Executive government and responsible government
How the Commonwealth executive is built in the Constitution, what responsible government adds, how the New South Wales Legislative Council’s power to call for State papers was upheld in Egan v Willis, and why Williams (No 1) and (No 2) hold that executive spending needs a source of power beyond an appropriation.
Learning outcomes
- Describe how sections 61 to 64 of the Constitution constitute the Commonwealth executive and link ministers to Parliament.
- Explain what responsible government requires of ministers and how a House of Parliament may hold the executive to account, by reference to Egan v Willis.
- Explain why an appropriation does not by itself authorise executive spending or contracting, by reference to Williams v Commonwealth (No 1) and (No 2).
Parliament makes law, but the executive carries much of it into effect, and also spends public money, makes contracts and runs departments. For each of those activities a student should ask two prior questions: what is the source of the power, and who can call the holder to account? This article answers them for the Commonwealth from the text of the Constitution and the High Court’s two decisions in Williams v Commonwealth, and for one State, New South Wales, only from the High Court’s decision in Egan v Willis and a later Court of Appeal decision, both concerning that State’s Legislative Council. No other State’s constitution or parliamentary practice is covered, so nothing here says how the executive of any other State is constituted or held to account. For the wider picture of the three functions of government, see the Australian legal system: an overview.
The Commonwealth executive in the text of the Constitution
Section 1 vests the legislative power of the Commonwealth in a Federal Parliament of the Queen, a Senate and a House of Representatives. Section 61 vests the executive power of the Commonwealth in the Queen, makes it exerciseable by the Governor-General as the Queen’s representative, and says that it extends to the execution and maintenance of the Constitution and of the laws of the Commonwealth. Section 62 creates a Federal Executive Council to advise the Governor-General, and section 63 provides that references to the Governor-General in Council mean the Governor-General acting with the advice of that Council.1
Section 64 supplies the link between the executive and Parliament. The Governor-General may appoint officers to administer departments of State; those officers are members of the Federal Executive Council and the Queen’s Ministers of State; and, after the first general election, no Minister may hold office for longer than three months unless he is or becomes a senator or a member of the House of Representatives. The text therefore requires ministers to sit in Parliament. The compiled text still speaks of the Queen, and this article does not state the conventions by which the Governor-General acts, because it read no source for them.
Responsible government
Responsible government is the idea that the executive answers to Parliament. In Williams v Commonwealth [2012] HCA 23, French CJ, drawing on Quick and Garran, said that the system of responsible government was “embedded in the federal Constitution” (at [58]).2 The joint reasons in Egan v Willis (1998) 195 CLR 424 give its content. Responsible government has traditionally been considered to encompass “the means by which Parliament brings the Executive to account”, and it includes at least two aspects: Ministers, who may sit in either House of a two-House Parliament, are liable to the scrutiny of that House about the conduct of the executive; and the ministry must command the support of the lower House on confidence motions (at [42], [45]).4 The second aspect is perhaps the better known, but the first is the one in issue in that case.
Parliament’s power to call the executive to account: Egan v Willis
On 1 May 1996 the New South Wales Legislative Council resolved that Mr Egan, the Leader of the Government in that House and a Minister, table certain papers. Cabinet had agreed that Ministers should decline to comply with such orders, and he did not. On 2 May the Council adjudged him guilty of contempt and suspended him for the remainder of that day’s sitting, and he was removed from the chamber. He sued for declarations and for trespass to the person. The High Court dismissed his appeal.
The joint reasons of Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ proceeded from the principle, which was not challenged, that the Legislative Council has “such powers, privileges and immunities as are reasonably necessary for the proper exercise of its functions” (at [48]). They found a function in the Council’s superintendence of the conduct of the executive by the production of State papers, noted that Council had required such papers since 1856, and said that what is reasonably necessary is understood by reference to the conventional practices the Council has established (at [46], [50]). They added that the position could be varied or abrogated by legislation, and that no question arose about the powers a House has over persons who are not its members (at [51], [56]). McHugh J agreed that the substance of the claim failed, for different reasons, though he would have allowed the appeal to set aside the Court of Appeal’s order and substitute another (at [59]). The joint reasons said that questions of privilege may arise in relation to the production of documents but that none arose in the case (at [53]). The New South Wales Court of Appeal later addressed them in Egan v Chadwick [1999] NSWCA 176. All three Justices held the Council could require access to documents over which legal professional privilege or public interest immunity was claimed, but the Chief Justice held that the power does not extend to documents that directly or indirectly reveal the deliberations of Cabinet (Spigelman CJ at [70]), and Meagher JA went further and treated the immunity of Cabinet documents as complete (at [154]); Priestley JA would have allowed the Council to call for them (at [142]-[143]).5 That is an intermediate appellate court’s decision on a New South Wales question. The decision in Egan v Willis is about a House’s powers over its own members in New South Wales. For the Commonwealth Parliament, section 49 of the Constitution provides that the powers, privileges and immunities of each House are those the Parliament declares and, until declared, those of the House of Commons at the establishment of the Commonwealth.
