Williams v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2)
Williams v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2014] HCA 23
Within days of the High Court holding school chaplaincy funding unlawful, Parliament passed a law to authorise it. The same parent challenged the new law. Which powers in the Constitution could support it?
What happened?
Ronald Williams had four children at a Queensland state school. In 2010 he challenged the Commonwealth’s payment of money to Scripture Union Queensland (SUQ) to provide chaplaincy services at that school ([4]). In June 2012, in Williams (No 1), the Court rejected his argument based on s 116 of the Constitution but held that the funding agreement and the payments under it were not supported by the executive power of the Commonwealth under s 61 ([5]).
Within days, Parliament enacted the Financial Framework Legislation Amendment Act (No 3) 2012 (Cth). It amended the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) and the Regulations to give legislative support not only to agreements and payments of the kind in issue in Williams (No 1) but to many other arrangements and grants ([6]). The central provision, s 32B, said that where the Commonwealth did not otherwise have power to make, vary or administer an arrangement or grant that was specified in the regulations, or was for a program specified in them, it had power to do so; the National School Chaplaincy and Student Welfare Program was specified ([15]-[16]).
Mr Williams brought a fresh proceeding challenging those provisions, generally and in their operation with respect to the SUQ funding agreement and the payments made under it ([7]). The Commonwealth parties defended them as laws with respect to the provision of benefits to students within s 51(xxiiiA) of the Constitution, and SUQ added that they were laws with respect to trading or financial corporations within s 51(xx) ([11]-[12]). The Commonwealth parties also sought to advance other arguments, including by an application to reopen Williams (No 1) ([13], [57]). The parties stated eight questions in a special case ([14]).
What did the Court decide?
French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ gave joint reasons and Crennan J gave separate reasons. The Court answered each of the eight questions in the special case, and its answers are set out in the order. It left relief to a single Justice, and ordered the defendants to pay Mr Williams’ costs of the special case.
The questions for the Court were which head of Commonwealth legislative power, if any, supported the new provisions, and whether the Court should reopen Williams (No 1) on the Commonwealth parties’ arguments about the Executive’s power to spend.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The heads of power. The joint reasons held that s 32B and the associated provisions were not valid laws of the Commonwealth in their operation with respect to the chaplaincy funding agreement and the payments under it. They were not laws with respect to the provision of “benefits to students” within s 51(xxiiiA) of the Constitution. “Benefits” there carries the sense accepted in the BMA Case, McTiernan J’s “material aid given pursuant to a scheme to provide for human wants”, which may be provided as a service ([43]-[44]).
Providing chaplaincy services at a school was not material aid for the human wants of students, was not directed to any identified or identifiable student, and was not directed to the consequences of being a student ([47]-[48]). The joint reasons did not attempt a comprehensive definition and said that “benefits to students” cannot be construed piecemeal ([45]). They also held that a law authorising the Commonwealth to make such agreements and payments was not a law with respect to trading or financial corporations within s 51(xx), because it made no provision regulating or permitting any act by or on behalf of a corporation ([49]-[51]).
The answer was confined to that operation. The joint reasons did not decide whether s 32B was wholly invalid, for example as an impermissible delegation of legislative power ([30], [36]).
Crennan J. Crennan J agreed with the joint reasons and the answers, subject to a reservation confined to s 51(xxiiiA) ([99]). She held that the provisions fell outside that paragraph because they did not institute a scheme of government assistance to or for persons, here students, as prescribed and identifiable beneficiaries ([102], [110]). A social security benefit, in her view, is a personal entitlement of individuals ([104]), and the submission that “benefits” includes services to undifferentiated persons had to be rejected ([107]-[108]). She said it was unnecessary to conclude or imply that the services of student welfare workers or counsellors could not be the subject of a federal scheme for benefits to students ([111]).
