Munda v Western Australia
Munda v Western Australia [2013] HCA 38
A man killed his de facto spouse in a sustained, drunken assault. The sentencing judge weighed his Aboriginal background and community disadvantage. How much can that weigh, and when may an appeal court call the sentence too low?
What happened?
Mr Munda pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of his de facto spouse, contrary to s 280 of the Criminal Code (WA) ([1]). They had been in a relationship for about 16 years and had four children, and were staying at the Mindi Rardi community near Fitzroy Crossing ([5]). On 12 July 2010 both became intoxicated at a local tavern, and an argument developed at home. He punched her on numerous occasions, threw her about the bedroom and repeatedly rammed her head into the walls ([6]). She died of traumatic brain injury ([8]).
Earlier, on 4 May 2009, he had been sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment, conditionally suspended, for doing grievous bodily harm to her, and he killed her a little more than two months after that order expired ([9], [11]). At the time of her death he was subject to a lifetime violence restraining order in relation to her, which they had evidently both ignored ([12]).
Commissioner Sleight sentenced him in the Supreme Court of Western Australia to five years and three months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years and three months ([1]). The maximum penalty was 20 years ([16]). The Commissioner treated the offending as towards the upper end of the range of seriousness for manslaughter ([16]). He noted that Mr Munda was a traditional Aboriginal man who as a child was exposed to the negative influences of alcohol and family violence ([17]), accepted that he was obliged to take the circumstances of disadvantage into account ([19]), and took account of the prospect of traditional payback, giving it limited weight ([20]).
The State appealed on the ground that the sentence was manifestly inadequate ([23]). The Court of Appeal of Western Australia allowed the appeal and resentenced him to seven years and nine months’ imprisonment ([2], [24]). In the High Court he argued that the Court of Appeal had failed to apply the principles governing State appeals for manifest inadequacy, had not given proper regard to his antecedents and personal circumstances as an Aboriginal man, and had erred in exercising its residual discretion ([3], [26]).
What did the Court decide?
The appeal was dismissed ([80]).
Two sets of reasons were given: the joint reasons of French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ ([1]-[80]) and the reasons of Bell J ([81]-[138]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The joint reasons began from the statement of Brennan J in Neal v The Queen ([50]):
“The same sentencing principles are to be applied … in every case, irrespective of the identity of a particular offender or his membership of an ethnic or other group. But in imposing sentences courts are bound to take into account, in accordance with those principles, all material facts including those facts which exist only by reason of the offender’s membership of an ethnic or other group.”
That statement had been consistently applied by intermediate appellate courts ([51]). The joint reasons quoted the observation of Eames JA in R v Fuller-Cust that regard to an offender’s Aboriginality serves to ensure that a relevant factor arising from it is not overlooked by a simplistic assumption that equal treatment of offenders means that differences in their individual circumstances related to their race should be ignored ([52]). But mitigating factors must not lead to a penalty disproportionate to the gravity of the offence ([53]).
It would be contrary to the principle in Neal “to accept that Aboriginal offending is to be viewed systemically as less serious than offending by persons of other ethnicities”, and to accept that Aboriginal offenders are in general less responsible would deny them “their full measure of human dignity”; it would also be wrong to accept that a victim of violence by an Aboriginal offender is “somehow less in need, or deserving, of such protection and vindication as the criminal law can provide” ([53]).
The joint reasons answered the suggestion that general deterrence has little claim in crimes that are not premeditated by saying that the criminal law is more than a mechanism for reducing deviant behaviour: it also vindicates the dignity of each victim, expresses community disapproval and protects the vulnerable against repetition ([54]-[55]). They quoted McLure P’s observation that addictions ordinarily increase the weight to be given to personal deterrence, and called it particularly poignant in this case ([56]-[57]). The circumstance that the appellant “has been affected by an environment in which the abuse of alcohol is common must be taken into account in assessing his personal moral culpability, but that consideration must be balanced with the seriousness of the appellant’s offending” ([57]).
Citing Gleeson CJ in Engert, they said that the interplay of sentencing considerations may be complex and that it is erroneous in principle to approach sentencing as though automatic consequences follow from the presence or absence of particular factual circumstances ([58]). The Court of Appeal’s synthesis was not shown to be affected by error ([60]).
On traditional punishment, the joint reasons said there was “something to be said for the view” that the appellant’s willingness to submit to payback is not material to the proper sentence, because the State and not the offender chooses the mode of punishment ([61]). They went on to say that the case did not afford an occasion to express a concluded view on whether the prospect of such punishment is relevant to sentence: it had been taken into account in his favour, the respondent accepted that it was relevant, and he suffered no injustice from the limited weight given to it ([62]-[63]).
On the first ground, the joint reasons rejected the argument that closely comparable cases are an essential precondition of a conclusion of manifest inadequacy: Hili v The Queen did not say so, the range of past sentences does not fix the boundaries within which future judges must or ought to sentence ([39]), the statutory maximum is a yardstick ([40]), and an earlier prosecution appeal, R v Gordon, was decided when double jeopardy was a consideration that no longer applied and gave little guidance ([41]).
