Executive government and responsible government
The Commonwealth executive in the text of the Constitution
The Constitution gives different powers to different bodies. Section 1 gives legislative power (the power to make laws) to Parliament: the Queen, the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Section 61 gives executive power (the power to carry out and enforce laws) to the Queen. The Governor-General exercises this power as her representative. It covers executing and maintaining the Constitution and Commonwealth laws.
Section 62 creates the Federal Executive Council, which advises the Governor-General. Section 63 explains that “Governor-General in Council” means the Governor-General acting on that Council’s advice.
Section 64 connects the executive to Parliament. The Governor-General can appoint Ministers to run government departments. These Ministers sit on the Federal Executive Council and are the Queen’s Ministers of State.
After the first general election, a Minister cannot hold office for more than three months unless they become a senator or House member. This means Ministers must sit in Parliament.
The Constitution’s text still refers to the Queen. This article does not explain the unwritten conventions guiding the Governor-General, since it had no source for them.
Responsible government
Responsible government means the executive must answer to Parliament. In Williams v Commonwealth [2012] HCA 23, French CJ said this system is built into the federal Constitution.
Egan v Willis (1998) 195 CLR 424 explains what responsible government involves. It describes the ways Parliament holds the executive to account.
The joint reasons identify at least two parts. First, Ministers sit in one of the two Houses, and that House can scrutinise their conduct of executive power. Second, the ministry must keep the support of the lower House on confidence motions.
The second part is more widely known. But Egan v Willis was actually concerned with the first part, about scrutiny by a House.
Parliament’s power to call the executive to account: Egan v Willis
Mr Egan was a Minister in the NSW Legislative Council. In 1996 the Council ordered him to table certain papers. Cabinet had decided Ministers should refuse to comply, and he did not table them.
The Council found him guilty of contempt, suspended him, and had him removed from the chamber. He sued, claiming trespass to the person. The High Court dismissed his appeal.
The joint judgment (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ) accepted an unchallenged principle: the Council has powers reasonably necessary for the proper exercise of its functions. They held that superintending the executive by requiring papers was one such function, and noted this practice dated to 1856.
They said “reasonably necessary” is worked out by looking at the Council’s established conventional practices. This position could be changed by legislation, and the case did not decide what powers a House has over non-members.
McHugh J agreed the claim ultimately failed, but for different reasons. He would have allowed the appeal only to vary the Court of Appeal’s order.
The joint judgment noted that privilege issues can arise over document production, but none arose on these facts.
A later NSW Court of Appeal decision, Egan v Chadwick, considered privilege directly. All three judges held the Council could require documents even where legal professional privilege or public interest immunity was claimed.
Spigelman CJ held this power did not extend to documents revealing Cabinet deliberations. Meagher JA went further, treating Cabinet document immunity as complete. Priestley JA disagreed, and would have allowed the Council to call for them.
Egan v Chadwick is only an intermediate appellate decision on a NSW question. Egan v Willis itself concerned a House’s powers over its own members, in New South Wales specifically.
For the Commonwealth Parliament, section 49 of the Constitution instead governs: a House’s powers, privileges and immunities are those Parliament declares, or, until declared, those of…
Parliament’s response and its limit: Williams (No 2)
Parliament quickly passed a law to support spending on agreements listed in regulations. This was a direct response to the earlier decision limiting executive spending power.
In Williams v Commonwealth [2014] HCA 23 (Williams No 2), the High Court held this law was invalid for the chaplaincy agreement. The majority reasoned that funding a school chaplain is not a “benefit to students” under section 51(xxiiiA) of the Constitution. They also rejected an argument based on the corporations power in section 51(xx).
Crennan J agreed with the outcome, but noted a reservation about the benefits-to-students reasoning.
The case teaches an institutional lesson. A statute can give the government power that section 61 alone does not provide. But Parliament can only do this if it has an actual head of legislative power to support that law.
Each High Court decision binds lower Australian courts. The High Court itself, however, remains free to reconsider its own past decisions.
Applying this in a problem question
Start by naming the actor involved. This could be Parliament, the Governor-General in Council, a Minister, a department or an officer. Also identify the jurisdiction. This article focuses on the Commonwealth, though it also discusses New South Wales Legislative Council decisions.
Next, find the source of authority. Check whether an Act applies. If not, consider whether the action fits within the fields French CJ identified in Williams (No 1) at [34]. Remember these are the reasoning of one Justice only, not the whole court.
When money is spent, keep the appropriation separate from the authority to spend it. Williams (No 1) at [39] establishes that section 83 is a necessary condition for spending, but not itself a source of power.
If an Act is said to authorise spending, ask whether that Act is a valid law with respect to a head of power. This is what Williams (No 2) required.
For accountability questions, check whether the minister sits in Parliament under section 64. Also consider which House can require production of documents. Egan v Willis addresses this for the New South Wales Legislative Council specifically. Other Parliaments depend on their own separate arrangements.
Self-check
Before moving on, check four things.
First, point to the real source of executive power. An appropriation alone does not create that power.
Second, keep French CJ’s reasons separate from the Court’s actual order in Williams (No 1). Reasons explain; the order is what the Court decided.
Third, remember Egan v Willis concerns only the New South Wales Legislative Council and its own members. Do not extend it further.
Finally, remember that a spending statute’s validity depends on a head of legislative power.
Where the authority sits
The Commonwealth executive’s power comes from sections 61 to 64 of the Constitution. These sections work together with section 1 and section 83.
Limits on executive spending come from two High Court decisions, both called Williams v Commonwealth. The Legislative Council’s power over its own members comes from Egan v Willis.
The constitutional text covered here is as it stood in 1977. This includes the orders and passages cited in those cases and in Egan v Chadwick.
This material covers the Commonwealth only. No State’s constitution is covered. Always check the jurisdiction before treating any of this as the law in a particular State.
A Quick Read uses simpler language and may leave out detail, including whole topics, to stay short. The full article is the complete statement.