Reopening Williams (No 1) and executive power. The joint reasons refused the application to reopen Williams (No 1) and answered Question 4 “No”. Williams (No 1) depended on premises established in Pape, which the Commonwealth parties did not seek to reopen. Showing that it had not applied principles carefully worked out in earlier cases would show only that the Court need not be especially reluctant to reopen a decision of six Justices so recently given ([60]). The Commonwealth parties had had a complete opportunity to put their arguments ([61]), and their complaint of “considerable inconvenience” disclosed no more than a wish that the decision had been different and the need to enact the impugned provisions ([65]).
The arguments rejected. The joint reasons rejected a limitation of executive power by reference to matters of “national benefit or concern” as a proposition of great width that may commit to Parliament the judgment of what is within the spending power ([70]-[71]). They held that consultation with the States, coupled with their acquiescence, does not supply otherwise absent constitutional power ([74]), and that the Commonwealth parties’ arguments wrongly assumed that the Commonwealth’s executive power is the same as that of the British Executive, an assumption that denies that the Constitution distributes powers between the Commonwealth and the States ([77]-[83]).
They rejected the argument that s 51(xxxix) supported the Appropriation Acts or s 32B, because treating expenditure as incidental to appropriation would be contrary to Pape, and treating s 32B as incidental to executive power presupposed what Pape and Williams (No 1) deny ([85]-[87]). Question 1 was answered “Unnecessary to answer” because the same questions about the validity of the impugned provisions would arise if the Appropriation Acts supplied authority ([53]-[56]). Crennan J agreed with the joint reasons on these matters ([99]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [43]–[48] (PDF p 25) (opens in a new tab), [49]–[51] (PDF p 28) (opens in a new tab)
[43]-[48] give the reasons why chaplaincy services at a school are not ‘benefits to students’, and [49]-[51] why a law authorising such agreements and payments is not a law with respect to trading or financial corporations. Each is a ground for the answer to Question 2, which depended on the Commonwealth parties and Scripture Union Queensland being unable to point to a head of power. The first range runs from physical page 25 to page 27.
Separate reasoning · Crennan J (agreeing with the joint reasons and the answers subject to a reservation confined to s 51(xxiiiA))
Read judgment: [99]–[110] (PDF p 40) (opens in a new tab)
Crennan J reached the same answer on s 51(xxiiiA) by a different route, treating a benefit as government assistance to which identifiable persons are entitled and holding that the scheme did not identify any student as a beneficiary. She concurs in the answers; her reservation means she did not adopt every step of the joint reasons on this limb. The range runs from physical page 40 to page 45.
Proposition 2
Ratio · French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ (joint reasons), with Crennan J agreeing
Read judgment: [57]–[67] (PDF p 30) (opens in a new tab), [68]–[83] (PDF p 32) (opens in a new tab), [85]–[87] (PDF p 37) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs give the reasons for refusing to reopen Williams (No 1) and for rejecting the Commonwealth parties’ arguments about the Executive’s power to spend and the incidental power. They are the ground for the answer ‘No’ to Question 4 and for the conclusion that, with the impugned provisions invalid in the relevant operation, the agreement and payments had no other support. The first range runs from physical page 30 to page 32, the second from page 32 to page 37.
Why does this case matter?
After Williams (No 1), the natural question is what Parliament can do in response. Students who stop at the first case miss that the response was itself litigated, by the same plaintiff, two years later. An examiner looks for an answer that treats the two decisions as a sequence and says which questions each of them decided.
Exam and application relevance
In a problem about government spending that has been given statutory backing, identify the head of power said to support the statute and test the statute’s operation against the words of that head. Say whose reasons you rely on for each point.
Where a government invites a court to depart from a recent decision, set out what the government argued, what the Court said about the decision’s premises and about the arguments, and why the application was or was not accepted. Keep the questions the Court answered separate from those it said it did not need to answer.
Check your understanding
1. What definition of “benefits” did the joint reasons take from the BMA Case, and which features of the chaplaincy program did they say took it outside that meaning?
2. How did Crennan J’s reasons on s 51(xxiiiA) differ from the joint reasons, and what did she say was unnecessary to conclude?
3. What reasons did the joint reasons give for refusing to reopen Williams (No 1)?
4. Why was Question 1 answered “Unnecessary to answer”?