Native title and Yorta Yorta: continuity of traditional laws and customs

Native title is what the Act defines

Start with the Act, not the common law. The claimants sought a determination that only the Act creates ([32]).

Section 223(1) defines native title as the communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders in relation to land or waters. Paragraph (a) requires that those rights are possessed under traditional laws acknowledged and traditional customs observed by those peoples. Paragraph (b) requires a connection with the land or waters by those laws and customs. Paragraph (c) requires recognition by the common law of Australia.

The joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ treat all three as elements, with the first two sourced in traditional law and custom ([33]–[34]).

The Full Court majority read par (c) as requiring a continuously identifiable community since sovereignty, and as importing extinguishment by “expiry” ([11], [71]). The joint reasons rejected that. Native title is not a creature of the common law, so talk of “common law requirements” invites error ([75]–[77]).

On their view, par (c) marks the intersection of the two legal systems at sovereignty. Recognition may be refused to rights antithetical to fundamental tenets of the common law, but no such case arose, so the point was put aside ([75]–[77]).

Gaudron and Kirby JJ agreed the Full Court majority erred on par (c) ([110]–[111]). McHugh J remained unconvinced this matched Parliament’s intention, but accepted it as settled by earlier decisions ([128]–[129], [134]).

Mabo v Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23 recognised native title at common law. The joint reasons observed that Olney J may have overemphasised it, at the expense of the Act’s determinative place ([70]).

Change, interruption and the reasons for it

Continuity does not mean the laws and customs stayed exactly the same. Change, adaptation, or even a gap in exercising native title rights will not necessarily defeat a claim. The key question is whether the law and custom can still be seen as traditional.

Courts may need to consider developments, but only those of a kind the traditional law and custom already contemplated. There is no bright-line test for this. Interruption of exercise is also different from a change in content: if some claimants did not exercise their rights, that does not automatically decide the claim, since the real questions are about possession and connection, not exercise.

Why an interruption happened is a harder issue. The joint reasons said calling this “abandonment” can mislead, and “expiry” is unhelpful too. The continuity inquiry does not require asking why acknowledgment and observance stopped. The reasons for stopping matter only if they help show whether an interruption actually occurred.

In Bodney v Bennell, the Full Federal Court read this as explaining why the test is “substantially uninterrupted” rather than “uninterrupted” — European settlement explains that wording. But once a substantial interruption is found, it cannot be excused by pointing to settlement.

How the Justices divided

Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ gave the joint reasons, and formed the majority. They said the Full Court majority wrongly placed the continuity question under paragraph (c). But the trial judge had found an interruption in observing traditional law and custom, and that the society had stopped observing them. Because of those findings, the claimants had to fail.

Gaudron and Kirby JJ disagreed. They would have allowed the appeal and sent the case back to Olney J. They said paragraph (b) only needs a present connection through traditional laws and customs. It does not require that the connection be “substantially maintained” since sovereignty. Olney J’s contrary view was a legal error, and it affected his “tide of history” finding (his conclusion that time had washed away the connection). They also said continuity of the community matters mainly because it shows whether laws and customs are genuinely traditional, and chiefly asks whether people identified themselves as community members throughout.

McHugh J agreed the Full Court majority had erred. But he found no legal error had affected the trial judge’s findings, so the claimants still failed.

Callinan J dismissed the appeal for separate reasons. He said tradition requires a high degree of continuity, and physical presence on defined land is essential to enjoying the rights. This differs from Gaudron and Kirby JJ, who said paragraph (b) does not require a physical connection.

The order dismissing the appeal binds the parties. The quoted statements of principle come from the joint reasons, held by only three of the seven Justices, so any citation should specify whose reasons it relies on. The Full Court in Bodney later said this approach on continuity had been adopted.

Applying this in a problem question

Begin with s 223(1) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), not the common law or Mabo (No 2). Yorta Yorta’s joint reasons treat the determination as created by the Act, with no separate common law requirements.

Identify the rights claimed, the traditional laws and customs behind them, and the relevant society, both at sovereignty and now. Work out whether each fact fits par (a) or par (b). Under par (b), connection need not be physical, as Stuart notes at [22].

Check whether the evidence shows acknowledgment and observance continuing substantially uninterrupted since sovereignty. This is the joint reasons’ formulation at [87], adopted in Bodney. Focus on the claimant group’s own laws and customs, not just whether a wider society survived, as Blucher shows. Bodney at [74] warns that proving a society’s continuity does not itself prove the claimed rights existed at sovereignty.

Treat three questions separately, though this is just a way to organise the analysis, not a list the joint reasons set out. First, change or adaptation: can the law and custom still be called traditional ([83])? Second, interruption of exercise, which is not always decisive ([84]). Third, interruption of acknowledgment and observance; the joint reasons do not require asking why this happened ([90]), as read in Bodney at [97].

Attribute every proposition to the reasons that state it, and note the outcome: the appeal was dismissed. Always check the current wording of s 223 and look for later authority before relying on this summary.

Self-check

Before moving on, check your understanding of Yorta Yorta.

Start your analysis with s 223(1) of the Act, not the common law. The phrase “substantially uninterrupted” comes from the joint reasons. It is not something the whole Court agreed on unanimously.

Remember that a change in the content of laws and customs differs from an interruption in acknowledging and observing them. Check Stuart and Blucher on how this affects connection and society.

Finally, be clear on what each judgment held. Note the separate positions of Gaudron and Kirby JJ, McHugh J, and Callinan J. The final order was to dismiss the appeal.

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