Police search warrants and digital investigative powers
How a Commonwealth search warrant is applied for and issued under Part IAA of the Crimes Act 1914, what it authorises over premises, persons and data, the safeguards and limits attached to it, and where the computer warrants in the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 sit alongside it.
Learning outcomes
- Identify the statutory source of a Commonwealth coercive search power and state why a State police officer investigating a State offence is not exercising it.
- State the conditions on which a Commonwealth search warrant issues under s 3E of the Crimes Act 1914, and what the issuing officer must record in the warrant.
- Work out what a Commonwealth search warrant authorises over premises, persons and data, and where the authority stops.
- Identify the safeguards and limits attached to execution, and distinguish a provision presently in force from one that has not yet commenced.
The Commonwealth warrant powers discussed here are statutory. A police officer who enters premises, searches a person or copies data from a phone needs lawful authority or justification — the occupier’s consent, a licence the law implies, a common law justification such as necessity to preserve life or property, or a statute — or the act is a trespass, so the prior question is which statute supplies the authority — and that turns first on the offence under investigation, not on which police force the officer belongs to. This article states the Commonwealth position: Part IAA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), with the computer warrants in the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth). It is federal law, not the search power of a State police force investigating a State offence, and State and Territory legislation is not stated here.
Where the power comes from, and how far it reaches
Part IAA is entitled “Search, information gathering, arrest and related powers (other than powers under delayed notification search warrants)”, and s 3E sits in its Division 2, headed “Search warrants”. The Part’s reach is set by its own definition of offence: an offence against a law of the Commonwealth other than the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth), an offence against a law of a Territory, or a State offence that has a federal aspect (s 3C(1)).
Section 3D then shows that the Part is not an exhaustive code. It is not intended to limit other Commonwealth laws, or Territory laws about offences against that Territory’s law, on searching premises, arrest, stopping or searching conveyances or persons, seizure or requesting documents; a power under the Part may be used despite another law conferring a similar one; and where the Part applies to State offences with a federal aspect, State and Australian Capital Territory law continues to operate concurrently (ss 3D(1)–(2), (4), (6)).2 The offence has to be identified first, and another statute may be the provision actually relied on.
When a search warrant may issue
An issuing officer may issue a warrant to search premises where satisfied, by information on oath or affirmation, that there are “reasonable grounds for suspecting that there is, or there will be within the next 72 hours, any evidential material at the premises” (s 3E(1)). A warrant authorising an ordinary search or a frisk search of a person issues on the equivalent condition about what the person has, or will have within 72 hours, in their possession (s 3E(2)).3 Evidential material means “a thing relevant to an indictable offence or a thing relevant to a summary offence, including such a thing in electronic form”, premises “includes a place and a conveyance”, and an issuing officer is “a magistrate” or “a justice of the peace or other person employed in a court of a State or Territory who is authorised to issue search warrants or warrants for arrest” (s 3C(1)).1 So the authorising decision may be made by a justice of the peace, not only by a magistrate or a court employee. The threshold is suspicion on reasonable grounds, not belief, and the authorising decision is made outside the investigating agency.
Since 27 August 2026 the application is governed by s 3QA: an application for a warrant, or for an assistance order under s 3LA(1), must be in writing and may be made in person or by electronic means, and the issuing officer may require further communication and may record it.4 Section 3R is the urgent alternative, available by telephone, telex, fax or other electronic means in an urgent case or where the delay of a s 3QA application would frustrate effective execution. The application must include everything a s 3QA application requires, but “may, if necessary, be made before the information is sworn” (s 3R(3)) — and if it was not sworn, the applicant must give or transmit it duly sworn, with the completed form of warrant, to the issuing officer by the day after the earlier of the warrant’s expiry and its execution (s 3R(7)). Section 3E(9) then changes two figures: the prospective period in the issuing condition becomes 48 hours rather than 72, and the issuing officer must state in the warrant the period for which it is to remain in force, “which must not be more than 48 hours”, the ordinary seven-day limit in s 3E(5A) having no effect. Section 3R(9) replaces the written application with a different discipline: where the issuing officer’s signed form is not produced in evidence, a court asked whether the power was duly authorised is to assume, unless the contrary is proved, that it was not.5
What the warrant must state, and why the statement decides validity
Section 3E(5) requires the issuing officer to state in the warrant the offence to which it relates, a description of the premises or the person, the kinds of evidential material to be searched for, the constable responsible for execution, the expiry time, and whether execution is confined to particular hours. The expiry time can be no later than the end of the seventh day after the day of issue (s 3E(5A)), which does not prevent successive warrants over the same premises or person (s 3E(8)).
