Section 109 and inconsistency between Commonwealth and State laws

How s 109 resolves conflict between Commonwealth and State laws: direct inconsistency and covering the field, applied in Worthing, Dickson, Kakariki and Jemena.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth
Subjects
constitutional-law
Topics
federalism

Learning outcomes

  • Test a State law against a Commonwealth law for direct inconsistency under s 109 before asking whether the Commonwealth law covers the field.
  • Identify the field a Commonwealth law is said to cover precisely enough to decide whether a State law enters it.
  • State the effect of s 109 as invalidity only to the extent of the inconsistency, and say what survives.

Section 109 of the Constitution decides what happens when a valid Commonwealth law and a valid State law apply to the same conduct and cannot stand together. Before asking which law prevails, a student must ask whether the two laws are inconsistent at all, because overlap between them is not enough. The answer fixes how much of the State law survives, since the section removes it only “to the extent of the inconsistency”. This article states the position as the High Court has stated it. The section is Commonwealth constitutional law and its text speaks of “a law of a State”; the laws of the Territories are not addressed here.

What the section says, and what it assumes

Section 109 reads: “When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid.”1 Covering clause 5 of the Constitution Act supports it by making Commonwealth laws binding on “the courts, judges, and people of every State” despite anything in the laws of any State.2

The section assumes two things. First, it assumes that both laws are valid on their own terms. Where Commonwealth and State powers are concurrent, the High Court has said, “the question of inconsistency does not involve the limits of constitutional powers under the respective Constitutions, but rather the operation of both Acts”.6 The validity of the Commonwealth law is therefore a prior question (see Characterisation and heads of power).

Second, it compares laws, and “a law of the Commonwealth” is not limited to a statute. In Jemena Asset Management (3) Pty Ltd v Coinvest Ltd [2011] HCA 33 the Court held that s 109 is capable of applying to an industrial award or other legislative instrument made under a statute, and described the section as requiring “a comparison between any two laws which create rights, privileges or powers, and duties or obligations”.6

Two aspects of inconsistency

The standard statement is Dixon J’s in Victoria v Commonwealth (1937) 58 CLR 618, the Kakariki case.3 The joint reasons of the whole Court took it up in Telstra Corporation Ltd v Worthing (1999) 197 CLR 614 and again in Dickson v The Queen (2010) 241 CLR 491.5 It has two propositions, and this article uses the labels the Court attached to them.

  1. Direct inconsistency. A State law that, if valid, would “alter, impair or detract from the operation of a law of the Commonwealth Parliament” is invalid to that extent. The test does not depend on whether both laws can be obeyed: “there may be inconsistency within the meaning of s 109 although it is possible to obey both the Commonwealth law and the State law”. One recognised form is “direct collision”, a phrase of Barwick CJ’s, where the State law “would impose an obligation greater than that for which the federal law has provided”.4 A different result follows where the Commonwealth law operates within the setting of other laws so that it is “supplementary to or cumulative upon” the State law.4 The alteration, impairment or detraction “must be significant and not trivial”.6
  2. Indirect inconsistency, or “covering the field”. If the terms, nature or subject matter of a Commonwealth enactment show that it was intended as a complete statement of the law governing a particular matter or set of rights and duties, a State law that regulates the same matter detracts from its full operation and is inconsistent with it. In Jemena the Court explained that “cover the field” means “cover the subject matter” and observed that this aspect of inconsistency “has not been free from criticism”.6

The two propositions are separate. The second “may apply in a given case where the first does not”, but where the first applies s 109 operates without any need to consider the second.4 The Court in Jemena added that all the accepted tests are ways of discerning whether there is a real conflict between the two laws.6 A problem answer therefore tests direct inconsistency first.

Direct collision applied: compensation and conspiracy

Telstra Corporation Ltd v Worthing concerned a worker injured in 1993 while employed by Telstra, who claimed under the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW). The Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) provided a compensation regime of its own, and the High Court set out the differences between the two schemes. Weekly payments were calculated differently and for different periods. Under the federal Act compensation for permanent impairment was payable only above a 10 per cent threshold, and each scheme capped the sum. Interest was available under the State Act and the federal Act had no equivalent. Applying the State law, the Court held, “would qualify, impair and, in some respects, negate the application of federal law”, and it was “no answer that the subject-matters of the two laws are not co-incident”, because the State law, by granting certain rights, “would deny or vary a right, power or privilege conferred by the federal law”. The Court of Appeal had gone on to ask whether the federal law covered the field. That was an unnecessary step once direct inconsistency was made out.4

