Telstra Corporation Ltd v Worthing
Telstra Corporation Ltd v Worthing (1999) 197 CLR 61
A linesman claimed workers compensation under New South Wales law for a back injury. His employer said a federal scheme already covered him, and that the State scheme could not run beside it.
Clarified by Jemena Asset Management (3) Pty Ltd v Coinvest Ltd [2011] HCA 33
In Jemena the joint reasons of French CJ, Gummow, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ said that the notions of altering, impairing or detracting from the operation of a law of the Commonwealth have in common the idea that a State law conflicts with a Commonwealth law if it undermines the Commonwealth law, so that any alteration, impairment or detraction must be significant and not trivial ([41]), and that the accepted tests of inconsistency are tests for discerning whether a real conflict exists ([42]).
What happened?
Mr Worthing applied to the Compensation Court of New South Wales for compensation under the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) for back injuries he alleged he sustained as a linesman employed by Telstra or its predecessors, on 20 May 1986, 28 April 1988 and 2 June 1993 ([2]). Telstra moved to strike out the application for want of jurisdiction on two grounds: that the New South Wales legislation did not on its proper construction cover Telstra or its predecessors, and that if it did, it conflicted with Commonwealth laws and was invalid under s 109 of the Constitution to the extent of the inconsistency ([3]). The Compensation Court dismissed the motion and the Court of Appeal of New South Wales dismissed Telstra’s appeal. Telstra and the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth, who had intervened, each appealed to the High Court ([1], [5]).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed both appeals and ordered that the application to the Compensation Court be struck out for want of jurisdiction ([45]). For the 1986 and 1988 injuries, the Court held that s 21(3) of the Telecommunications Act (Cth) declared a legislative purpose that Commonwealth law operate exclusively of State law on the topic, so that s 109 operated on the State law ([24]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
In the joint reasons of seven Justices, there may be inconsistency within s 109 although it is possible to obey both the Commonwealth law and the State law, and there is what Barwick CJ identified as direct collision where the State law, if allowed to operate, would impose an obligation greater than that for which the federal law has provided; a different result obtains if the Commonwealth law operates within the setting of other laws so that it is supplementary to or cumulative upon the State law ([27]).
Of Dixon J’s two propositions in Victoria v The Commonwealth, the first being that a State law which would alter, impair or detract from the operation of a law of the Commonwealth is to that extent invalid and the second that a Federal enactment intended as a complete statement of the law on a matter makes a State law regulating the same matter inconsistent, the second may apply where the first does not, but if the first applies s 109 operates even if, and without the occasion to consider whether, the second applies ([28]).
Applying the New South Wales workers compensation scheme to Mr Worthing’s 1993 injury would qualify, impair and in some respects negate the application of the federal law, so the State law was invalid to the extent of the inconsistency, and it was no answer that the subject-matters of the two laws are not coincident ([31]-[32]).
The joint reasons said that the Court of Appeal proceeded as if it was not the inevitable consequence of its view of the comparison that s 109 operated, and went on to consider whether the federal law covered the field ([33]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ
Read judgment: [27] (PDF p 20) (opens in a new tab), [28] (PDF p 21) (opens in a new tab), [31] (PDF p 22) (opens in a new tab), [32]–[34] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab)
For the 1993 injury, the joint reasons applied direct inconsistency to hold that the State compensation rights would qualify, impair and in some respects negate the federal scheme. That conclusion required the State claim to be struck out. The principles adopted at [27]-[28] explain why simultaneous obedience did not save the State law and why direct inconsistency sufficed without a further finding that the federal law covered the field. The reasons attribute the direct-collision formulation to Barwick CJ and quote Dixon J’s two propositions; their application here, rather than the quotations alone, supports this classification. The supplementary or cumulative operation mentioned at [27] is a contrast expressly rejected on these facts, not a holding that these schemes could coexist. At [33]-[34] the Court confirms that the direct-inconsistency reasoning was sufficient to allow the appeals.
Why does this case matter?
Worthing gives a student a decided example of s 109 applied to two statutory schemes that both respond to the same injury, which is something concrete to hold a new problem against. The risk in using it is to treat the facts of a compensation scheme as the whole of the law of inconsistency.
Exam and application relevance
Use the case for what the seven Justices decided about workers compensation schemes: the comparison of the two schemes in the Court of Appeal’s analysis, on which the Court relied, is the model for how to set out a direct inconsistency argument ([29]-[31]). The Court said that a different result follows where the federal law stands in a different relation to the State law, so test the facts against that contrast as well. Apply the case together with the High Court’s later statement of the significance required, and not in place of it.
Check your understanding
1. Is it enough, for s 109, that a person can obey both the Commonwealth law and the State law? What did the seven Justices say?
2. Which of Dixon J’s two propositions did the Court say could apply on its own, and what follows for the second if the first applies?
3. What did the Court say about the Court of Appeal’s decision to ask whether the federal law covered the field?