The first of those requirements decides cases. In Smethurst v Commissioner of Police [2020] HCA 14 the Australian Federal Police searched a journalist’s home under a warrant purporting to state an offence against s 79(3) of the Crimes Act. Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ said that “[t]he power to search has always been regarded as an exceptional power, to be exercised only under certain justifying conditions” (at [23]). Reading ss 3E(1) and 3E(5)(a) together, their Honours recorded that it was not disputed that unless those conditions are met a warrant purporting to issue under s 3E(1) is not authorised and is not valid, the protective purpose being that the issuing officer, the executing officer and the persons affected each understand the object of the search and its limits (at [26]–[27]). The warrant both failed to state and misstated the offence, so it was invalid and the entry, search and seizure were unlawful (at [44]). The Court quashed it by certiorari.16 Its division was about relief, and it granted no mandatory injunction for delivery up or destruction of the copied data, so invalidity did not of itself return the material. What happens to that material if it is tendered belongs to the evidentiary discretions, treated in The exclusionary discretions: ss 135, 137 and 138.
What a warrant authorises, including access to data
Section 3F states the authorisation. A premises warrant authorises entry, recording fingerprints, taking forensic samples, and searching for and seizing the kinds of evidential material specified in the warrant. It also authorises seizing other things found in the course of the search believed on reasonable grounds to be evidential material for the warrant offence or another indictable offence, or evidential material or tainted property under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) — but only where seizure is believed on reasonable grounds to be necessary to prevent concealment, loss or destruction, or use in committing an offence. Seizable items, anything presenting a danger or usable to assist escape from lawful custody (s 3C(1)), may also be seized.
The digital authority in ss 3F(2A) to (2E) is tied to a purpose. Electronic equipment, including a Commonwealth or carrier telecommunications facility, may be used to access data held in a computer or device found in the search, for the purpose of determining whether that data is evidential material of a kind specified in the warrant; other data may be added, copied, deleted or altered where necessary for that purpose; and another computer or a communication in transit may be used where that is reasonable having regard to other methods likely to be as effective. Subsection (2B) does the same for account-based data of the computer’s owner, lessee or user. Subsection (2C) withholds that authority for anything likely to “materially interfere with, interrupt or obstruct” a communication in transit or others’ lawful use of a computer, unless it is necessary to do something specified in the warrant, or likely to cause other material loss or damage to other lawful users.6
Section 3L adds that data accessed at the premises, including data not held there, may be copied and taken away; the equipment itself may be seized where copying or producing a document is not practicable, or where the occupier’s possession of it could be an offence (s 3L(3)); and once the copied data is no longer required for a purpose in s 3ZQU or for judicial or administrative review, s 3L(1B) obliges the Commissioner to arrange its removal and the destruction of other reproductions in Australian Federal Police control.7
Encrypted devices are reached by a further order, made by a magistrate rather than an issuing officer. A constable may apply for an order requiring a specified person to give information or assistance that is “reasonable and necessary” to access, copy or render intelligible data in a device on warrant premises, found in a search of a person, moved for examination, or seized (s 3LA(1)). The magistrate may grant it on being satisfied of reasonable grounds for suspecting that evidential material is held in or accessible from the device, that the specified person answers one of six alternative descriptions — a person “reasonably suspected of having committed the offence stated in the relevant warrant”, the owner or lessee of the computer or device, an employee of the owner or lessee, a person engaged by the owner or lessee under a contract for services, a person who uses or has used it, or a person who is or was a system administrator for the system including it — and that the person has relevant knowledge of the device, a computer network of which it forms or formed a part, or the measures applied to protect its data (s 3LA(2)). An omission contravening the order, by a person capable of complying, carries a maximum penalty of “Imprisonment for 5 years or 300 penalty units, or both”, rising to “Imprisonment for 10 years or 600 penalty units, or both” where the offence to which the relevant warrant relates is a serious offence or a serious terrorism offence (ss 3LA(5), (6)).8 Only the first of the six descriptions turns on suspicion of the warrant offence; the other five turn on a relationship to the device, so the order can reach a system administrator or an employer who is not suspected of anything.
