Aboriginal customary law and the general criminal law

Customary law is not an alternative criminal law

In Walker v New South Wales, a man faced a New South Wales criminal charge. He argued Parliament had no power to make laws affecting Aboriginal people without their consent.

Mason CJ, the only judge mentioned, rejected this. New South Wales Parliament can make laws for the state on any matter. Nothing in Mabo (No 2) said Aboriginal consent was needed.

Counsel also argued Aboriginal customary criminal law survived, like native title did in Mabo (No 2). So state criminal law would not apply to Aboriginal people.

Mason CJ rejected this too. He said everyone should be equal before the law. Different criminal penalties for the same conduct, based on who committed it, breaches that principle.

Even assuming customary criminal law once survived settlement, he held it ended once general criminal statutes were passed. Unlike native title, criminal law does not allow two legal systems operating side by side.

Walker was decided by a single judge on an application to stop the case, not the Full Court. It only concerned New South Wales criminal law. It says nothing about sentencing courts considering an offender’s cultural background.

Sentencing: the same principles, and all the material facts

Neal v The Queen (1982) was a Queensland case about an assault on a reserve. In separate reasons, Brennan J said sentencing principles are the same for every offender, whatever their ethnic or other group. But courts must still consider all material facts, including facts that exist only because of the offender’s group membership. This is needed for even-handed criminal justice. How much weight to give those facts is normally for the sentencing court to decide.

This was one Justice’s separate reasoning, not a majority judgment. It was later adopted by six Justices in Munda v Western Australia (2013).

Munda involved a Crown appeal (an appeal by the prosecution) against a manslaughter sentence. The offender had killed his de facto spouse in a sustained, alcohol-fuelled assault. The WA Court of Appeal raised the sentence from five years three months to seven years nine months, for being manifestly inadequate. The High Court dismissed the offender’s own appeal.

The joint reasons made three points. First, Brennan J’s statement in Neal is “the starting point,” unless specific legislation says otherwise (as in the Canadian cases the Court discussed).

Second, mitigating factors (facts reducing culpability) must get appropriate weight. But it would be wrong, contrary to Neal, to treat Aboriginal offending as systemically less serious than other offending. It would also be wrong to treat victims of Aboriginal offenders as less deserving of the law’s protection. Imposing lesser punishment based on a victim’s identity “creates a group of second-class citizens.”

Third, that the offender lived where alcohol abuse is common must be considered in assessing his personal moral culpability (how blameworthy he personally is). But this must be balanced against how serious the offending was.

The offender did not argue that Aboriginality itself justified leniency. He instead relied on disadvantage from social and economic problems common in Aboriginal communities. Bell J dissented, and would have allowed the appeal.

Traditional punishment: left open

In Munda, the sentencing judge gave some weight to the chance the offender would face traditional “payback” (corporal punishment) after release. This was treated as a factor in his favour, but only given limited weight.

On appeal, the High Court’s joint reasons suggested there is “something to be said” for the view that this factor should not matter. Their reasoning was that the state imposes punishment, and offenders don’t choose its form.

However, the respondent had already accepted that the prospect of payback was relevant to sentencing. Because of this, the Court did not need to decide the issue outright.

The joint reasons held it was enough that the offender suffered no injustice from the limited weight given to the factor. They did not reach a final, concluded view on whether payback should count at all.

So this question remains open at the High Court level. A student should not say payback either does or doesn’t reduce a sentence, as if the Court had settled it.

Where Parliament has spoken: the Commonwealth provisions

Parliament has made rules for sentencing federal offences. Section 16A(2A) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) says courts must not use customary law or cultural practice to excuse, justify, lessen or increase how serious the offending was.

There is one exception. Paragraph (2)(ma) lets a court treat the offender’s standing in the community as a reason to make the sentence more serious, where that standing helped the offence happen. The general ban in s 16A(2A) does not block this.

Section 16AA(1) sets the same ban for offences against Northern Territory law. But it has no equivalent exception for community standing.

Each provision also excludes certain cultural heritage offences from the ban (s 16A(2AA); s 16AA(2)). “Criminal behaviour” is defined broadly: it covers conduct, omissions, circumstances or results that are part of the offence, plus any fault element attached to them (s 16A(2B); s 16AA(3)).

The broader scheme of s 16A is explained in the overview article on First Nations peoples and Australian law. One question remains unresolved by the authorities discussed: whether these provisions cover the prospect of traditional punishment.

Applying this in a problem question

First, work out the jurisdiction and offence. Check whether sentencing is for a federal offence (Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A), a Northern Territory offence (s 16AA), or governed by a State or Territory sentencing statute, which must be read before applying the common law.

Next, work out what the customary law argument is for. If it is said to remove the accused from the criminal statute altogether, apply Walker. Remember Walker was decided by a single Justice, and customary criminal law is not an alternative to the general criminal law.

If instead it is raised on sentence, start with the principle in Neal, as applied in Munda: the same sentencing principles apply to every offender, though material facts about an offender’s background must still be considered.

Be clear about what Munda does not allow. It does not permit treating Aboriginal offending as systemically less serious, or a victim as less deserving of protection. Nor may mitigating factors produce a penalty disproportionate to the offence’s gravity (at [53]).

If traditional punishment is raised, note the High Court left open whether its prospect is relevant to sentence. Always check the applicable statute before relying on it.

Self-check

Before moving on, check you understand four things.

First, keep two claims separate. Walker is about customary law displacing the criminal law. Neal and Munda are about customary law being relevant to sentencing only.

Second, check whose reasons you are citing. The Neal passage comes from Brennan J’s separate reasons. The Munda propositions come from the joint reasons, not from Bell J.

Third, remember that in Munda the High Court did not reach a final view. It left open the question of traditional punishment.

Fourth, before applying common law principles, identify the sentencing statute. Work out which statute governs the offence first.

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