Williams v Commonwealth of Australia
Williams v Commonwealth of Australia [2012] HCA 23
The Commonwealth paid a company to provide chaplains in a Queensland state school. Parliament had appropriated money but passed no law setting up the program. Could the executive government spend on it anyway?
Affirmed by Williams v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2014] HCA 23
In Williams v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2), the joint reasons of French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ, with whom Crennan J agreed subject to a reservation on s 51(xxiiiA), refused the Commonwealth’s application to reopen Williams (No 1) ([66], [99]). They accepted that differences can be identified in the reasons given in Williams (No 1), but said that the decision rested on premises established in Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation: an appropriation under ss 81 and 83 does not itself confer a substantive spending power, and the power to spend appropriated money must be found elsewhere in the Constitution or in statutes made under it ([25]). They rejected the assumption that the Commonwealth Executive has the same power to spend and contract as the British Executive, because the Constitution distributes powers between the Commonwealth and the States ([82]-[83]).
Affirmed by Williams v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2014] HCA 23
In Williams v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2), the joint reasons of French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ held that providing money to pay persons to provide chaplaincy or welfare services at a school is not a provision of benefits to students within s 51(xxiiiA), because it is not material aid for the human wants of students, is not directed to any identified or identifiable student and is not directed to the consequences of being a student ([47]-[48]). Crennan J agreed with the joint reasons subject to a reservation confined to s 51(xxiiiA) ([99]).
What happened?
Ronald Williams was the father of four children enrolled at the Darling Heights State Primary School in Queensland (Gummow and Bell JJ at [86]). Under the National School Chaplaincy Program, the Commonwealth had made a funding agreement with Scripture Union Queensland, a public company limited by guarantee, under which it paid that company to provide chaplaincy services at the school ([5]-[6], [87]). No Act of the Parliament provided for the program, and the funding was not a grant to a State under s 96 of the Constitution; the Commonwealth relied on the executive power in s 61, and said that the expenditure met the requirement of a parliamentary appropriation ([2], [88]).
In December 2010 Mr Williams began proceedings in the original jurisdiction of the High Court challenging the agreement, the drawing of money from the Consolidated Revenue Fund and the payments, and Gummow J referred an amended special case to the Full Court ([5], [8]). He also argued that the agreement and payments infringed s 116 of the Constitution ([9]).
What did the Court decide?
The Court answered that Mr Williams had standing to challenge the agreement and the payments, that the agreement was beyond the executive power of the Commonwealth under s 61, that the making of the payments was not supported by that power, and that neither the agreement nor the payments was prohibited by s 116. It was unnecessary to answer the question about the Appropriation Acts. The Justice disposing of the action was to grant such declaratory relief as appeared appropriate, and the Commonwealth parties were to pay the costs of the special case (Order).
On s 116, Gummow and Bell JJ held that the chaplains engaged by Scripture Union Queensland held no office under the Commonwealth, so the religious test limb of the section did not apply ([109]); French CJ, Hayne J and Kiefel J agreed ([9], [168], [597]).
French CJ, Gummow and Bell JJ (jointly), Hayne J, Heydon J, Crennan J and Kiefel J each gave reasons.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
It was not in dispute that an appropriation under s 83 is a necessary condition of executive spending but not a source of the power to spend, and no Act authorised these payments (French CJ at [39]). The question was therefore whether s 61 itself authorised them.
French CJ, Gummow and Bell JJ, and Crennan J rejected the Commonwealth’s contention that, subject to appropriation, the executive may contract and spend on any matter that could be the subject of Commonwealth legislation. French CJ accepted that significant fields of executive action need no statutory authority, but said that the metes and bounds of executive power are not measured by undiscriminating reference to the subject matters of legislative power, that Commonwealth spending in fields within State competence has the potential to diminish the authority of the States, and that the Commonwealth’s character as a national government did not entitle it to enter such a field by executive action alone ([34], [36]-[37], [83]).
Gummow and Bell JJ said that a spending power co-extensive with the heads of legislative power in s 51 would be too broad, and would undermine the assumption of legislative predominance and distort the relationship between Chapters I and II of the Constitution ([134]-[137]); pointing to the by-passing of s 96, the Parliament’s limited part in a program it had not created and the States’ capacity to provide such a scheme, they held that s 61 did not support the agreement or the payments ([143]-[146]).
Crennan J said that, despite recognised exceptions, Commonwealth executive expenditure will often require statutory authority beyond appropriation Acts, and that the possibility of enabling legislation was not enough ([534], [544]).