The executive’s power needs a source: Williams (No 1)
Responsible government does not by itself say what the executive may do. Williams v Commonwealth [2012] HCA 23 asked whether the Commonwealth could, without legislation, enter a funding agreement with a private organisation to provide chaplaincy services at a State school in Queensland, and pay money under it. Appropriation Acts had been passed, but no Act authorised the payments (French CJ at [39]). The Court answered that the agreement was beyond the executive power of the Commonwealth under section 61 and that the making of the payments was not supported by that power; Heydon J dissented.
The Justices wrote separately, and the following is French CJ’s account. Some executive action needs no express statutory authority: what is necessary or reasonably incidental to the execution and maintenance of a valid law once it has taken effect, the administration of departments of State under section 64, and activities properly characterised as deriving from the character and status of the Commonwealth as a national government (at [34]). The agreement fitted none of them (at [83]). French CJ did not accept that the reach of the executive’s contracting and spending power is measured by the subjects on which Parliament could legislate (at [36]), and an appropriation did not fill the gap: it was not in dispute that an appropriation under section 83 is a necessary condition of the exercise of the spending power but is not a source of it (at [39]). He also pointed to the federal dimension, because wide executive spending in fields the States also occupy has the potential to diminish their authority in practice (at [37]).
Parliament’s response and its limit: Williams (No 2)
Within days of the decision Parliament enacted legislation to give legislative support to spending on agreements specified in regulations. In Williams v Commonwealth [2014] HCA 23 the Court held that, in its operation with respect to the chaplaincy agreement, that legislation was not valid, because providing a chaplain or welfare worker at a school is not the provision of benefits to students within section 51(xxiiiA) of the Constitution (joint reasons of French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ at [47]-[48]); the joint reasons also rejected an argument under the corporations power in section 51(xx) (stated at [12]). Crennan J agreed with the answers, subject to a reservation confined to the benefits-to-students challenge (at [99]).3 The lesson is institutional: a statute can supply the authority section 61 does not, but only if Parliament has a head of legislative power to enact it. Each case binds lower Australian courts; the High Court can reconsider its own decisions.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify the actor (Parliament, the Governor-General in Council, a Minister, a department or an officer) and the jurisdiction. This article states the Commonwealth position and the New South Wales Legislative Council decisions it read.
- Find the source of authority. Is there an Act? If not, ask whether the action falls within the fields French CJ identified in Williams (No 1) at [34], and say that those are one Justice’s reasons.
- Where money is spent, separate the appropriation from the authority: section 83 is a necessary condition, not a source of power (Williams (No 1) at [39]).
- Where an Act is said to authorise the spending, ask whether the Act is a valid law with respect to a head of power, as Williams (No 2) required.
- For accountability, ask whether the minister sits in Parliament (section 64) and which House may require documents. Use Egan v Willis for the New South Wales Legislative Council, and say that other Parliaments depend on their own arrangements.
Self-check
- Have I stated the source of the executive’s power rather than treating an appropriation as authority?
- Have I distinguished French CJ’s reasons from the Court’s order in Williams (No 1)?
- Have I kept Egan v Willis to the New South Wales Legislative Council and its own members?
- Have I said that the validity of a spending statute turns on a head of legislative power?
Where the authority sits
The Commonwealth executive rests on sections 61 to 64 of the Constitution, read with section 1 and section 83. The limits on executive spending rest on the High Court’s two decisions in Williams v Commonwealth, and the Legislative Council’s powers over its own members on Egan v Willis. The constitutional text is stated as compiled to 1977, together with the orders and passages cited in those decisions and in Egan v Chadwick. No other State’s constitution is covered, so identify the jurisdiction before stating any of it as the law there.