Egan v Chadwick
Egan v Chadwick [1999] NSWCA 176
A Treasurer refuses to hand an upper House a Crown Solicitor’s advice and a Cabinet submission, and is eventually escorted from the chamber. How far does the House’s power to demand State papers reach?
What happened?
Michael Egan brought the proceedings while he was a member of the Legislative Council, the Leader of the Government in the Council, Vice President of the Executive Council and a Minister, including Treasurer. The defendants were the President of the Council, the Clerk of the Parliaments and the Usher of the Black Rod (Priestley JA at [96]). They followed Egan v Willis, in which the High Court decided that the Council had the power it asserted to require him, as a member and Minister, to provide State papers; that case did not decide what the position would be if a person claimed to refuse production because of a claim to privilege ([97]; Spigelman CJ at [3]).
On 13 October 1998 the Council resolved to call on the Leader of the Government to table all documents relating to the ongoing contamination of Sydney’s water supply system. Documents subject to a claim of legal professional privilege or public interest immunity were to be identified, with the claim and its reasons, and tabled with the Clerk, available only to members; if a member disputed a claim, the Clerk could release the document to an independent legal arbiter for a report; and a document for which privilege was claimed and which was identified as a Cabinet document was not to be made available to a member ([99]).
Egan refused to table any documents under the part of that order dealing with documents subject to those claims ([100]). He held a letter of advice dated 26 August 1998 from the Crown Solicitor to the Director-General of the Cabinet Office, for which he asserted legal professional privilege in the Crown, and a submission to Cabinet from the Deputy Premier dated 21 September 1998, for which he asserted public interest immunity ([100]).
On 20 October 1998 the Council adjudged him guilty of contempt and suspended him from the service of the House for five sitting days or until he fully complied, whichever occurred first ([101]-[102]). Further orders followed on 24 and 26 November 1998. The resolution of 26 November noted that a report from Sir Laurence Street on the Government’s claim of privilege had been tabled, called for the documents for which privilege was claimed, and provided that, if the Leader of the Government failed to comply, he was suspended from the service of the House for the remainder of the session or until he fully complied ([105]).
Egan did not deliver the documents ([106]). On 27 November 1998 the Usher of the Black Rod, carrying the Black Rod, approached him and escorted him from the House ([107]). Egan claimed that this was an assault, and the defendants admitted that the conduct would have been an assault had it not been justified by the Council’s order and the President’s direction ([108]).
Since the hearing Parliament had been prorogued and a new Parliament elected, and the suspension was no longer operative (Spigelman CJ at [89]). Spigelman CJ adopted Priestley JA’s statement of the facts and issues ([1]). Priestley JA said that two issues were left for the Court: whether the Council’s power to require production extends to privileged documents of two classes, those to which legal professional privilege attached and those entitled to public interest immunity; and, only if Egan succeeded on that, who was to decide whether a claim about a particular document should be allowed ([111]-[112]).
What did the Court decide?
The Court of Appeal (Spigelman CJ, Priestley JA and Meagher JA) gave three separate judgments and dismissed the proceedings (Spigelman CJ at [95]; Priestley JA at [147]-[148]; Meagher JA at [155]). Priestley JA and Meagher JA would order Egan to pay the defendants’ costs ([148], [155]); Spigelman CJ would make no order as to costs ([95]). Spigelman CJ declined to make any finding on the validity of the resolution, which was no longer operative ([89], [94]). Priestley JA found it unnecessary to consider the second issue, who decides a claim of privilege ([145]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Spigelman CJ applied the common law rule that the Legislative Council has such powers as are reasonably necessary for the proper exercise of its functions, and asked whether the Council’s power to require production extends to documents that would be protected at common law by legal professional privilege or public interest immunity ([2] (iii), [3]-[4]). On legal professional privilege, he held that the applicability of the doctrine depends upon the relationship between the persons in the context in which the issue of access arises, and that the question here falls to be determined by public law principles ([81], [84]).
He found it hard to reconcile the High Court’s contemporary reasoning on the privilege with the emphasis on accountability in Egan v Willis and concluded that the latter should prevail ([85]), so that “access to legal advice is reasonably necessary for the exercise by the Legislative Council of its functions” ([86]); what access, if any, should occur is a matter of the occasion and manner of the exercise of the power and not of its existence ([87]). Meagher JA agreed with the Chief Justice that the Council may require access to the legal advice on which the Executive acted ([152]).
Priestley JA reached the same result by a different route: he did not think that the justification for legal professional privilege applies in New South Wales when a House of Parliament seeks the production of Executive documents ([139], [144]). On public interest immunity, Spigelman CJ said that performance of the Council’s legislative and accountability functions may require access to information the disclosure of which may harm the public interest, so that access may be reasonably necessary ([54]), and that where the public interest to be balanced involves those functions the courts should be very reluctant to undertake the balancing ([52]-[53]).
The qualification he identified was conflict with the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, in its individual or collective dimension ([55]); only collective responsibility was raised in the proceedings ([40], [71]). Meagher JA, speaking of documents covered by public interest immunity where no other basis of non-production is claimed, said that he could not see how the Council was in any different position and that the Court cannot possibly prohibit the Council from examining such documents ([153]). Priestley JA held that the Council, like a court, may have the Executive’s documents produced to it, that its function and status justify the same degree of trust being reposed in it as in the courts, and that it would bear a duty to balance the conflicting public interests, requiring a very high degree of circumspection for certain cabinet documents ([140]-[142]).
On documents connected with Cabinet, Spigelman CJ and Meagher JA each concluded that the Council’s power does not reach as far as it does for other documents, and Priestley JA took the contrary view. Spigelman CJ held that “it is not reasonably necessary for the proper exercise of the functions of the Legislative Council to call for documents the production of which would conflict with the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, either in its individual or collective dimension”, the power being itself in significant degree derived from that doctrine ([55]).