Hayne J and Kiefel J reached the conclusion that the payments were unsupported by a narrower route, Hayne J proposing a differently worded answer on the agreement ([290]). Hayne J rejected the submission that the power to spend appropriated money is unlimited, but said that to hold that the Constitution requires that the Executive never spend money lawfully available for expenditure without legislative authority would be to decide a large and complex issue, better not decided until necessary ([253], [288]); it was enough that a law providing for the payments would have been supported by neither s 51(xx) nor s 51(xxiiiA), because paying for a school chaplain is not providing “benefits to students” ([285]-[286]).
Kiefel J likewise found it unnecessary to decide when legislative authority is required, because neither head of power would support the agreement ([569], [574]-[575]). Heydon J dissented, treating as the law, subject to exceptions, the assumption that the executive may contract without statutory authority wherever the Parliament could give that authority, and holding that s 51(xxiiiA) would support the program ([403], [429]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · French CJ
Read judgment: [34] (PDF p 25) (opens in a new tab), [36]–[37] (PDF p 26) (opens in a new tab), [83] (PDF p 54) (opens in a new tab)
French CJ’s rejection of the broad contention and his conclusion that no aspect of the executive power authorised the agreement or the expenditure are the reasons for his answers to Questions 2(a) and 4(a).
Ratio · Gummow and Bell JJ
Read judgment: [134]–[137] (PDF p 72) (opens in a new tab), [143]–[146] (PDF p 75) (opens in a new tab)
Gummow and Bell JJ reject the proposition that executive spending power is co-extensive with the heads of legislative power and hold that the executive power did not extend to the agreement or the payments. These passages carry their answers to Questions 2(a) and 4(a); together with French CJ and Crennan J they are four of the seven Justices rejecting the broad contention.
Ratio · Crennan J
Read judgment: [534] (PDF p 206) (opens in a new tab), [544] (PDF p 209) (opens in a new tab)
Crennan J’s rejection of both the Commonwealth’s wider and narrower submissions is the reason for her conclusion at [548] that the agreement was beyond s 61 and the payments unsupported by it.
Proposition 2
Separate reasoning · Hayne J
Read judgment: [285]–[286] (PDF p 124) (opens in a new tab), [288] (PDF p 125) (opens in a new tab)
Hayne J concurs that the payments were unsupported but reaches that conclusion by asking whether a law authorising the payments would have had a head of power, and expressly leaves undecided whether executive spending generally requires legislative authority.
Separate reasoning · Kiefel J
Read judgment: [569] (PDF p 218) (opens in a new tab), [574]–[575] (PDF p 220) (opens in a new tab)
Kiefel J concurs in the result on the same narrower footing as Hayne J: neither s 51(xxiiiA) nor s 51(xx) would support a law authorising the agreement, so the wider question need not be resolved.
Separate reasoning · Heydon J
Read judgment: [403] (PDF p 167) (opens in a new tab), [429] (PDF p 177) (opens in a new tab)
Heydon J dissents: he would treat the executive power as extending to contracts the Parliament could authorise and would hold s 51(xxiiiA) wide enough to support the program, answering Questions 2(a) and 4(a) ‘No’.
Why does this case matter?
Governments fund programs by contract and grant every day, often with no legislation beyond an appropriation, so whether that spending is lawful is a recurring question in constitutional law. Examiners look for an answer that identifies the claimed source of authority for the spending, says which Justices’ reasoning supports each step, and considers other routes by which the same end might be pursued.
Exam and application relevance
When a problem involves Commonwealth spending or contracting, separate the questions: is there an appropriation, is there an Act authorising the spending, and if not, what aspect of the executive power is said to support it? Then ask whether a law authorising the program would itself have constitutional support. Cite each step to the Justices who take it, and read Williams v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2014] HCA 23 before you apply the case.
Check your understanding
1. What role did the parties accept that an appropriation under s 83 plays in Commonwealth spending, and why did that leave s 61 as the question ([39])?
2. Which fields of executive action did French CJ accept need no statutory authority, and why did he refuse to measure executive power by reference to the heads of legislative power ([34], [36]-[37])?
3. What two reasons did Gummow and Bell JJ give for rejecting a spending power co-extensive with s 51 ([135]-[136])?
4. How did the route taken by Hayne J and Kiefel J differ from that of French CJ, Gummow and Bell JJ and Crennan J, and what question did they leave open ([288], [569])?