First Nations peoples and Australian law: an overview
An orientation to the separate bodies of law that concern Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples: the constitutional head of power in s 51(xxvi), recognition of native title under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), statutory land grant schemes, cultural heritage protection, the prohibitions in the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), and where traditional laws and customs are given legal effect.
Learning outcomes
- Identify, on given facts, which of the bodies of law concerning Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples is engaged, and name the instrument that governs it.
- Distinguish recognition of native title under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) from a statutory grant of land under a land rights Act, and state the different question each asks.
- Explain how the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) operates both on an act of a person and on the content of a law, and when s 8(1) takes a special measure outside Part II.
- State the limited place that customary law and cultural practice have in sentencing for a federal offence, and the exceptions to that exclusion.
“First Nations and Australian law” names several separate bodies of law rather than one. They concern the same peoples and often the same land, but they ask different questions and produce different outcomes. Before asking whether a right exists or whether conduct was lawful, a student must ask a prior question: which of those regimes is engaged on these facts? The answer settles what has to be established and what follows, and almost nothing transfers from one regime to another. This article states Commonwealth law, with s 36 of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW) as a worked example of a State scheme; the cultural heritage statutes of the States and Territories are stated in Protection of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultural heritage.
Which body of law is engaged
Five questions, each answered by a different instrument.
- Do rights in land survive from traditional law and custom? That is native title, under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth).
- Can land be granted under a statutory scheme? That is statutory land rights, under a Commonwealth or State Act whose criteria are its own.
- Is a place or an object protected from harm? That is cultural heritage protection, ordinarily under the statute of the State or Territory where it is.
- Has an act, or a law, treated people unequally because of race? That is the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), which addresses the two separately.
- Does traditional law or custom itself bear on a legal consequence? That turns on the statute in question.
The constitutional starting point
The Constitution says little directly, and what it says is a grant of power rather than a grant of rights. Section 51 confers power on the Commonwealth Parliament, “subject to this Constitution”, to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to a list of subjects, and paragraph (xxvi) of that list is “the people of any race for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws”.1 That is a head of power: it authorises legislation and confers nothing on any person. It does not itself confer individual rights, and it is not the only source of rights in this area: native title also involves rights recognised by the common law, as the preamble to the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) and s 223(1)(c) of that Act acknowledge, while the schemes described below are statutory. Section 25 also remains: for the purposes of s 24, which apportions the members of the House of Representatives among the States, where a State law disqualifies all persons of a race from voting for that State’s more numerous House, persons of that race resident there are not counted in reckoning the number of the people of the State or of the Commonwealth.
The preamble to the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) records both the constitutional change and the Act’s own character: that the people of Australia voted overwhelmingly to amend the Constitution so that the Parliament would be able to make special laws for peoples of the aboriginal race, that Australia ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and enacted the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), and that the Act’s provisions are intended as special measures to rectify the consequences of past injustices.2 That characterisation has legal work to do, because the Racial Discrimination Act treats special measures differently from other race-based distinctions.
Native title is recognised, not granted
The Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) does not create the rights it deals with. Section 10 provides that “Native title is recognised, and protected, in accordance with this Act”, and s 11(1) that “Native title is not able to be extinguished contrary to this Act”; s 11(2) confines extinguishment by legislation made on or after 1 July 1993, whether Commonwealth, State or Territory, to Division 2B or Division 3 of Part 2 of the Act or to the validation of past acts and intermediate period acts.3 What is recognised is defined by s 223(1), and the rights and interests it describes are “possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed” by the peoples concerned. The statutory definition, rather than the common law alone, is therefore where a proposition about native title comes from. The recognition case and the working of the definition are set out in Native title: common-law recognition and the statutory framework.
