R v Rondo

Supreme Court of New South Wales, Court of Criminal Appeal · 2001

Criminal Law And ProcedureCriminal Process

R v Rondo [2001] NSWCCA 540

Police pull over a young man in a fast sports car with panel damage after he answers that the car is not his. Did they have enough to stop him, and what follows for the drugs found in the car?

What happened?

About 7pm on 19 February 1999 Constable Barnes was driving a police vehicle east along Epping Road at Lane Cove with Constable Gautier, and they noticed a navy blue Toyota Supra coupe with panel damage to the driver’s side, which entered Epping Road from Centennial Avenue ([32]). Constable Gautier asked the driver, John Rondo, “Is this your car?” and he replied “No” ([32]). Constable Barnes moved the police vehicle behind the Supra and engaged the beacons and siren, and the Supra pulled over ([32]).

The constables’ evidence was that, as Constable Barnes walked up, he noticed the appellant lean across to the passenger side and put something in the glovebox ([33]). The appellant said the car was his mother’s ([34]). Constable Barnes told him that he believed something stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained was in the car and that he would search it with or without consent ([34]). He found $860 folded in the console and, in the locked glovebox, small bags of green vegetable matter that the appellant described as marijuana ([35]-[38]).

The appellant was arrested, taken to Chatswood Police Station, and detained under a detention warrant, and police then obtained a search warrant for the house where he lived with his mother, where they found cannabis leaf and cannabis plants ([29], [85]). The appellant was 20 ([43]).

At a voir dire the Crown prosecutor told the trial judge that the police were suspicious because a fresh faced young man in a fast car with damage to it was driving down the road, said the car was not his, and then reached across to the glovebox ([43]). The trial judge held that the glovebox conduct was sufficient to ground a suspicion that brought s 357E into play ([47]) and admitted the evidence under s 138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) ([59]).

He held the detention warrant valid, held the search warrant invalid, and admitted the evidence found on its execution under s 138 ([130]-[134]). A jury convicted the appellant of supplying a prohibited drug (224 grams of cannabis leaf) and of cultivating a prohibited plant (59 to 63 cannabis plants), and acquitted him of offering a bribe to a police officer ([27]). He was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, suspended on a bond to be of good behaviour for two years ([27]). He appealed, unrepresented, on a number of grounds that included the stopping and search, the discretion under s 138, the detention warrant and the search warrant ([18], [28], [30]).

What did the Court decide?

On 24 December 2001 the Court of Criminal Appeal (Spigelman CJ, Simpson J and Smart AJ) allowed the appeal against the convictions, quashed them and entered verdicts of acquittal (header; [142]). Spigelman CJ gave reasons at [1]-[25], Simpson J at [26] and Smart AJ at [27]-[142].

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Smart AJ held that, when Constable Barnes required the appellant to stop the vehicle, he did not have reasonable grounds to form any of the suspicions mentioned in s 357E of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), so that the stopping of the appellant and his vehicle was unlawful ([54]). Spigelman CJ agreed with Smart AJ’s reasons subject to his own observations ([1]) and referred to the stopping of the vehicle “without any proper basis” ([4]), and Simpson J agreed with the orders and generally with Smart AJ’s reasons ([26]).

Section 357E allowed a member of the police force to stop, search and detain any person whom he or she reasonably suspected of having or conveying anything stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained, or used or intended to be used in an indictable offence, and any vehicle in which he or she reasonably suspected there was any such thing ([48]). Smart AJ drew on authorities from other fields, including George v Rockett, in stating three propositions as emerging ([52]-[53]). First, a reasonable suspicion involves “less than a reasonable belief but more than a possibility”: there must be something that would create in the mind of a reasonable person an apprehension or fear of one of the states of affairs the section covers, and a reason to suspect that a fact exists is more than a reason to consider or look into the possibility of its existence ([53(a)]).

Second, “Reasonable suspicion is not arbitrary. Some factual basis for the suspicion must be shown”; a suspicion may be based on hearsay or on material that may be inadmissible in evidence, but the material must have some probative value ([53(b)]). Third, what is important is the information in the mind of the police officer stopping the person or the vehicle at the time he did so, and the question is whether that information afforded reasonable grounds for the suspicion the officer formed, having regard to the source and content of the information in the light of the whole of the surrounding circumstances ([53(c)]).

