Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 63
Trespassers secretly filmed possums being killed at a licensed abattoir and the footage reached the ABC. The owner asked a court to stop the broadcast. What legal right, if any, could it rely on?
Qualified by legislation: Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) Sch 2 cl 7, from 10 June 2025
Since 10 June 2025, Schedule 2 to the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) has given an individual a cause of action in tort against another person where that person invaded the individual’s privacy by intruding upon their seclusion or misusing information that relates to them, a person in the individual’s position would have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in all the circumstances, the invasion was intentional or reckless and serious, and the public interest in the individual’s privacy outweighed any countervailing public interest (cl 7(1)). It is actionable without proof of damage (cl 7(2)), and intruding upon the seclusion of an individual includes watching, listening to or recording the person’s private activities or private affairs (cl 6(1)). The cause of action belongs to an individual, so it does not assist a corporation in Lenah’s position. The Schedule does not apply to an invasion of privacy by a journalist, by the journalist’s employer or a person engaging the journalist, or by certain persons assisting a journalist (cl 15(1)(c) and (d)), to the extent that it involves the collection, preparation for publication or publication of journalistic material (cl 15(1)); nor does it apply to the publication or distribution of journalistic material prepared by a journalist (cl 15(1A)). Clause 21 says that the Schedule is not intended to exclude or limit the concurrent operation of any law, written or unwritten, of a State or Territory. The Justices in Lenah gave their reasons about whether a tort of invasion of privacy should be recognised before this Schedule existed.
What happened?
Lenah Game Meats processed brush tail possums at a licensed abattoir in Tasmania ([23], [65]). Persons unknown broke in, installed hidden cameras and filmed the killing of possums without Lenah’s knowledge or consent ([24], [66]). The film reached Animal Liberation Limited and then the ABC, which intended to broadcast parts of it on the “7.30 Report” ([24], [66]). It was not alleged that the ABC was implicated in the trespass ([67]). Lenah claimed that broadcasting would cause it financial harm ([25]).
Lenah sued the ABC and Animal Liberation in the Supreme Court of Tasmania and applied for an interlocutory injunction ([65]-[70]). Underwood J dismissed the application on three grounds, the first being that no serious question to be tried was disclosed ([2]). The Full Court (Wright and Evans JJ; Slicer J dissenting) allowed Lenah’s appeal and granted an injunction restraining the ABC, and the ABC appealed to the High Court ([2], [63]). It was conceded below that Lenah had no maintainable action for breach of confidence ([33], [73]).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Full Court’s orders and ordered that Lenah’s appeal to that Court be dismissed, with the ABC to pay Lenah’s costs of the appeal to the High Court (orders; [139]). Five sets of reasons were given: Gleeson CJ ([1]-[57]); Gaudron J ([58]-[62]); Gummow and Hayne JJ jointly ([63]-[139]); Kirby J ([140]-[222]); and Callinan J, dissenting ([223]-[353]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Gleeson CJ. He agreed in the orders proposed by Gummow and Hayne JJ ([57]) and held that the law of breach of confidence can reach the case if the activities filmed were private. “A photographic image, illegally or improperly or surreptitiously obtained, where what is depicted is private, may constitute confidential information” ([34]), and there would be an obligation of confidence on those who obtained the images and on those into whose possession they came “if they knew, or ought to have known, the manner in which they were obtained” ([39]).
But “[a]n activity is not private simply because it is not done in public”, and a requirement of being “highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities” is in many circumstances “a useful practical test of what is private” ([42]). The activities filmed were not shown or alleged to be private in any sense other than that they took place on private property ([35]), and were not “relevantly private” ([43]). In that event, “the circumstance that the information was tortiously obtained in the first place is not sufficient to make it unconscientious of a person into whose hands that information later comes to use it or publish it” ([55]). He counselled caution about declaring a new tort of privacy ([41]) and did not decide whether a corporation may invoke privacy ([43]).
