Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth
Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31
The Commonwealth did not forbid the States to bank. It forbade banks to serve them without the Treasurer’s consent. Five Justices struck the law down, and they did not give the same reasons.
What happened?
Section 48 of the Banking Act 1945 (Cth) provided that, except with the written consent of the Commonwealth Treasurer, a bank was not to conduct any banking business for a State or for any authority of a State, including a local governing authority. The Treasurer proposed to specify local governing authorities, including the City of Melbourne, to which the section would apply, so that banks other than the Commonwealth Bank could not do their business. The Lord Mayor, Councillors and Citizens of the City of Melbourne banked with the National Bank of Australasia and claimed a declaration that the Act, or alternatively s 48, was invalid. The Commonwealth demurred, relying on the power to make laws with respect to “Banking, other than State banking” in s 51(xiii). Victoria intervened in support of the Commonwealth; South Australia and Western Australia opposed it.
What did the Court decide?
The demurrer was overruled with costs, and s 48 was declared void. McTiernan J dissented.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
Section 48 of the Banking Act 1945 (Cth), which forbade a bank to conduct banking business for a State or an authority of a State, including a local governing authority, except with the written consent of the Commonwealth Treasurer, was held invalid by Latham CJ, Rich, Starke, Dixon and Williams JJ; McTiernan J would have upheld it as a law with respect to banking. The five did not give one set of reasons. Latham CJ held the section to be in substance legislation about States and State authorities, so not a law with respect to a subject of Commonwealth power.
Rich J held its pith and substance to be that a State must have the Treasurer’s consent to become a bank’s customer, and that the power freely to use the facilities provided by banks is essential to the efficient working of government. Starke J asked whether the law curtails or interferes in a substantial manner with the exercise of a State’s constitutional power, and did not treat discrimination as a decisive test. Dixon J held that the section singled out the States and imposed a disability upon them. Williams J held it in pith and substance aimed at giving directions to the States about how they exercise governmental functions, discrimination pointing strongly to that conclusion.
Latham CJ said of the section: “It singles out States and State agencies and creates a rule for them and for no others.” Starke J said: “I cannot agree that the presence or absence of discrimination affords a decisive test or legal criterion of constitutional power.” Williams J said: “the presence of discrimination points strongly to the law being aimed at the States.”
In his own reasons Dixon J treated the Engineers’ Case as establishing a prima facie rule that a power to legislate on a subject enables the Parliament to make laws that affect the operations of the States and their agencies, subject to a reservation for a law that discriminates against States or places a particular disability or burden on an operation or activity of a State, especially on the execution of its constitutional powers. He said that the distinction between a law of general application and a provision singling out governments and placing special burdens on the exercise of their powers or the fulfilment of their functions is a consequence of the conception on which the Constitution is framed, namely a central government and a number of separately organised State governments whose continued existence the Constitution predicates as independent entities.
The High Court has since treated the singling-out distinction as part of a single inquiry into whether a federal law impairs a State’s capacity to function as a government: in Austin v Commonwealth (2003) 215 CLR 185 at [143], Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ said that fixing separately upon laws addressed to States and laws of general application tends to favour form over substance, and in Clarke v Commissioner of Taxation [2009] HCA 33 at [65]-[66], Gummow, Heydon, Kiefel and Bell JJ described discrimination as but an illustration of such a law and said there is but one limitation, applied by looking at the substance and actual operation of the federal law.
His words were: “The foundation of the Constitution is the conception of a central government and a number of State governments separately organized. The Constitution predicates their continued existence as independent entities.”
Why does this case matter?
Melbourne Corporation is cited in federalism answers as the source of a limit on Commonwealth laws that bear on the States, and the usual mistake is to give it one settled test. An answer that quotes one Justice as though the Court had said it misdescribes the case, however accurate the quotation.
Exam and application relevance
Use the case for its order and for the reasons of the Justices you name, and attribute each formulation to the Justice who gave it. Dixon J’s reasoning is the source of the passage on the foundation of the Constitution that later High Court reasons quote; the joint reasons in New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1 at [194] quote it in explaining what Engineers did not establish. The High Court has since restated the limit, so Dixon J’s 1947 formulation is the origin of the limit and not a statement of the current test: give the later restatement, and check any more recent authority before applying the formulation to a modern law. The section here was struck down on its own features, and Dixon J said that the decision could be no wider than those features require.
Check your understanding
1. Which Justice would have upheld s 48, and what was his view of the subject the section dealt with?
2. Name two of the majority Justices and say how each described what was wrong with s 48.
3. Which Justice’s reasons contain the statement that the Constitution predicates the continued existence of the States as independent entities, and did every Justice in the majority adopt the test that Justice applied?