On the information Constable Barnes had, a young man was driving a fast open coupe with some panel damage and, when asked whether the car was his, replied “No” ([51]). Smart AJ said that “The mere fact that the appellant was driving a car which he did not own or lease or hire is not sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion” ([51]). The trial judge had not examined the lawfulness of requiring the appellant to stop, and had directed his attention to the later search ([50], [57]).

Smart AJ added that an unlawful stop does not necessarily preclude police from investigating whether any offence has been committed, and that evidence obtained as a consequence is a matter for the court’s discretion under s 138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) ([55]-[56]). He concluded, “Not without doubt”, that it was open to the trial judge to find that the appellant’s alleged act, after the vehicle had stopped, of reaching across and appearing to place something in the glovebox was sufficient to ground a reasonable suspicion for the search ([58]).

The Court allowed the appeal against conviction and entered verdicts of acquittal on the footing that the defects in the police investigation had a cumulative effect, and not on the unlawful stop alone. Smart AJ held that the trial judge’s exercise of his discretion under s 138 of the Evidence Act to admit the evidence found in the vehicle was vitiated because the judge did not take into account that the vehicle had been unlawfully stopped and that all else flowed from that ([60]).

He held that the detention warrant was invalidly issued, because the application was not verified as s 356H required ([114]), did not include the information s 356I(1)(c) and (d) required ([115]-[116]), and rested on an incorrect statement that the appellant had offered no explanation, so that the real grounds were not before the justice ([118]-[120]); he rejected the submission that the warrant was applied for after the four-hour investigation period had expired ([117]). The trial judge had himself found that the search warrant was improperly issued and invalid ([130]), and Smart AJ regarded its grounds as insufficient to constitute reasonable grounds for a belief that there was cannabis on the premises ([135]).

He said that regard should be had to the combined effect of the unlawful stopping, the invalid detention warrant and the invalid search warrant ([137]), that in exercising his discretion over the evidence obtained on execution of the search warrant the trial judge did not appear to have had regard to them or to the pattern of unlawful conduct, and that it could not be said that the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighed the undesirability of admitting it ([138]).

He regarded the offences as towards the bottom of the criminal scale, noted the suspended sentence, and held that the case did not warrant a retrial ([141]-[142]). Spigelman CJ said that it was the cumulative effect of the defects in the investigative process that led him to conclude that the appeal should be allowed ([1]). He said that the defects would lead to acquittal only if a trial judge exercised the s 138 discretion to exclude the evidence and that the Court “cannot and does not purport to undertake the balancing exercise”, but that, given the number and nature of the defects, the trial and appeal, and the suspended sentence, a new trial should not be ordered ([2]).

He thought the evidence found at the home was obtained in consequence of the contravention of s 357E, there being a clear chain of causation ([5]), and in consequence of a contravention of Part 10A of the Crimes Act during the extended detention ([6]). He said that the stopping, had it stood alone, was not sufficiently distinctive from the illegality the trial judge had assumed to justify intervention, and that he would not have found a miscarriage of justice if it stood alone, “However, it does not stand alone” ([8]).

On the detention warrant he agreed that the absence of a signature on the application was not a breach ([19]), and held that the cumulative effect of the deficiencies, including the absence of a verifying affidavit and the unanswered paragraph about the investigation to date, meant that the warrant was not valid ([23]-[25]). Simpson J agreed with the orders and generally with Smart AJ’s reasons, agreed with the Chief Justice’s additional observations, and found it unnecessary to express an opinion on the difference between them about the effect of the initial stopping had it stood alone, because the contravention did not stand alone ([26]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Smart AJ (Spigelman CJ agreeing with his reasons subject to his own observations; Simpson J agreeing generally)

Read judgment: [49]–[54] (opens in a new tab)

The conclusion that the stopping of the vehicle was unlawful because the officer lacked material for any s 357E suspicion, and the statement of what a reasonable suspicion requires on which it rests, was one of the defects on which the orders depended ([1], [137]-[138]). The three propositions at [53] are Smart AJ’s summary of authorities from other fields, which he applies at [51] and [54].