Statutory land rights: a different route to land
A land rights Act grants land rather than recognising a surviving right, and its criteria are not the native title criteria. Under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) the Minister may establish Aboriginal Land Trusts to hold title to land in the Northern Territory “for the benefit of Aboriginals entitled by Aboriginal tradition to the use or occupation” of that land, and s 50(1)(a) makes it a function of an Aboriginal Land Commissioner, on an application by or for Aboriginals claiming a traditional land claim to such land, to ascertain whether “those Aboriginals or any other Aboriginals” are the traditional Aboriginal owners, to report the findings to the Minister and the Administrator of the Northern Territory, and, where the Commissioner finds that there are traditional Aboriginal owners, to make recommendations to the Minister for the granting of the land or any part of it under ss 11 and 12. The inquiry is not confined to the applicants, and the recommendation on such a finding is not discretionary. That claim route is closed to new applications: the Commissioner must not perform the function on an application made more than ten years after the subsection imposing the limit commenced.4
New South Wales asks a different question. Section 36 of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW) lets the New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council or a Local Aboriginal Land Council claim claimable Crown lands, and those criteria concern the status of the land rather than traditional ownership: the lands must be vested in Her Majesty and, when the claim is made, able to be lawfully sold or leased or reserved or dedicated under the named Crown lands statutes, not lawfully used or occupied, not needed or likely to be needed for an essential public purpose, and not land which “in the opinion of a Crown Lands Minister” is needed or likely to be needed as residential land — so that criterion turns on a Minister’s opinion rather than on the fact. Section 36 still names the Crown Lands Consolidation Act 1913 and the Western Lands Act 1901, but the High Court has explained that those references are read through s 68(3) of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) and, since 2018, compendiously as references to the Crown Land Management Act 2016 (NSW) (La Perouse Local Aboriginal Land Council v Quarry Street Pty Ltd [2025] HCA 32, Gageler CJ at [4]).5 Where a Minister is not satisfied that land is claimable only because it is needed for an essential public purpose, the Minister may, if the claimant agrees, grant the claim subject to a condition that would meet that need (s 36(5A)). The two native title criteria each carry an express exception: the lands must not be the subject of a registered native title determination application “other than a non-claimant application that is an unopposed application”, or of an approved determination of native title “other than an approved determination that no native title exists in the lands” (s 36(1)(d), (e)). An unopposed non-claimant application, and a determination that there is no native title, therefore do not put the land outside the claim. A Crown Lands Minister must grant a qualifying claim by transferring the land, unless satisfied that the claimant has undertaken in an Aboriginal Land Agreement not to lodge or to withdraw the claim (s 36(5AA)), and refuse one that does not qualify, with an appeal to the Court; a transfer is ordinarily for an estate in fee simple, though Western Lands Act 1901 land outside an urban area passes by a lease in perpetuity (s 36(9A)), and either way it is subject to any native title rights and interests existing immediately before it.5
The Northern Territory traditional land claim route turns on who the traditional Aboriginal owners are, within the categories of land s 50(1)(a) makes eligible (unalienated Crown land, or alienated Crown land in which all estates and interests not held by the Crown are held by or on behalf of Aboriginals); the New South Wales scheme turns on what the land is, and its criteria do not require traditional ownership. Neither set of criteria answers a question arising under the other, and the second shows that the two regimes can be live over the same land at once.
Cultural heritage protection is a third regime
The Commonwealth heritage statute works by declaration. Under ss 9 and 10 of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth) the Minister may protect a specified area from injury or desecration by making a declaration, and only on an application made orally or in writing by or on behalf of an Aboriginal or a group of Aboriginals. Section 18 adds a narrow exception: an authorised officer who is satisfied that an area is a significant Aboriginal area under serious and immediate threat, that the circumstances would justify a s 9 declaration but the injury is likely to occur before one can be made, and that no s 18 declaration has been made for the area within the previous three months because of a substantially similar threat, may make a declaration lasting no more than 48 hours, without waiting for a Minister.6 An emergency declaration under s 9 requires the Minister to be satisfied that the area is a significant Aboriginal area under serious and immediate threat of injury or desecration, and lasts no more than 30 days, extendable only to 60 days after it came into effect. A declaration under s 10 is not the emergency declaration with a report added: its threshold is lower and its inputs are different. Section 10(1) requires the Minister to be satisfied that the area is a significant Aboriginal area and that it is “under threat of injury or desecration” — without s 9’s requirement that the threat be serious and immediate — to have received and considered a report under s 10(4) from a person nominated by the Minister, together with any representations attached to it, and to have considered such other matters as the Minister thinks relevant. The report must deal with the significance of the area to Aboriginals, the nature and extent of the threat, the extent of the area to be protected, the prohibitions and restrictions to be made, the effects on others’ proprietary or pecuniary interests, the duration of any declaration, and “the extent to which the area is or may be protected by or under a law of a State or Territory, and the effectiveness of any remedies available under any such law” — potential State or Territory protection as well as protection already operating. A s 10 declaration has effect for the period it specifies, with no 30-day ceiling.6
That assumption is deliberate. Section 7(1) provides that the Act “is not intended to exclude or limit the operation of a law of a State or Territory that is capable of operating concurrently”,6 so the Commonwealth power sits alongside the jurisdiction’s own heritage statute rather than in place of it.
