Interpreting the Constitution: text, structure and history
The High Court’s method of reading the Constitution: the words in their legal setting from the Engineers’ case, what that case did not decide, and the use of history.
Learning outcomes
- Explain the starting point and method the High Court applies to constitutional text, as stated in the Engineers’ case.
- Distinguish what the Engineers’ case rejected from what it did not decide, including implications drawn from the structure of the Constitution.
- Use history and context to identify meaning, and decline arguments from failed referendums or an undefined federal balance.
Every question about constitutional power or limitation is answered by construing a text, but the High Court does not read the Constitution as a private contract or as a statute with no setting. Before applying any doctrine, a student must ask what the Court treats as the starting point: the words of the Constitution read in their legal setting, or a prior view of how power ought to be divided between the Commonwealth and the States. The starting point changes the result, because it is what separates the older implied-immunity and reserved-powers reasoning from the approach in use since 1920. This article states Commonwealth constitutional method as the High Court has stated it.
Start with the words: the Engineers’ case
In Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129 (the Engineers’ case) a union sought to bring State trading concerns within a Commonwealth industrial arbitration scheme, and the States relied on an immunity from Commonwealth control.1 The joint judgment of Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ, delivered by Isaacs J, treated the question as one of construing the instrument. It called the Constitution a “political compact of the whole of the people of Australia, enacted into binding law by the Imperial Parliament”, and said that the Court’s “chief and special duty” is “faithfully to expound and give effect to it according to its own terms, finding the intention from the words of the compact”.1 Gavan Duffy J dissented, and Higgins J gave separate reasons.
The method the joint judgment applied can be set out as three steps. The Constitution is to be read “naturally in the light of the circumstances in which it was made, with knowledge of the combined fabric of the common law, and the statute law which preceded it”. Where the text is explicit it is conclusive, and where it is ambiguous recourse is had to the context and scheme of the instrument, a rule the judgment took from Privy Council authority. The judgment also said: “The ordinary meaning of the terms employed in one place may be restricted by terms used elsewhere: that is pure legal construction.”1 It drew a consequence for the burden of argument: “where the affirmative terms of a stated power would justify an enactment, it rests upon those who rely on some limitation or restriction upon the power, to indicate it in the Constitution”.1
What the Engineers’ case rejected
The joint judgment rejected two lines of reasoning. The first was an implied prohibition on the exercise of a granted power, justified by “necessity”. It held that such a doctrine could not be applied consistently, because necessity of that political kind varies with the power, the State and the time, and that “possible abuse of powers is no reason in British law for limiting the natural force of the language creating them”. The second was reading s 107 of the Constitution as reserving to the States a power that falls within an express grant in s 51: “a fundamental and fatal error”, the judgment said, unless the reservation is explicitly stated.1 It also declined to treat American authority as a secure basis for measuring Commonwealth and State rights, because two features of the Australian system, the common sovereignty of all parts of the British Empire and the principle of responsible government, distinguish it from the American Constitution.1 The Court held that States, when parties to industrial disputes in fact, are subject to Commonwealth legislation under s 51(xxxv) if the legislation on its true construction applies to them.1 That holding is itself subject to the implication from the structure of the Constitution discussed in the next section.
What the Engineers’ case did not decide
The case is sometimes taught as a rule that nothing outside the text counts. The High Court corrected that in New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1 (the Work Choices case), where the joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ said that it is “important not to overstate either the propositions about constitutional construction applied in and after the Engineers’ Case or the consequences of their adoption”. Kirby J and Callinan J dissented in that case.2
The joint reasons made three points. First, what was discarded in 1920 was “an approach to constitutional construction that started in a view of the place to be accorded to the States formed independently of the text of the Constitution”. Whether an implication is needed depends on the starting point: if the inquiry begins with the constitutional text, a different conclusion is reached. Second, the Engineers’ case “did not establish that no implications are to be drawn from the Constitution”, and it did not establish that no regard may be had to the general nature and structure of the framework the Constitution erects. The Court quoted Dixon J in Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31: “The foundation of the Constitution is the conception of a central government and a number of State governments separately organized. The Constitution predicates their continued existence as independent entities.”42 The case is an example of an implication drawn from the structure of the Constitution, and Characterisation and heads of power deals with the limit that follows from it. The Court added that this observation “does not identify the content of any of those functions”.2
Third, arguments from the “federal balance” must have content. The joint reasons observed that such references “carry a misleading implication of static equilibrium”, and that to be valuable the proposition that a construction would impermissibly alter the federal balance “must have content”, which the plaintiffs had not defined.2 The Court also quoted Windeyer J that the Constitution “is not an ordinary statute: it is a fundamental law”, whose principles may vary and develop with changing circumstances without courts transgressing lawful boundaries.2
History as an aid: Cole v Whitfield
Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360 shows how history is used. The Court, in joint reasons of seven Justices, said that reference to the history of s 92 may be made “not for the purpose of substituting for the meaning of the words used the scope and effect ... which the founding fathers subjectively intended the section to have, but for the purpose of identifying the contemporary meaning of language used, the subject to which that language was directed and the nature and objectives of the movement towards federation”.3 The history showed that the movement toward federation aimed at eliminating intercolonial border duties and discriminatory burdens and at free trade between the colonies. The Court adopted “the interpretation which ... is favoured by history and context” and departed from a doctrine that had failed to retain general acceptance. It did not treat the United States commerce clause as helping to elucidate s 92. The result for s 92 is explained in Section 92.3
What does not fix the meaning
Two arguments the High Court has declined to accept as settling meaning are worth naming. One is borrowing a foreign model: Engineers declined to treat American decisions as a measure of Australian federal power, and Cole v Whitfield declined to use the United States commerce clause to elucidate s 92. The other is the failure of a referendum proposal. In the Work Choices case the joint reasons said there are “insuperable difficulties in arguing from the failure of a proposal for constitutional amendment to any conclusion about the Constitution’s meaning”, and that the failure of successive referendums “provides no assistance in the resolution of the present matters”.2 Alteration and interpretation are separate processes; see The Constitution: legal authority, enforcement and alteration.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify the constitutional text in issue and its operative words, and ask first what those words naturally mean.
- Read the words in their constitutional context. A word in one provision may be restricted by another provision, and that is a question of construction.
- If an argument says that a power is cut down because of State interests or a “federal balance”, ask what text or structural feature supports the limit and what its content is. Separate a limit drawn from the structure of the Constitution, such as the continued existence of the States, from a general claim that a field belongs to the States.
- Use history to identify the meaning of the language, the subject it addressed and the objectives of federation, not the subjective intentions of the framers.
- Do not treat a failed referendum or an overseas model as settling meaning, and state which court decided each authority and what it held.
Self-check
- Have I begun with the words of the Constitution rather than a view of what the States should keep?
- Have I distinguished implications from the structure of the Constitution from reserved powers or immunities of the older kind?
- Have I used history for meaning and not for subjective intention?
- Have I given the content of any “federal balance” argument before relying on it?
Where the authority sits
The Engineers’ case, the Work Choices case and Cole v Whitfield are High Court decisions. A High Court holding binds lower Australian courts, and the High Court can reconsider its own decisions. The statements in the Work Choices case quoted above are from the joint reasons of five Justices, and the article does not address the separate reasons of Kirby J or Callinan J.