Wilson v Ferguson

Supreme Court of Western Australia · 2015

Intellectual Property And Technology LawEquity And TrustsConfidential InformationEquitable Remedies

Wilson v Ferguson [2015] WASC 15

A man angry at a break-up posts intimate images of his former partner to his Facebook friends, many of them her workmates. What can equity do for her once the images are already out?

What happened?

Ms Wilson was a mobile plant operator at the Cloudbreak mine site, and Mr Ferguson worked in the same crew ([18]-[19]). They began a romantic relationship in November 2012, and after a few weeks she moved into his home in Maida Vale ([20]). During the relationship they sent each other sexually explicit photographs by mobile phone, and he also took explicit photographs of her with her knowledge and consent ([22]). She took videos of herself, and on one occasion left her phone in the lounge room while he was present; when she returned he told her he had used her phone to email the videos to himself.

She was upset, asked him to make sure nobody else saw them, and he agreed that no one would see them ([23]). During arguments he had threatened to post photographs of her on Facebook and YouTube, but he had not published any before 5 August 2013 ([25]).

On 5 August 2013 she sent him a text message saying that she knew he was cheating on her and wanted nothing to do with him ([26]). He then posted 16 photographs and two videos of her on his Facebook page, with the comment “Happy to help all ya boys at home.. enjoy!!” ([27]). He had about 300 Facebook friends, many of whom worked at Cloudbreak ([28]). He sent her text messages saying that the photographs would be out for everyone to see, and she replied begging him to take them down; they were removed at about 7.00 pm ([30]-[32]).

Mitchell J inferred that he posted them because he was angry at the end of the relationship and wanted to cause her extreme embarrassment and distress ([33]). He found that she was horrified, humiliated and anxious, slept badly, attended counselling, and did not return to work until 30 October 2013, losing wages of $13,404 ([38]-[40]).

Ms Wilson sued for an injunction, damages and costs ([7]). At trial her counsel confined the money claim to equitable compensation, disclaimed reliance on s 25(10) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) and abandoned the claim for punitive damages ([67]). Mr Ferguson filed a defence that did not plead a positive defence ([8]), his solicitors later withdrew, and he did not appear at the trial, which Mitchell J allowed to proceed in his absence ([9]-[15]).

What did the Court decide?

Mitchell J of the Supreme Court of Western Australia heard the matter on 2 December 2014 and delivered judgment on 16 January 2015. He found for the plaintiff on her claim in equity ([2]). The orders he set out, subject to considering further submissions on their precise form, were these ([90]):

1. a permanent injunction restraining the defendant, directly or indirectly, from publishing in any form photographs or videos of the plaintiff engaging in sexual activities or in which she appears naked or partially naked, other than as required by law, to professional advisers for the purpose of obtaining professional advice, with leave of the Court, or with her express written consent ([65]-[66], [90]);

2. an order that the defendant pay the plaintiff equitable compensation of $48,404 ([85], [90]); and

3. an order that the defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of the action, to be taxed, with indemnity costs refused ([87]-[90]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Mitchell J, sitting alone, said that the essential elements of an action in equity for breach of confidence are that the information was of a confidential nature, that it was communicated or obtained in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence, and that there was an unauthorised use of the information ([46]). By that principle, he said, equity imposes “an obligation of conscience arising from the circumstances in or through which the information was communicated or obtained” ([45]), and the doctrine may be applied to images of a person, even where the images were created by the person sought to be restrained from disclosing them ([47]).

He held that the intimate images had “the necessary quality of confidence about them”, because intimate photographs and videos taken in private and shared between two lovers “would ordinarily bear a confidential character, and be implicitly provided on condition that they not be shown to any third party” ([56]). The circumstances in which the defendant obtained the images imposed an obligation of conscience to keep them confidential: the fact that he emailed copies of the videos to himself from her phone without her knowledge or consent “would of itself ordinarily be sufficient to import an obligation of confidence”, and the nature of the images and the circumstances made it obvious to any reasonable person in his position that they were for his viewing only ([57]-[58]).

Posting them on his Facebook page, where they were accessible to hundreds of his Facebook friends, was a misuse of them ([59]). On detriment, Mitchell J recorded that Mason J in Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd had regarded it as necessary to show unauthorised use of the information to the detriment of the party communicating it, and that “The existence of a requirement to show detriment has been doubted in subsequent cases”, citing Ammon v Consolidated Minerals Ltd [No 3] [2007] WASC 232 at [310] ([43] and footnote 4).

He did not resolve that doubt. The elements he stated at [46] do not include detriment, and at [59] he said that, “To the extent that it is necessary for the plaintiff to show that the disclosure was to her detriment”, she had proved it, because the publication of the images was deeply distressing to her and resulted in her having to take time off work and undertake counselling.

