Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally

High Court of Australia · 1999

FoundationsConstitutional

Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511

Legislation sought to let federal courts hear State matters. Why did the constitutional challenge not produce the same result in every proceeding?

What happened?

Commonwealth and State legislation established arrangements for cross-vesting jurisdiction, including State matters, in federal courts. Four proceedings raised challenges to those arrangements and questions about the Federal Court’s jurisdiction ([1]-[6], [83]-[87]).

In the proceedings associated with George Wakim, he alleged that the handling of a bankrupt estate had reduced what creditors could recover. He sued the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act and also brought negligence proceedings against solicitors and a barrister. The legal practitioners challenged the Federal Court’s jurisdiction over the claims against them ([129]-[134]). Other proceedings concerned examinations under corporations legislation.

What did the Court decide?

The McNally and Darvall applications were dismissed. In the Amann proceeding, the first-named applicant obtained limited certiorari and prohibition; the remaining applications were dismissed. In Spinks v Prentice, special leave was granted and the appeal was dismissed.

Kirby J dissented on the constitutional validity question. Gummow and Hayne JJ gave joint reasons; Gleeson CJ agreed with them and added reasons of his own ([3]), and Gaudron J adopted them ([26]). McHugh J and Callinan J wrote separately ([31]-[32], [265] and the orders).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

An equally divided Court in Gould v Brown had left the question open and established no principle or precedent having authority in the Court ([100]-[101]). The majority in Re Wakim held invalid the legislation to the extent that it purported to confer State jurisdiction on federal courts or authorise the States to do so. Gummow and Hayne JJ reasoned that Ch III is an exhaustive statement of how the judicial power of the Commonwealth may be vested: the jurisdiction that may be conferred on a federal court under s 77 is limited to the heads in ss 75 and 76, and no other polity can confer jurisdiction on a federal court ([108]-[111], [116]; see Gleeson CJ at [5], [13]-[14]). The incidental powers relied on did not authorise adding State judicial power to federal courts. Commonwealth consent did not cure that constitutional difficulty ([116]-[127]).

The Constitution expressly permits the Commonwealth Parliament to invest State courts with federal jurisdiction under s 77(iii). That does not establish a reciprocal power to invest federal courts with State jurisdiction. Legislative cooperation and practical convenience cannot supply the missing constitutional authority: the Parliaments cannot, by cooperation, amend the Constitution (Gleeson CJ at [2]), and cooperation of the kind accepted in Duncan complements existing powers rather than creating new ones ([113]).

A State-law claim is not necessarily a separate State matter. For the Wakim proceedings, the relevant inquiry was the justiciable controversy as a whole. On the joint reasons, the claims against the Official Trustee, the solicitors and the barrister arose from a common factual foundation and concerned the same alleged loss, so they formed one matter within federal jurisdiction. Separate proceedings and different parties did not compel the opposite conclusion ([135]-[147]). This explains why the McNally and Darvall applications were dismissed despite the invalidity holding.

McHugh J’s route was different: he was sceptical that there was a single controversy, but was not prepared to say on the materials before the Court that the matter was outside federal jurisdiction, and would have dismissed the applications for prohibition as premature ([74]-[78]). Callinan J, in a minority on this point, found no single justiciable controversy and would have issued prohibition restraining the Federal Court proceedings against the solicitors ([272]-[275]).

The result also did not invalidate every part of the legislative arrangements. The Spinks proceeding involved Commonwealth legislation for the Australian Capital Territory, and its appeal was dismissed on a distinct jurisdictional basis ([175]-[177]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Gummow and Hayne JJ (joint reasons), with Gleeson CJ agreeing at [3] and Gaudron J adopting the reasons in these matters at [26]

Read judgment: [105]–[111] (PDF p 58) (opens in a new tab), [113] (PDF p 62) (opens in a new tab), [116] (PDF p 65) (opens in a new tab), [119] (PDF p 66) (opens in a new tab), [127] (PDF p 69) (opens in a new tab)

These passages construe the provisions as seeking to confer jurisdiction on the Federal Court ([105]), identify Ch III as an exhaustive statement of the federal judicial power, so that federal jurisdiction under s 77 is confined to the heads in ss 75 and 76 and no other polity can confer jurisdiction on a federal court ([108]-[111]), explain why cooperation of the Duncan kind complements existing powers and cannot supply a power the Commonwealth and States lack ([113], [116]), why the asserted incidental power cannot sustain the cross-vesting arrangement because the judicial power conferred is that of the States and not of the Commonwealth ([119]), and state its invalidity ([127]). This resolves the constitutional issue, while the consequences for each proceeding require further analysis. The conclusion concerns State jurisdiction rather than every claim governed by State law.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Gummow and Hayne JJ (joint reasons), with Gleeson CJ agreeing at [3] and Gaudron J adopting the reasons in these matters at [26]

Read judgment: [135]–[140] (PDF p 71) (opens in a new tab), [143]–[147] (PDF p 74) (opens in a new tab)

The joint reasons state the inquiry into the justiciable controversy of which a federal claim forms part ([135]-[136]), and reject the contention that accrued jurisdiction can never extend to a newly joined party ([143]-[145]), applying that inquiry to the common alleged loss arising from the handling of the bankrupt estate ([145]-[147]). The result supplies the ground for dismissing the two applications. Paragraph [140] quotes earlier authorities before explaining the inquiry; those quotations are not original formulations attributed to this case.

Why does this case matter?

Use this case when a problem combines a constitutional challenge with several proceedings. Explain the orders in each proceeding separately, instead of assuming that the constitutional conclusion determines every outcome.

Exam and application relevance

Identify the court, the asserted source of jurisdiction and the relief sought. Distinguish a challenge to the validity of a conferral from the question whether a court has jurisdiction on another basis. Explain the pleaded controversy and its factual relationships before reaching a conclusion about the proper forum.

Use the particular outcome relevant to the problem. A statement that the cross-vesting provisions were invalid does not by itself describe the orders made in each proceeding.

Check your understanding

1. Why did the constitutional holding require a further examination of the individual proceedings?

2. What features of the claims involving Wakim mattered to the jurisdictional inquiry?

3. What does s 77(iii) authorise, and why was reciprocity disputed?