Police search warrants and digital investigative powers

Where the power comes from, and how far it reaches

Section 3E sits within Part IAA, Division 2 of the Crimes Act. Part IAA covers search, information gathering, arrest and related powers, but not delayed notification search warrants.

The Part only applies to an “offence” as defined in s 3C(1). This means a Commonwealth offence (except under the Defence Force Discipline Act), a Territory offence, or a State offence with a federal aspect.

Section 3D makes clear this Part does not cover the whole field. Other Commonwealth and Territory search and arrest powers can still operate alongside it.

A power under the Part can be used even if another law gives a similar power. And for State offences with a federal aspect, State and ACT law can still apply at the same time (ss 3D(1)–(2), (4), (6)).

Because of this, a student must first identify the offence. The power actually being used might come from a different statute altogether.

What the warrant must state, and why the statement decides validity

Section 3E(5) sets out what a warrant must state: the offence, a description of the premises or person, the evidential material sought, the executing constable, the expiry time, and any hours limit on execution. The expiry time must not be later than the end of the seventh day after issue (s 3E(5A)). This does not stop police getting successive warrants over the same premises or person (s 3E(8)).

The requirement to state the offence is critical. In Smethurst v Commissioner of Police [2020] HCA 14, a warrant for a journalist’s home purported to state an offence under s 79(3) of the Crimes Act. The majority said search powers are exceptional, used only under justifying conditions. Reading ss 3E(1) and 3E(5)(a) together, they held an invalid warrant gives no authority at all. This is because everyone involved needs to understand the search’s object and limits.

Here the warrant failed to state the offence properly, and also misstated it. So it was invalid, making the entry, search and seizure unlawful. The Court quashed the warrant by certiorari (an order cancelling a decision made without proper legal power).

The judges disagreed only about remedy. The Court did not order the police to return or destroy the copied data. So invalidity alone did not get the material back. Whether such material can be used as evidence is a separate question, covered under the exclusionary discretions (ss 135, 137, 138).

The safeguards on execution, and what a warrant cannot authorise

Quick Read: These rules under the Crimes Act set safeguards for how a warrant is carried out, not just what it says. Officers must show a copy of the warrant to the occupier or the person searched, and identify themselves. Under s 3H(5), that copy does not need the issuing officer’s signature or the court seal.

An occupier or their representative can usually watch the search. But under s 3P, this right stops if they get in the way of it. Section 3Q says police must give a receipt for anything they seize or take away for examination.

Three short provisions set firm outer limits. Section 3S says a warrant can never allow a strip search or a search of body cavities. Section 3ZT makes it an offence, carrying up to 2 years’ imprisonment, to knowingly give false or misleading information in a warrant application — this targets the applicant, not the suspect.

Finally, s 3ZX makes clear this Part does not change the law on legal professional privilege, meaning that protection still applies as normal.

The digital warrants in the Surveillance Devices Act

Two Commonwealth Acts split up digital warrants. Account takeover warrants sit in the Crimes Act. Data disruption warrants and network activity warrants sit in the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth), which aims to set up procedures for accessing and disrupting computer data (s 3).

These warrants have different issuing conditions than s 3E warrants. An eligible Judge or a nominated ART member issues them, not a magistrate or court officer. The Act also adds proportionality conditions s 3E lacks: a data disruption warrant needs the disruption to be “reasonably necessary and proportionate” to the offences (s 27KC(1)(b)); a network activity warrant needs its issue to be “justified and proportionate” (s 27KM(1)(aa)). The issuer must also weigh things like less intrusive options, privacy effects on innocent computer users, and protecting journalists’ sources (ss 27KC(2), 27KM(2)).

An AFP officer applies for a data disruption warrant. They need reasonable suspicion that offences involve data on a target computer, and that disrupting it will substantially help stop similar offences (s 27KA(1)).

A network activity warrant is sought by the AFP or ACC chief officer. They need reasonable suspicion that a group is a criminal network, and that accessing a member’s computer will substantially help gather intelligence. The individuals, computer, or location can all be unknown (ss 27KK(1)–(2)).

Both warrant types expire automatically — a different kind of safeguard. Sections 27KAA and 27KKA repeal each Division at the end of 4 September 2029. Section 27KU repeals the emergency-authorisation provisions at the same time.

An account takeover warrant works differently: a magistrate issues it, not an eligible Judge or ART member. An AFP or ACC officer applies, needing reasonable suspicion about relevant offences (serious Commonwealth offences, or...).

What commenced in August 2026, and what has not

The Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Omnibus No. 1) Act 2026 (Cth) got assent on 26 August 2026. Different Schedules start on different dates, so you must check each one separately.

Schedule 1 started on 27 August 2026. It added s 3QA, changed how ss 3E and 3R refer to it, and set a fixed repeal date of 4 September 2029.

Schedule 2 is not yet in force. Its Part 1 (evidentiary certificates for serious drug offences) starts on 26 February 2027. Its Part 2 (mixtures containing prohibited substances) starts on a Proclamation date, or automatically 12 months after assent if no Proclamation is made.

Neither Part of Schedule 2 changes the search-warrant provisions. The lesson: an amending Act commences in stages, not all at once. Always check the commencement table provision by provision.

Self-check

Before relying on this area, check a few things.

First, check the offence actually falls under Part IAA. Don’t assume a police power is federal just because police are involved.

Second, be clear which jurisdiction’s law applies. This Commonwealth regime is not the same as a State police force’s law.

Third, use the statute’s actual threshold. The test is suspicion on reasonable grounds, not a looser paraphrase of it.

Fourth, remember Smethurst goes to validity, not to relief (the remedy a court might give). Also match each investigative act to the specific subsection that authorises it.

Finally, keep the Surveillance Devices Act conditions separate from the Crimes Act conditions. Confirm that any amendment you rely on has actually commenced.

A Quick Read uses simpler language and may leave out detail, including whole topics, to stay short. The full article is the complete statement.

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