The safeguards on execution, and what a warrant cannot authorise
Division 2 attaches safeguards to execution rather than leaving them to the warrant’s terms. A copy of the warrant is to be made available to a present occupier or to the person being searched, shown to a person searched under a premises warrant, and the executing officer is to identify himself or herself, although s 3H(5) provides that the copy “need not include the signature of the issuing officer or the seal of the relevant court”. A present occupier or apparent representative is entitled, subject to Part IC, to observe the search, a right that ceases if the person impedes it (s 3P); and a receipt is to be provided for anything seized or moved for examination (s 3Q).9
Three provisions mark the outer limits, each a single sentence in the Act. A warrant “cannot authorise a strip search or a search of a person’s body cavities” (s 3S). It is an offence punishable by imprisonment for 2 years to make, in an application for a warrant, a statement known to be false or misleading in a material particular (s 3ZT) — an offence directed at the applicant, not the suspect. And the Part “does not affect the law relating to legal professional privilege” (s 3ZX).10
The digital warrants in the Surveillance Devices Act
Commonwealth digital warrants are split between two Acts. Account takeover warrants are issued under Part IAAC of the Crimes Act; data disruption warrants and network activity warrants are in the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth), whose stated purposes include establishing procedures for warrants authorising access to, and the disruption of, data held in computers (s 3).
Their issuing conditions differ from s 3E. The issuer is an eligible Judge or a nominated ART member rather than a magistrate or court officer. And the Act imposes an express proportionality condition that s 3E does not: a data disruption warrant requires satisfaction that the disruption authorised is “reasonably necessary and proportionate” having regard to the offences in question (s 27KC(1)(b)), and a network activity warrant that its issue is “justified and proportionate” having regard to the kinds of offences involved (s 27KM(1)(aa)). Each section also lists matters the issuer must weigh, among them less intrusive alternatives, the privacy implications of reaching data of people lawfully using a computer, and the public interest in protecting a journalist’s source where the data is a journalist’s and each offence is against a secrecy provision (ss 27KC(2), 27KM(2)).