He said that the revelation of the actual deliberations of Cabinet is inconsistent with collective responsibility, whereas documents prepared outside Cabinet for submission to it may or may not be, depending on their content ([56]-[57]). On the evidence of the Director General of the Cabinet Office about Cabinet Minute 237-98 ([67]-[68]), he concluded that the documents the Council sought included documents which revealed the internal deliberations of Cabinet and that “the Legislative Council does not have power to require the production of such documents” ([69]).
The power “should, at least, be restricted to documents which do not, directly or indirectly, reveal the deliberations of Cabinet” ([70]). He said that the test is whether disclosure is inconsistent with the principles of responsible government, not a balancing exercise between conflicting public interests, and that it was neither necessary nor desirable to consider what other circumstances may result in a relevant inconsistency ([71]). Meagher JA said that he agreed with the Chief Justice, described the Cabinet as “the cornerstone of responsible government in New South Wales”, and concluded that the immunity of Cabinet documents from production is complete, so that they can never be produced until released by Cabinet, with no process of balancing interests arising for the courts or anyone else ([154]).
Priestley JA took the contrary view: although he accepted that great respect must be paid to cabinet confidentiality and collective responsibility, he said that “no legal right to absolute secrecy is given to any group of men and women in government” ([143]; see also [140]-[142]). Meagher JA did not accept the analogy that Priestley JA drew ([154]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Priestley JA
Read judgment: [139]–[148] (opens in a new tab)
Priestley JA dismissed the proceedings because the Council had the power it claimed, which defeated the assault claim ([144], [146]-[147]); his conclusions that the power extends to documents attracting legal professional privilege or public interest immunity ([139]-[144]) are the reasoning for his order. He found it unnecessary to consider who decides a claim of privilege, since that arose only if the plaintiff succeeded on the first issue ([145]).
Classification unresolved · Spigelman CJ and Meagher JA
Read judgment: [52]–[55] (opens in a new tab), [81]–[88] (opens in a new tab), [89]–[95] (opens in a new tab), [152]–[153] (opens in a new tab), [155] (opens in a new tab)
Spigelman CJ answers the principal issue ([3]-[4], [54]-[55], [86]), but his stated reasons for the order are that the Court should not decide the validity of a spent resolution and should practise prudential restraint ([89]-[95]). Meagher JA agrees with the Chief Justice on legal advice and addresses public interest immunity ([152]-[153]); he states no separate ground of restraint, and his dismissal of the action ([155]) follows from his conclusions on the issues the plaintiff argued ([151]-[154]), with the costs order resting on the plaintiff having lost them ([155]). A binary ratio or obiter label would conceal that the answers on the scope of the power are the issue argued and, for Meagher JA, the reasons for dismissal, while the Chief Justice’s own ground for the order is stated separately.
Proposition 2
Classification unresolved · Spigelman CJ and Meagher JA
Read judgment: [55]–[57] (opens in a new tab), [67]–[71] (opens in a new tab), [154] (opens in a new tab)
Both judges give their answer on Cabinet documents as part of deciding the principal issue. Spigelman CJ confines his conclusion to documents that directly or indirectly reveal Cabinet’s deliberations and leaves other circumstances unconsidered ([69]-[71]); Meagher JA states a wider immunity ([154]). Spigelman CJ does not give it as the stated ground of his order, which rests on [89]-[95]; Meagher JA’s conclusion on Cabinet documents is one of the conclusions on the issues argued from which his dismissal of the action follows ([151], [154]-[155]).
Separate reasoning · Priestley JA
Read judgment: [140]–[143] (opens in a new tab)
Priestley JA takes the opposite view on Cabinet documents (the headnote records his dissent on the point and Meagher JA at [154] rejects his analogy) but concurs in the dismissal of the proceedings ([144], [147]-[148]); agreement in the order does not adopt the other judges’ reasons on this question.
Why does this case matter?
A problem about a House of Parliament and Executive documents invites two shortcuts: to assume that a protection which keeps a document from a court keeps it from a House, and to assume the opposite. The three judgments show the work needed to avoid both. An answer earns credit by attributing each point to the judge who made it.
Exam and application relevance
In a problem about a House calling for Executive documents, sort the documents first: advice from a lawyer to the Executive, other material said to be confidential in the public interest, and material connected with Cabinet. Then identify whose House is involved and whether a statute specifies its powers, immunities and privileges. Spigelman CJ treated the absence of such a statute in New South Wales as the reason the common law rule applied ([4]), so a jurisdiction with such a statute needs its own analysis.
Apply each judge’s reasoning separately and give the paragraph. Where Meagher JA says he agrees with the Chief Justice, read his own paragraph as well, and cite the paragraph each judge’s words come from.
This is a decision of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales. It binds courts below it in that State and is persuasive, not binding, elsewhere.
Check your understanding
1. What did the Council’s order of 13 October 1998 provide about documents for which privilege was claimed and about documents identified as Cabinet documents ([99])?
2. Which two documents did Egan hold on 13 October 1998, and what did he claim for each ([100])?
3. What happened on 27 November 1998, and what did the defendants admit about it ([107], [108])?
4. What two issues did Priestley JA say were left for the Court, and which of them arose only if Egan succeeded on the other ([111], [112])?
5. What did Spigelman CJ say about the courts balancing public interests where a House’s legislative or accountability functions are involved ([52], [53])?
6. Which judges would order Egan to pay costs, what order as to costs would Spigelman CJ make, and what did Spigelman CJ say about the validity of the resolution ([89], [94], [95], [148], [155])?
7. What does Meagher JA say about the Cabinet and about the immunity of its documents from production ([154])?