Obiter · Smart AJ (Spigelman CJ and Simpson J agreeing generally)

Read judgment: [55]–[58] (opens in a new tab)

The remarks that an unlawful stop does not preclude investigation and that admissibility is a matter for s 138 are general comment. The conclusion at [58], reached not without doubt, that it was open to the trial judge to find the glovebox conduct sufficient to ground suspicion for the search went against the appellant on that limb and was not necessary to the orders made on the combined effect of the defects.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Smart AJ, Spigelman CJ and Simpson J (each agreeing in the orders)

Read judgment: [1] (opens in a new tab), [26] (opens in a new tab), [137]–[138] (opens in a new tab), [141]–[142] (opens in a new tab)

The orders (appeal allowed, convictions quashed, verdicts of acquittal) rest on the combined effect of the unlawful stop, the invalid detention warrant and the invalid search warrant: Spigelman CJ at [1], Simpson J at [26] (this contravention did not stand alone) and Smart AJ at [137]-[138].

Separate reasoning · Smart AJ

Read judgment: [60] (opens in a new tab), [112]–[120] (opens in a new tab)

Smart AJ’s own reasons that the failure to take the unlawful stop into account vitiated the trial judge’s discretion over the evidence found in the vehicle ([60]), and his grounds on the detention warrant ([112]-[120]), are his. Spigelman CJ said at [8] that he would not have found a miscarriage of justice if the stop stood alone, and Simpson J at [26] expressed no opinion on the effect of the stop standing alone; Simpson J agreed generally with Smart AJ’s reasons and with the Chief Justice’s observations on the defects in the detention warrant.

Separate reasoning · Spigelman CJ

Read judgment: [2] (opens in a new tab), [4]–[8] (opens in a new tab), [17]–[25] (opens in a new tab)

Spigelman CJ agreed with Smart AJ’s reasons subject to his own observations. His distinct route: the Court cannot and does not purport to undertake the s 138 balancing but declines to order a new trial; the stop, had it stood alone, would not have been a miscarriage of justice; the detention warrant was invalid on the cumulative effect of its deficiencies.

Separate reasoning · Simpson J

Read judgment: [26] (opens in a new tab)

Simpson J agreed with the orders and generally with Smart AJ’s reasons and with the Chief Justice’s observations, and expressly did not express an opinion on the effect of the stopping had it stood alone, describing it as a classic exercise of discretion that could reasonably go either way.

Why does this case matter?

Police-power problems usually give the facts of a roadside stop and ask whether the officer had power to do what was done, and a good answer then follows the consequences into the trial. The case is an unusually complete example of that sequence, with a short stop, a search, a detention and a house search all in one set of facts.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem about a police stop and search, set out what the officer knew at the moment of the stop and what was learned afterwards, name the statutory power relied on, and ask what follows for the evidence at trial. Attribute each statement to the Justice who made it.

This decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal binds New South Wales trial courts and is persuasive elsewhere, but it does not bind the High Court. The provision it construed, s 357E of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), has since been replaced; the corresponding warrantless stop and search powers are in the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), including s 21 (searching persons) and s 36 (searching vehicles), which commenced (apart from Part 8A) on 1 December 2005, and their current text should be checked before the case is applied.

The detention-warrant provisions the judgment applies are those of Part 10A of the Crimes Act as it sets them out ([10], [105]-[111]), under which the maximum investigation period was 4 hours unless a detention warrant extended it. The corresponding scheme is now in Part 9 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), where s 115(2) fixes the maximum investigation period at 6 hours or such longer period as a detention warrant allows and ss 118 to 120 deal with detention warrants; check the current text before applying the case to a detention.

In 2026 a District Court judge on a rehearing applied this decision at [53] to s 21 of the 2002 Act and separated the question whether the officer held the suspicion from the question whether the grounds relied on were reasonable (Brown v R [2026] NSWDC 42, Newlinds SC DCJ, at [10]-[14]); that is a single judge’s decision.

Check your understanding

1. What did Constable Gautier ask the driver, what was the answer, and what did Constable Barnes do next ([32])?

2. What did the Crown prosecutor say, on the voir dire, was the basis on which the police were suspicious ([43])?

3. What did s 357E allow a member of the police force to do, and in respect of whom or what ([48])?

4. Whose three propositions about reasonable suspicion are at [53], and from what does the judgment say they emerge ([52])?

5. On what basis did Spigelman CJ say that he had concluded the appeal should be allowed ([1])?

6. What did Simpson J say about the difference of opinion between Spigelman CJ and Smart AJ ([26])?