A data disruption warrant is applied for by a law enforcement officer of the Australian Federal Police, on reasonable suspicion that relevant offences involve data held in a target computer and that disrupting it is likely to substantially assist in frustrating offences of the same kind (s 27KA(1)).11 A network activity warrant is applied for by the chief officer of the Australian Federal Police or of the Australian Crime Commission, on reasonable suspicion that a group is a criminal network and that access to a computer used by any of its members will substantially assist intelligence collection; the individuals, the computer and its location may all be unidentifiable (ss 27KK(1), (2)).12 Both Divisions are also time-limited, which is a safeguard of a different kind: ss 27KAA and 27KKA each provide that the Division is repealed at the end of 4 September 2029, and s 27KU repeals the emergency-authorisation subsections at the same time.13
An account takeover warrant is issued by a magistrate, not an eligible Judge or ART member. A law enforcement officer of the Australian Federal Police or the ACC applies on reasonable suspicion that relevant offences (serious Commonwealth offences, or serious State offences with a federal aspect) have been, are being or are likely to be committed, that an investigation into them is or will be conducted, and that taking control of the target online accounts is necessary to obtain evidence of them (s 3ZZUN(1)). The magistrate may issue it if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for that suspicion (s 3ZZUP(1)), and must have regard to the gravity of the offences, alternative means of obtaining the evidence, the privacy of anyone affected, the likely value of the evidence, the impact on people lawfully using a computer, the journalist’s-source public interest where the magistrate believes on reasonable grounds that each target account is held by a working journalist or a journalist’s employer and each offence is against a secrecy provision, and earlier warrants for the same account or offences (s 3ZZUP(2)). Its issuing conditions contain no proportionality test like those in ss 27KC(1)(b) and 27KM(1)(aa); proportionality enters at execution instead, as a condition of every warrant that it not be executed so as to cause loss of or damage to data unless the damage is justified and proportionate (s 3ZZUR(8)(a)). It is time-limited in the same way: the Divisions providing for these warrants and for emergency authorisations are repealed at the end of 4 September 2029 (ss 3ZZUMA, 3ZZUWA).14
What commenced in August 2026, and what has not
The Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Omnibus No. 1) Act 2026 (Cth) was assented to on 26 August 2026, and the table in its s 2(1) gives its Schedules different commencements. Schedule 1 commenced on 27 August 2026, and it is the Schedule that matters here: it inserted s 3QA, redirected the application references in ss 3E and 3R to it, and substituted the fixed repeal date of 4 September 2029 for an earlier formula running five years from commencement.
Schedule 2 is not in force, and it is the part of the Act most likely to be misread as current. Its Part 1, inserting evidentiary-certificate provisions for serious drug offences into the Criminal Code, commences on 26 February 2027; its Part 2, on mixtures containing prohibited substances, commences on a day to be fixed by Proclamation or, if none is made within 12 months of assent, on the day after that period ends.15 Neither Part amends the search-warrant provisions above. An amending Act is not a single event, and its commencement table is read provision by provision.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify the offence and ask whether it is a Commonwealth offence, a Territory offence, or a State offence with a federal aspect. If it is none of those, look for the State or Territory statute instead.
- Test the issuing condition on its own terms: was the issuing officer satisfied, by information on oath or affirmation, of reasonable grounds for suspecting that evidential material is or will be at the premises or in the person’s possession within the stated period. Identify whether the application was made under s 3QA or by the urgent route in s 3R, because the prospective period drops to 48 hours and the warrant’s stated life must not exceed 48 hours.
- Read the warrant against s 3E(5), starting with the statement of the offence, and apply Smethurst to one that fails to state or misstates it: the plurality held the warrant invalid and the search unlawful, and the Court granted certiorari without ordering the material back.
- Separate what was done from what was authorised. For each act — entry, seizure of unspecified things, accessing or altering data, taking a device away, requiring assistance — name the subsection relied on and check its conditions, including the s 3F(2C) carve-out and the s 3L(3) limit.
- Check the execution safeguards in ss 3H, 3P and 3Q, then the limits in ss 3S, 3ZT and 3ZX.
- For a data disruption or network activity warrant, apply the Surveillance Devices Act conditions, including the proportionality requirement, rather than importing the s 3E threshold; and for any amendment relied on, read the commencement table and say whether the provision was in force at the relevant time.
Self-check
- Have I identified the offence and confirmed that it brings the matter within Part IAA, rather than assuming a police power is federal?
- Have I said which jurisdiction’s law I am applying, and avoided treating this Commonwealth regime as the law of a State police force?
- Have I used the statute’s own threshold — suspicion on reasonable grounds — rather than a paraphrase?
- Have I applied Smethurst to validity rather than to relief, and matched each investigative act to the subsection authorising it?
- Have I kept the Surveillance Devices Act conditions separate from the Crimes Act conditions, and confirmed that every amendment I rely on has commenced?