Racial discrimination: equality supplied by statute
The Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) works in two distinct ways, and conflating them is a common error. Section 9(1) makes an act unlawful: an act involving a distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin that has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the equal enjoyment of a human right or fundamental freedom in public life. Section 9(1A) brings in a requirement to comply with a term, condition or requirement that is not reasonable having regard to the circumstances, with which the person does not or cannot comply, where requiring compliance has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the equal enjoyment of a human right or fundamental freedom in public life by persons of the same race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin as that person.
Section 10(1) operates on a law. Where, by reason of a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory, persons of a particular race do not enjoy a right enjoyed by persons of another race, or enjoy it to a more limited extent, then “notwithstanding anything in that law” they enjoy that right by force of s 10 to the same extent — the section supplies the remedy itself rather than striking the law down. Section 8(1) carves out special measures to which paragraph 4 of Article 1 of the Convention applies, except measures to which s 10(1) applies by virtue of s 10(3).7
Where traditional laws and customs stand
Traditional laws and customs are the source of the rights the Native Title Act recognises. Elsewhere their place is set by the statute in question, and for sentencing on a federal offence Parliament has settled it expressly. Section 16A(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) requires a sentence of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances, and s 16A(2A) provides that the court “must not take into account under subsection (1) or (2), other than paragraph (2)(ma), any form of customary law or cultural practice” as a reason for excusing, justifying, authorising, requiring or lessening the seriousness of the criminal behaviour, or as a reason for aggravating it — the exclusion runs both ways. It is not absolute: s 16A(2AA) disapplies it for a listed group of cultural heritage offences, including s 22 of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth) and ss 69 and 70 of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth).8 Section 16A governs federal offences, so it decides nothing about sentencing under a State or Territory statute.
Applying this in a problem question
- Name what is in dispute — rights in land, a grant of land, harm to a place or object, unequal treatment by race, or the legal effect of traditional law — and identify the regime that governs it before reaching for any test.
- For a claimed right in land, decide whether the claim is for recognition of native title or for a grant under a land rights Act, and apply that instrument’s own criteria rather than the other’s.
- Work through the conditions in the Act of the jurisdiction concerned, and check whether a native title claim or determination excludes the land or qualifies what is transferred.
- For harm to a place or object, start with the State or Territory heritage statute and treat the Commonwealth declaration power as separate and dependent on an application.
- Where race-based unequal treatment is alleged, separate the s 9 question — an act — from the s 10 question — the operation of a law — and ask whether s 8(1) applies.
- Before relying on customary law or cultural practice in sentencing, read the governing sentencing statute; for a federal offence s 16A(2A) restricts its use as a reason for excusing, justifying, authorising, requiring or lessening the seriousness of the criminal behaviour, or for aggravating it (other than under paragraph (2)(ma)), subject to s 16A(2AA).
Self-check
- Have I identified which regime governs, rather than answering with whichever body of law I know best?
- Have I kept recognition of native title separate from a statutory grant of land, and applied each Act’s own criteria?
- Have I named the jurisdiction whose statute governs, rather than presenting one Act as the general position?
- Have I treated s 51(xxvi) as a head of power rather than as a source of rights?