Given a 20-year maximum and the prolonged, brutal beating, a conclusion that the sentence was manifestly inadequate could not be said to have been wrong ([42]). On the third ground, the Court of Appeal had a residual discretion under s 31 of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), and the joint reasons said that if McLure P’s observations suggested a more confined view of its scope they were unduly narrow, since delay in the appeal, imminent or past release on parole, the effect of resentencing on rehabilitation and the conduct of the Crown might be relevant ([65], [72]-[73]). None of the five matters urged had a claim on it ([73]-[78]).
Bell J delivered separate reasons and would have allowed the appeal ([138]). She agreed that McLure P’s statement of the scope of the discretion was unduly narrow ([90]), but held that the Court of Appeal did not address the material relied on by the appellant to show that his sentence was consistent with sentences in relevantly like cases ([105]). She regarded it as open to the sentencing judge to take into account the isolation the appellant, a traditional Aboriginal man, would experience in a prison distant from his community, and the social disadvantages in his community, weighed against the need to protect vulnerable Aboriginal women ([135]), and held that the Court of Appeal was not justified in concluding that the sentence fell definitely below the range ([137]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [50]–[53] (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab), [57]–[58] (PDF p 20) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state how an Aboriginal offender’s circumstances enter the sentencing of this appellant: from the Neal principle ([50]), with the limits that Aboriginal offending is not systemically less serious and the victim’s claim to vindication is undiminished ([53]), and with the offender’s alcohol-affected environment taken into account in assessing culpability and balanced against the seriousness of the offending ([57]-[58]). They answer the appellant’s second ground and are necessary to the dismissal of the appeal.
Obiter · French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [61]–[63] (PDF p 22) (opens in a new tab)
The joint reasons say ‘there is something to be said for the view’ that the appellant’s willingness to submit to traditional punishment is not material to the proper sentence ([61]) but expressly decline to give a concluded view, because the possibility had been taken into account in his favour, the respondent accepted it was relevant and he suffered no injustice from the limited weight given ([62]-[63]). The observation was not necessary to the ground of decision.
Separate reasoning · Bell J (dissenting in the result)
Read judgment: [133]–[135] (PDF p 48) (opens in a new tab), [137]–[138] (PDF p 49) (opens in a new tab)
Bell J treated the Fernando propositions as weighing in both directions and held that it was open to the primary judge to take into account the appellant’s isolation in a distant prison and the social disadvantage in his community, to be weighed against the need to protect vulnerable Aboriginal women ([133]-[135]). She would have allowed the appeal ([138]). This is a dissent and is not the law stated by the Court.
Proposition 2
Ratio · French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [39]–[42] (PDF p 13) (opens in a new tab), [72]–[78] (PDF p 25) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs answer the appellant’s first and third grounds: comparable sentences are not a precondition of manifest inadequacy ([39]-[42]), and the residual discretion is wider than McLure P’s observations suggested but no matter urged engaged it ([72]-[78]). They are necessary to the dismissal of the appeal.
Separate reasoning · Bell J (dissenting in the result)
Read judgment: [90] (PDF p 32) (opens in a new tab), [105] (PDF p 37) (opens in a new tab)
Bell J agreed with the joint reasons that the Court of Appeal’s statement of the scope of the residual discretion was unduly narrow ([90]) but would have held that the Court of Appeal did not address the appellant’s material on comparable sentences ([105]). That is her own route to a different result and is not attributed to the joint reasons.
Why does this case matter?
Students writing about the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders tend to announce a conclusion about mitigation without working through the facts that support it, and tend to forget that a prosecution can also challenge a sentence as too low. This is the case an examiner expects an answer to draw on in both situations, with each Justice’s reasons kept apart.
Exam and application relevance
List each fact about the offender and its source, then ask how it bears on culpability and on each purpose of the sentence, and set that against the seriousness of the offence and the maximum penalty. Attribute the points to the joint reasons or to Bell J. If the problem concerns a prosecution appeal, identify the statute and the ground, and ask what yardstick the appeal court used.
The decision arose on a prosecution appeal under Western Australian legislation and does not state the sentencing legislation of other jurisdictions, so say which statute governs a problem set elsewhere.
Check your understanding
1. What did Brennan J’s statement in Neal require of a sentencing court, and what did the joint reasons say would be contrary to it ([50], [53])?
2. How did the joint reasons say an environment in which the abuse of alcohol is common is to be treated in assessing the offender’s moral culpability, and what must that be balanced with ([57])?
3. What did the joint reasons decide and what did they leave undecided about the prospect of traditional punishment ([61]-[63])?
4. On which points did Bell J agree with the joint reasons, and on which did she differ ([90], [105], [135], [137]-[138])?