Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd
Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129
Western Australia’s state trading concerns argued that a Commonwealth arbitration law could not bind a State as an employer. The Court had accepted that kind of argument for years, and this time it did not.
Qualified by Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31
The holding that States, as parties to industrial disputes in fact, are subject to Commonwealth legislation under s 51(xxxv) stands. It operates subject to the implication from the structure of the Constitution that the joint reasons in New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1 at [194] describe, which rests on Dixon J’s statement in Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31 at 82 that the Constitution predicates the continued existence of the States as independent entities.
What happened?
The Amalgamated Society of Engineers brought a plaint under the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act against 844 respondents. Among them were the Minister for Trading Concerns of Western Australia and two State undertakings under his control, the State Implement and Engineering Works and the State Sawmills. The special case recorded two facts that were conceded: the respondents carried on trading operations that could give rise to industrial disputes if they were private employers, and they were not private employers but represented the State of Western Australia. A case was stated under s 18 of the Judiciary Act for the Full Court on a summons under s 21AA of the Act, asking whether the Commonwealth Parliament could make laws binding on the States about conciliation and arbitration for industrial disputes extending beyond one State, and whether the dispute was an industrial dispute within s 51(xxxv).
What did the Court decide?
The Court answered both questions yes. Four Justices gave a joint judgment. Higgins J wrote separately, concluding that the Railway Servants’ Case should be overruled and that the question should be answered as the Chief Justice proposed. Gavan Duffy J dissented, concluding that the Federal Parliament had no jurisdiction under s 51(xxxv) over disputes between a State carrying on industrial operations and its employees. The joint judgment also said which earlier decisions it treated as no longer authoritative: it held the decision in D’Emden v Pedder sound as an application of s 109, and it held the Railway Servants’ Case could no longer be regarded as law.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
In the joint judgment of Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ (delivered by Isaacs J), the Constitution is to be read naturally in the light of the circumstances in which it was made and the common law and statute law that preceded it, and the doctrine of implied prohibition, resting on political necessity, is rejected as a means of limiting a power ascertained by ordinary rules of construction. Section 107 does not reserve from the Commonwealth a power that falls fairly within an express grant in s 51 unless the reservation is explicitly stated. States, and persons representing States, when parties to industrial disputes in fact, are subject to Commonwealth legislation under s 51(xxxv) if the legislation on its true construction applies to them.
The joint judgment states the method in these words: “The one clear line of judicial inquiry as to the meaning of the Constitution must be to read it naturally in the light of the circumstances in which it was made, with knowledge of the combined fabric of the common law, and the statute law which preceded it, and then lucet ipsa per se.” On s 107 it says that “it is a fundamental and fatal error to read sec. 107 as reserving any power from the Commonwealth that falls fairly within the explicit terms of an express grant in sec. 51, as that grant is reasonably construed, unless that reservation is as explicitly stated.”
The holding on the question asked is this: “We therefore hold that States, and persons natural or artificial representing States, when parties to industrial disputes in fact, are subject to Commonwealth legislation under pl. XXXV. of sec. 51 of the Constitution, if such legislation on its true construction applies to them.”
Why does this case matter?
Engineers is the case an examiner expects an answer on constitutional method to start from, and the case students most often carry too far. Describing it by one sentence about implications misstates what the Court later said was and was not discarded, and leaving it out leaves the later federalism cases without their starting point.
Exam and application relevance
Use the case for what the joint judgment of four Justices decided, and for nothing wider: begin from the questions the special case asked and the Court’s answers, then give the reasoning from the Proposition. Keep the joint judgment’s statements apart from Higgins J’s separate reasons and from Gavan Duffy J’s dissent. The joint judgment declined to pronounce on some earlier decisions that had used the same kind of reasoning and left them for further consideration, so do not say that it overruled all of them. Say that the s 51(xxxv) holding stands subject to the later High Court account of the structural implication, and name that account.
Check your understanding
1. Which Justices wrote the joint judgment, who delivered it, and which Justice wrote separately but reached the same answers?
2. What did the joint judgment say about the decision in D’Emden v Pedder, and why does that differ from what it said about the Railway Servants’ Case?
3. Whose reasoning concluded that the Federal Parliament had no jurisdiction under s 51(xxxv) over the State’s industrial operations, and how did the final order come out?