R v Rondo
R v Rondo [2001] NSWCCA 540
Police pull over a young man in a fast sports car with panel damage after he answers that the car is not his. Did they have enough to stop him, and what follows for the drugs found in the car?
What happened?
In February 1999, two constables in New South Wales noticed a navy blue Toyota Supra with panel damage on Epping Road, Lane Cove. Asked if the car was his, John Rondo, aged 20, said no. The police stopped him, and Constable Barnes said he saw Rondo reach toward the glovebox.
Barnes searched the car without consent, finding $860 and bags of cannabis. Rondo was detained under a detention warrant. Police later searched his mother’s home under a search warrant and found cannabis leaf and plants.
The trial judge admitted the evidence under s 138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), holding the search warrant invalid. A jury convicted Rondo of supply and cultivation, and he received a suspended sentence.
Rondo appealed unrepresented. Ask yourself what the police actually knew when they required him to stop.
What did the Court decide?
On 24 December 2001 the Court of Criminal Appeal (Spigelman CJ, Simpson J and Smart AJ) allowed the appeal against the convictions, quashed them and entered verdicts of acquittal (header; [142]). Spigelman CJ gave reasons at [1]-[25], Simpson J at [26] and Smart AJ at [27]-[142].
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Smart AJ held that Constable Barnes lacked reasonable grounds for any suspicion under s 357E of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). This meant stopping the appellant’s vehicle was unlawful ([54]). Spigelman CJ agreed with Smart AJ’s reasons, adding his own observations, and described the stop as “without any proper basis” ([1], [4]). Simpson J agreed with the orders and generally with Smart AJ’s reasoning ([26]).
Section 357E let police stop, search and detain a person reasonably suspected of having or carrying stolen or unlawfully obtained goods, or things used or intended for an indictable offence. It also covered vehicles reasonably suspected of containing such things ([48]).
Drawing on authorities from other areas, including George v Rockett, Smart AJ stated three propositions ([52]-[53]).
First, “reasonable suspicion” is less than a reasonable belief but more than a mere possibility. It requires something that would create apprehension in a reasonable person’s mind. A reason to suspect a fact exists is stronger than a reason merely to consider or investigate that possibility ([53(a)]).
Second, reasonable suspicion is not arbitrary. Some factual basis must be shown. The material may be hearsay or otherwise inadmissible, but it must have some probative value ([53(b)]).
Third, what matters is the information actually in the officer’s mind at the time of the stop. The question is whether that information gave reasonable grounds for the suspicion, considering the source and content of the information and the surrounding circumstances ([53(c)]).
On the facts, Constable Barnes knew only that a young man was driving a fast, damaged coupe, and said “No” when asked if the car was his ([51]). Smart AJ said this alone was not enough to found a reasonable suspicion. Merely driving a car you do not own, lease or hire is insufficient ([51]).
The trial judge had not considered whether the stop itself was lawful. He had focused only on the later search ([50], [57]).
Smart AJ also noted that an unlawful stop does not necessarily stop police from later investigating whether an offence occurred.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Smart AJ (Spigelman CJ agreeing with his reasons subject to his own observations; Simpson J agreeing generally)
Read judgment: [49]–[54] (opens in a new tab)
The conclusion that the stopping of the vehicle was unlawful because the officer lacked material for any s 357E suspicion, and the statement of what a reasonable suspicion requires on which it rests, was one of the defects on which the orders depended ([1], [137]-[138]). The three propositions at [53] are Smart AJ’s summary of authorities from other fields, which he applies at [51] and [54].
Obiter · Smart AJ (Spigelman CJ and Simpson J agreeing generally)
Read judgment: [55]–[58] (opens in a new tab)
The remarks that an unlawful stop does not preclude investigation and that admissibility is a matter for s 138 are general comment. The conclusion at [58], reached not without doubt, that it was open to the trial judge to find the glovebox conduct sufficient to ground suspicion for the search went against the appellant on that limb and was not necessary to the orders made on the combined effect of the defects.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Smart AJ, Spigelman CJ and Simpson J (each agreeing in the orders)
Read judgment: [1] (opens in a new tab), [26] (opens in a new tab), [137]–[138] (opens in a new tab), [141]–[142] (opens in a new tab)
The orders (appeal allowed, convictions quashed, verdicts of acquittal) rest on the combined effect of the unlawful stop, the invalid detention warrant and the invalid search warrant: Spigelman CJ at [1], Simpson J at [26] (this contravention did not stand alone) and Smart AJ at [137]-[138].
Separate reasoning · Smart AJ
Read judgment: [60] (opens in a new tab), [112]–[120] (opens in a new tab)
Smart AJ’s own reasons that the failure to take the unlawful stop into account vitiated the trial judge’s discretion over the evidence found in the vehicle ([60]), and his grounds on the detention warrant ([112]-[120]), are his. Spigelman CJ said at [8] that he would not have found a miscarriage of justice if the stop stood alone, and Simpson J at [26] expressed no opinion on the effect of the stop standing alone; Simpson J agreed generally with Smart AJ’s reasons and with the Chief Justice’s observations on the defects in the detention warrant.
Separate reasoning · Spigelman CJ
Read judgment: [2] (opens in a new tab), [4]–[8] (opens in a new tab), [17]–[25] (opens in a new tab)
Spigelman CJ agreed with Smart AJ’s reasons subject to his own observations. His distinct route: the Court cannot and does not purport to undertake the s 138 balancing but declines to order a new trial; the stop, had it stood alone, would not have been a miscarriage of justice; the detention warrant was invalid on the cumulative effect of its deficiencies.
Separate reasoning · Simpson J
Read judgment: [26] (opens in a new tab)
Simpson J agreed with the orders and generally with Smart AJ’s reasons and with the Chief Justice’s observations, and expressly did not express an opinion on the effect of the stopping had it stood alone, describing it as a classic exercise of discretion that could reasonably go either way.
Why does this case matter?
This NSW Court of Criminal Appeal case follows a stop, search, detention and house search as one sequence. It asks whether each stage was lawful.