Mitchell J asked whether equitable compensation can be awarded to compensate a plaintiff for the non-economic loss comprising the embarrassment and distress occasioned by disclosure of private information in breach of an equitable obligation of confidence ([71]). He identified two hurdles: the common law approach that damages for emotional distress short of a recognised psychiatric or psychological injury are available only in very limited circumstances, and the fact that equitable compensation in Australian cases had, until recently, been awarded only for economic loss.

He regarded the second as the more significant, because restrictions of the common law are not automatically applied in the exercise of equitable jurisdiction ([72]). He said that the Victorian Court of Appeal in Giller v Procopets, the only decision of an Australian superior court on the issue that he had been able to locate, held monetary compensation for emotional distress caused by the release of confidential personal information available both in the court’s equitable jurisdiction and under the Victorian version of Lord Cairns’ Act ([73]).

He thought Giller might be distinguished in Western Australia so far as it rested on the Victorian statute, whose terms differed from s 25(10) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), but not so far as it rested on the inherent equitable jurisdiction ([74]). Applying the High Court’s statement in Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd that trial judges should not depart from intermediate appellate decisions in another jurisdiction on non-statutory law unless convinced they are plainly wrong ([75]), he did not consider Giller plainly wrong; he saw it as a development of the doctrine, consistent with the way the law had developed in the United Kingdom, albeit under the influence of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) and European jurisprudence that have no Australian counterparts, and he took account of the ease and speed with which images can now be disseminated ([76]-[81]).

He described the step in Giller as “an appropriate incremental adaptation of an established equitable principle” to contemporary electronic communication ([82]), and he agreed with the Victorian Court’s conclusion ([83]). He awarded $35,000 for the plaintiff’s embarrassment, anxiety and distress, taking account of the aggravation caused by the release being an act of retribution intended to cause her harm, the absence of psychiatric injury, and the need for the amount not to be disproportionate to amounts commonly awarded for pain, suffering and loss of amenity in tortious personal injury cases, and added $13,404 for her lost wages ([85]).

He expressly gave no view on whether compensation for non-economic loss is available for breach of other equitable obligations ([84]) or on whether damages could be awarded under s 25(10) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), which the plaintiff had not claimed ([67], [86]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Mitchell J

Read judgment: [45]–[47] (opens in a new tab), [55]–[58] (opens in a new tab)

Mitchell J’s statement of the elements, his finding that the images were confidential and his finding that the circumstances in which the defendant obtained them imposed an obligation of conscience were necessary to the conclusion at [55] that posting the images breached an equitable obligation of confidence, on which the injunction and the compensation rest ([2], [60]-[66], [85]).

Classification unresolved · Mitchell J

Read judgment: [43] (opens in a new tab), [59] (opens in a new tab)

At [43] Mitchell J reported that the requirement to show detriment had been doubted; at [59] he said that, to the extent it was necessary, the plaintiff had shown detriment. He did not decide whether detriment is a separate requirement. A single label would hide that the doubt is recorded, the question is left open, and the result would be the same either way.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Mitchell J

Read judgment: [71]–[83] (opens in a new tab), [85] (opens in a new tab)

Mitchell J’s conclusion that equitable compensation can be awarded for embarrassment and distress from a breach of confidence, and his reasons for following Giller, were necessary to the award of $35,000 for non-economic loss at [85].

Classification unresolved · Mitchell J

Read judgment: [84] (opens in a new tab), [86] (opens in a new tab)

Mitchell J said he was not expressing a view on non-economic equitable compensation for other equitable obligations ([84]) or on damages under s 25(10) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) ([86]). These are questions he reserved, not observations on the ground of decision.

Why does this case matter?

Cases about private images sit where several kinds of claim meet, and a weak answer picks a label for the wrong claim and then argues the remedy from the label. This decision shows a court working through one equitable claim from its elements to its remedies, step by step, which is the discipline an examiner looks for.

Exam and application relevance

Identify the equitable claim before selecting a remedy, and distinguish the questions Mitchell J decided from those he left open. Use his reasons for each step he took, with the paragraph, and say where a point rests on another court’s decision.

The decision is that of a single judge of the Supreme Court of Western Australia at first instance. It does not bind courts in other States, and it is persuasive there. This lesson concerns Mitchell J’s equitable reasoning in January 2015, so confirm current authority before relying on it.

Check your understanding

1. How did the defendant come to have copies of the videos, and what did the plaintiff say to him when she learned of it ([23])?

2. What did the defendant post on 5 August 2013, to whom was it available, and what did Mitchell J infer about his reason for posting it ([27]-[28], [33])?

3. What three elements did Mitchell J say are essential to an action in equity for breach of confidence ([46])?

4. What did Mitchell J say about the ordinary character of intimate photographs and videos shared between two lovers ([56])?

5. What did Mitchell J record at [43] about a requirement to show detriment, and what did he say at [59]?

6. What two hurdles did Mitchell J identify to the plaintiff’s money claim, and which did he regard as the more significant ([72])?

7. Which decision did Mitchell J consider on that money claim, and what test from Farah Constructions did he apply to it ([73], [75]-[76])?

8. What did Mitchell J say he was not deciding ([84], [86])?