Dickson v The Queen shows the same reasoning in a criminal setting. Customs had seized cigarettes and stored them in a warehouse in Victoria, and it was accepted that they were in the Commonwealth’s possession for the purposes of the Commonwealth theft provision. The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to steal them under s 321 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). The Commonwealth had its own conspiracy provision, s 11.5 of the Criminal Code (Cth), which was narrower. It applied only where the primary offence carried more than 12 months’ imprisonment or a fine of 200 penalty units or more, required an overt act, and gave no liability to a person who withdrew before an overt act and took all reasonable steps to prevent the primary offence. The Victorian offence was complete on the making of the agreement. The Court held that the State law “alters, impairs or detracts from the operation of the federal legislation and so directly collides with it”, allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction. It found it unnecessary to consider covering the field.5 It noted that the differing modes of trial strengthened the case for inconsistency, because s 80 of the Constitution requires unanimity on a trial on indictment for a Commonwealth offence, and it stressed that s 109 matters to the citizen on whom concurrent duties would otherwise be imposed.5

Where the Commonwealth law leaves room

Not every overlap is a conflict. In the Kakariki case a wreck lay in Port Phillip. Section 13 of the Marine Act 1928 (Vic) authorised a port officer to take proceedings for the removal of a sunk ship, with the cost recoverable from the owner, and s 329 of the Navigation Act 1912 (Cth) let the Commonwealth Minister require the owner to remove it. No step had been taken under the Commonwealth section. The Court held that the Victorian port officer could lawfully exercise the State power. Dixon J found nothing in the language, nature or subject matter of s 329 to suggest that the Commonwealth authority was to have the exclusive power of deciding whether the owner should remove a wreck, and said: “The end in view is not only compatible with, but is aided by, the co-existence of other powers for securing the removal of wrecks.” He allowed that if the Minister undertook the removal the State authority might be shut out as to that wreck, but that went no further than the inconsistency, since “a State law is invalid only to the extent of the inconsistency”.3

Jemena applies the same idea to a statutory scheme. The appellants were bound by federal awards and certified agreements, made under the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), that dealt in detail with long service leave. The Construction Industry Long Service Leave Act 1997 (Vic) required employers to pay a charge into a fund that paid portable long service leave benefits to workers in the construction industry. The appellants alleged both direct and indirect inconsistency. The Court unanimously rejected both. The State scheme provided benefits paid from the fund and made no provision for the grant of long service leave itself, which was the subject of the federal instruments. Those instruments did not deal with portable benefits for workers moving between employers in the industry, and the Court said it was possible to infer from the beneficial character of the federal instruments that the Commonwealth did not intend to exclude a compatible State law. A Minister’s second reading speech, it added, does not overcome the need to read the text. The practical lesson is the Court’s own: “the importance of clearly identifying the field said to be covered exhaustively by a law of the Commonwealth and correctly characterising a law of a State”.6

The extent of the inconsistency, and what a Commonwealth law can say about itself

Section 109 invalidates a State law only “to the extent of the inconsistency”, and the extent “depends on the text and operation of the respective laws”.6 Whether one provision of a State Act can operate apart from another that is inconsistent “must depend upon the intention of the State legislation, ascertained by interpreting the statute”, in words of Dixon J that the Court quoted.6

A Commonwealth law cannot, by its own force, deny operation to a State law merely by saying so. Mason J’s statement, quoted by the Court in Dickson, is that such a provision may nevertheless validly show an intention to make exhaustive or exclusive provision, which brings s 109 into play, and a Commonwealth law may equally show that it is not intended to be exhaustive. The Court cautioned that “intention” here is the court’s construction of the federal law and not a collective mental state of legislators, and that cases where a field is said to be covered by implication alone are the more difficult ones.5

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify both laws and confirm that each is valid in its own right: the Commonwealth law needs a head of power, and the State law must be otherwise valid.
  2. Identify the Commonwealth source, which may be a statute or an instrument made under a statute that has the force of a Commonwealth law.
  3. Test direct inconsistency first. Ask whether the State law, if it operated, would impose a greater obligation, attach liability to conduct the Commonwealth law excludes, or deny or vary a right the Commonwealth law confers. Any alteration, impairment or detraction must be significant and not trivial. That both laws can be obeyed does not answer the question.
  4. If there is no direct inconsistency, ask whether the terms, nature or subject matter of the Commonwealth law show that it is a complete statement of the law on the matter. Define the field narrowly and say what the Commonwealth law does not deal with, and look for any express statement that it is, or is not, exhaustive.
  5. State the consequence precisely: the State law is invalid only to the extent of the inconsistency, so say which part, if any, survives.

Self-check

  • Have I confirmed that both laws are valid before comparing them?
  • Have I tested direct inconsistency before covering the field?
  • Have I named the field exactly, and what the Commonwealth law leaves untouched?
  • Have I confined the result to the extent of the inconsistency?

Where the authority sits

The statements of principle in Worthing, Dickson and Jemena are joint reasons of the Court. A High Court holding binds lower Australian courts, and the High Court can reconsider its own decisions. The decisions cited here run from 1937 to 2011, and later decisions on s 109 are not covered by them.

Pop quiz

5 quick questions on this article, the authorities it cites and the articles it links to.

  • About 3 minutes, and no time limit.
  • You can only go forwards: each answer locks when you submit it.
  • After each question you see the right answer, why, and where to read more.
  • Free, and no account needed. Log in or create a free account to keep your scores.