Victoria v Commonwealth

High Court of Australia · 1937

Constitutional LawFederalism

Victoria v Commonwealth (1937) 58 CLR 618

A wrecked ship lay in Port Phillip Bay, and a State statute and a Commonwealth statute each provided for its removal at the owner’s cost. Neither authority had yet acted, and the State feared its statute might already be void.

Affirmed by Telstra Corporation Ltd v Worthing (1999) 197 CLR 61

In Telstra Corporation Ltd v Worthing the joint reasons of seven Justices set out Dixon J’s two propositions in these words ([28]). They added that the second proposition may apply in a given case where the first does not, but that if the first proposition applies then s 109 operates even if, and without the occasion to consider whether, the second proposition applies.

What happened?

The ship Kakariki lay wrecked in Port Phillip Bay. Section 13 of the Marine Act 1928 (Vic) allowed a port officer or harbour master to have a wreck in a Victorian port removed under a warrant issued by justices, with the cost recoverable from the owner. Section 329 of the Commonwealth Navigation Act 1912-1935 allowed the Minister to require the owner of a wreck on or near the coast of Australia to remove it, and to remove it himself and recover the cost if the owner did not. The Commonwealth contended that the State section was invalid because it was inconsistent with the Commonwealth one. No step had been taken by the Minister, and the proceedings arose from an apprehension that if the State acted, the cost of removal might be irrecoverable from the owners. Victoria and others brought a special case in the High Court.

What did the Court decide?

The Court answered question b yes and gave no answer to questions a and c. As Dixon J describes them, question a asked whether s 13 was a valid exercise of State legislative power and of full force and effect, and question c concerned what the Minister might do under s 329. Starke J and McTiernan J would also have answered question a in the affirmative.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

A Victorian statute authorising a port officer to have a wreck in a Victorian port removed at the owner’s expense was held not to be rendered invalid by s 329 of the Commonwealth Navigation Act 1912-1935, which empowered the Minister to require the owner of a wreck on or near the coast of Australia to remove it and to remove it himself if the owner did not, no step having been taken by the Minister. The Justices gave separate reasons.

Latham CJ held that there was no inconsistency in express terms, and that an inconsistency would exist only if the Commonwealth section meant that no one else could remove the wreck, which he saw no reason to imply. Dixon J, with Rich J agreeing, held that s 329 conferred a concurrent or parallel power and that any inconsistency would extend no further than wrecks in respect of which the Minister was proceeding under it. Evatt J held that the co-existence of executive powers to remove wrecks seldom establishes inconsistency, and McTiernan J that the terms of s 329 did not negate the State power at least until the Minister intervened. Starke J held the State law not inconsistent because concurrent powers were useful, and no conflict arose unless one authority interfered with the acts of the other.

Dixon J, with Rich J agreeing, gave this formulation of the test of inconsistency under s 109: when a State law, if valid, would alter, impair or detract from the operation of a law of the Commonwealth Parliament, then to that extent it is invalid; and if it appears from the terms, the nature or the subject matter of a Federal enactment that it was intended as a complete statement of the law governing a particular matter or set of rights and duties, then for a State law to regulate or apply to the same matter or relation is regarded as a detraction from the full operation of the Commonwealth law and so as inconsistent.

Why does this case matter?

Answers on s 109 quote the formulation from this case more often than they describe the case itself. Because the formulation is Dixon J’s, attributing it to the whole Court in 1937 misdescribes the decision.

Exam and application relevance

Attribute the formulation to Dixon J, with Rich J agreeing, and attribute each other Justice’s reasoning to that Justice. The Court answered only question b, so do not use the case for the validity of the Commonwealth section or for what the Minister could do under it. Because no step had been taken by the Minister, the case does not decide what happens when both authorities act on the same wreck; Latham CJ said that questions of validity would or might arise if they did, and Dixon J said that if they began to remove the wreck by different and incompatible means, one would have to give way to the other.

Check your understanding

1. Which questions did the Court answer, which did it leave unanswered, and which two Justices would also have answered question a?

2. Which Justice gave the two propositions on inconsistency, and which Justice agreed with his reasons?

3. What did Dixon J say the extent of any inconsistency would be if s 329 gave the Commonwealth an exclusive power once the Minister exercised it?