Victoria v Commonwealth
Victoria v Commonwealth (1937) 58 CLR 618
A wrecked ship lay in Port Phillip Bay, and a State statute and a Commonwealth statute each provided for its removal at the owner’s cost. Neither authority had yet acted, and the State feared its statute might already be void.
Affirmed by Telstra Corporation Ltd v Worthing (1999) 197 CLR 61
In Telstra Corporation Ltd v Worthing the joint reasons of seven Justices set out Dixon J’s two propositions in these words ([28]). They added that the second proposition may apply in a given case where the first does not, but that if the first proposition applies then s 109 operates even if, and without the occasion to consider whether, the second proposition applies.
What happened?
The Kakariki wrecked in Port Phillip Bay. Victorian law let port officers remove wrecks at owners’ expense. Commonwealth law let the Minister do similarly, Australia-wide. The Minister hadn’t acted. Victoria sought a High Court ruling on whether the State law was invalid for inconsistency.
What did the Court decide?
The Court answered only question b, leaving questions a and c unanswered. Starke J and McTiernan J would have answered question a yes.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
A Victorian law letting a port officer remove a wreck, at the owner’s expense, was not invalid under s 109. This was despite s 329 of the Commonwealth Navigation Act 1912-1935, letting the Minister require removal, or remove it himself.
Judges differed in reasoning. Latham CJ found no express inconsistency. Dixon J (Rich J agreeing) said s 329 gave a concurrent power; conflict only arises once the Minister acts. Evatt J, McTiernan J and Starke J similarly found no inconsistency, at least absent actual conflict.
Dixon J’s test: a State law is invalid under s 109 if it detracts from a Commonwealth law meant to completely state the governing rules.
Why does this case matter?
Answers on s 109 quote the formulation from this case more often than they describe the case itself. Because the formulation is Dixon J’s, attributing it to the whole Court in 1937 misdescribes the decision.