Gummow and Hayne JJ, with Gaudron J agreeing. They decided the appeal on a different footing. The statute did not give the Supreme Court power to make an order on Lenah’s application “other than in protection of some legal or equitable right of Lenah which the Court might enforce by final judgment” ([105]). Unconscionable conduct does not “operate wholly at large” ([98]). Lenah’s interest was in its goodwill ([79]), and “Whatever development may take place” in the field of privacy “will be to the benefit of natural, not artificial, persons” ([132]); an artificial legal person “lacks the sensibilities, offence and injury to which provide a staple value for any developing law of privacy” ([126]).
They said that nothing in their reasons foreclosed debate about a principle protecting the interests of individuals in leading a secluded and private life ([132]). Gaudron J added that, leaving aside orders specifically authorised by statute and orders protecting the court’s own processes, an injunction is a remedy that “can only issue to protect an equitable or legal right” ([60]), and that Lenah pointed to none ([61]-[62]).
Kirby J. He held that the Supreme Court has statutory power to restrain the use of information obtained by a trespasser or other improper means where its use would be unconscionable ([183]), but that the Full Court’s discretion miscarried for want of proper weight to the implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters ([214], [220]-[221]). He preferred to postpone the question of a privacy tort ([189]).
Callinan J. He would have dismissed the appeal, because the ABC’s receipt of the film made in violation of Lenah’s right of exclusive possession placed it in a relationship of confidence to which equity should attach a constructive trust ([296]-[298]). He gave tentative views that the time was ripe to consider a tort of invasion of privacy ([335]).
What the Court did not decide. Gummow and Hayne JJ found it unnecessary to rule on those of the Commonwealth’s submissions about equity’s jurisdiction over information obtained unlawfully that were not already disposed of by the success of the appeal ([135]-[138]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Separate reasoning · Gleeson CJ
Read judgment: [42] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab), [43] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab), [55] (PDF p 22) (opens in a new tab), [56] (PDF p 22) (opens in a new tab)
Gleeson CJ concurred in allowing the appeal. The absence of relevant privacy or confidentiality, and the insufficiency of the trespass alone to restrain the ABC, were necessary to his conclusion that Lenah disclosed no serious question to be tried. This is his route to the orders, rather than an adoption by all the Justices of his privacy analysis.
Obiter · Gleeson CJ
Read judgment: [34] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab), [39] (PDF p 16) (opens in a new tab)
The positive account of protection for private recordings explains how confidence could protect privacy. Its application to genuinely private activities was hypothetical: the activities here were not relevantly private. The proposed obligation on recipients of such private recordings was therefore unnecessary to refusing Lenah relief.
Classification unresolved · Gleeson CJ
Read judgment: [43] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab)
Gleeson CJ expressly found it unnecessary to decide whether, or in what circumstances, a corporation may invoke privacy. His conclusion rested on the nature of these activities, so it does not resolve corporate entitlement to privacy protection.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Gummow and Hayne JJ (Gaudron J agreeing)
Read judgment: [98] (PDF p 39) (opens in a new tab), [105] (PDF p 43) (opens in a new tab), [138] (PDF p 57) (opens in a new tab)
The requirement for a legal or equitable right enforceable by final judgment was necessary to reject Lenah’s claim to an interlocutory injunction based on unconscionability at large. This classification concerns the stated ground of these reasons, which Gaudron J adopted, rather than every observation made in the case.
Ratio · Gummow and Hayne JJ (Gaudron J agreeing)
Read judgment: [126] (PDF p 53) (opens in a new tab), [132] (PDF p 55) (opens in a new tab)
Lenah also sought to supply the missing right through an emergent privacy tort. Rejecting that claim for this artificial person was necessary to dispose of that alternative basis for relief. The reasoning distinguishes its commercial goodwill from the personal sensibilities protected by privacy; it does not establish a general privacy tort.
