presently practised had continued “substantially uninterrupted”. The High Court refused special leave to appeal on 6 August 2026, saying that the proposed grounds concerned established principles and lacked sufficient prospects; that is not an endorsement of the Full Court’s reasoning.6
On legislation, the words of s 223(1)(a)–(c) set out in the joint reasons at [10] are the words in compilation 50 of the Act (compilation date 12 June 2024), which the Federal Register of Legislation listed as the latest in October 2026; the endnotes record two amendments to s 223, by Acts of 1998 and 2007. The Australian Law Reform Commission’s 2015 report Connection to Country: Review of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (Report 126) recommended amending the definition to state that traditional laws and customs may adapt, evolve or otherwise develop, and that it is not necessary to establish continuation substantially uninterrupted since sovereignty or the continued existence of a society since before sovereignty. Those recommendations are not reflected in the text of s 223(1) in that compilation.
Applying this in a problem question
- Start with s 223(1) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), not with the common law or Mabo (No 2): the joint reasons in Yorta Yorta treat the determination sought as a creature of the Act and hold that there are no separate “common law requirements”.
- Identify the rights claimed, the traditional laws and customs said to give rise to them, and the society whose laws and customs they are, at sovereignty and now. Ask whether each fact goes to par (a) or par (b), and remember that under par (b) the connection need not be physical (Stuart at [22], joint reasons).
- Ask whether the evidence shows acknowledgment and observance continuing substantially uninterrupted since sovereignty, the formulation of the joint reasons at [87], which Bodney treated as the approach. Ask about the claimant group’s laws and customs, not only about whether a broader society survived (Blucher), and do not treat the survival of a community alone as enough: Bodney at [74] says proof of continuity of a society does not necessarily establish that the rights are those that existed at sovereignty.
- Treat three questions as separate (a way of organising the analysis, not a list the joint reasons state): change or adaptation (can the law and custom still be seen to be traditional, [83]); interruption of exercise (not inevitably decisive, [84]); and interruption of acknowledgment and observance (the joint reasons do not require inquiry into why, [90], read in Bodney at [97]).
- Attribute each proposition to the reasons that state it and state the outcome, an order dismissing the appeal. Check the current text of s 223 and look for later authority before relying on any statement here.
Self-check
- Have I started from s 223(1) of the Act rather than from the common law?
- Have I stated “substantially uninterrupted” as the formulation of the joint reasons, not as the unanimous view of the Court?
- Have I distinguished change in the content of laws and customs from interruption in their acknowledgment and observance, and checked Stuart and Blucher on connection and society?
- Have I said what Gaudron and Kirby JJ, McHugh J and Callinan J each held, and that the order was to dismiss the appeal?