Ratio · Gaudron J
Read judgment: [60] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab), [61] (PDF p 24) (opens in a new tab)
Gaudron J’s additional reasons apply the need for a legal or equitable right to Lenah’s failure to identify any right or wrong supporting relief. She distinguishes specific statutory orders and protection of court processes. This is a ground for her concurrence in allowing the appeal.
Obiter · Gummow and Hayne JJ (Gaudron J agreeing)
Read judgment: [107] (PDF p 44) (opens in a new tab), [132] (PDF p 55) (opens in a new tab)
The observations that Victoria Park does not bar future development and that protection of individuals remains open were unnecessary to refusing relief to this corporation. They leave the form and outcome of any future development undecided; they do not recognise a new cause of action for individuals.
Proposition 3
Separate reasoning · Kirby J
Read judgment: [170] (PDF p 72) (opens in a new tab), [183] (PDF p 77) (opens in a new tab), [214] (PDF p 88) (opens in a new tab), [220] (PDF p 91) (opens in a new tab), [222] (PDF p 91) (opens in a new tab)
Kirby J concurred in the orders but took a distinct route. He accepted power to restrain unconscionable use of improperly obtained information, including by an innocent recipient, then refused relief because the discretion had miscarried through inadequate weight to political communication. His agreement in the result does not adopt the joint reasons’ account of injunctive power.
Obiter · Kirby J
Read judgment: [185] (PDF p 77) (opens in a new tab), [189] (PDF p 80) (opens in a new tab)
Kirby J expressly regarded the proposed privacy tort as unnecessary to his analysis because he had accepted other bases for injunctive power. His preference to postpone recognition records an open question rather than a holding establishing or excluding that tort.
Separate reasoning · Callinan J
Read judgment: [296] (PDF p 122) (opens in a new tab), [297] (PDF p 123) (opens in a new tab), [298] (PDF p 124) (opens in a new tab), [353] (PDF p 153) (opens in a new tab)
Callinan J dissented and would have dismissed the appeal. His confidence and constructive trust analysis supplied an underlying remedy supporting continuation of the injunction. It explains his proposed disposition, rather than a ground adopted by the Justices who allowed the appeal.
Obiter · Callinan J
Read judgment: [313] (PDF p 129) (opens in a new tab), [328] (PDF p 136) (opens in a new tab), [335] (PDF p 138) (opens in a new tab)
Callinan J expressly introduced his privacy discussion as tentative and unnecessary given his conclusion on unconscionability. His willingness to consider corporate privacy and recognition of a privacy tort therefore did not supply the ground even of his proposed dissenting orders.
Why does this case matter?
Covert filming and leaked recordings are a common problem setting, and answers often cite this case for a single statement of the law, as though one set of reasons had said it. The Justices reached the same orders by routes that do not coincide.
Exam and application relevance
Take the tests for what is private from Gleeson CJ’s reasons at [42]-[43], and say whose reasons they are.
Where a problem concerns a corporation, give the Justices’ views on corporate privacy separately: Gleeson CJ at [43], Gummow and Hayne JJ at [126]-[132], Kirby J at [190]-[191] and Callinan J at [328].
Lenah made no claim to copyright in the film ([28], [103]), and the questions about ownership of intellectual property rights in the sounds and images were not raised or explored ([103]).
Check your understanding
1. Which Justices wrote separately in the High Court, and with whose reasons did Gaudron J and (in the orders) Gleeson CJ and Kirby J agree?
2. According to Gleeson CJ at [55], what is the position where information is not confidential but was obtained by a trespasser, and what does it depend on?
3. What did Gummow and Hayne JJ identify as Lenah’s interest at [79], and how did that bear on the privacy argument at [126]-[132]?
4. What did Kirby J hold about the power to restrain the use of improperly obtained information, and why did he nonetheless agree in the orders?
5. On what basis would Callinan J have continued the injunction?