Confidential information: public domain, public interest and government secrets
The limits of the equitable action for breach of confidence in Australia: what happens when information becomes public, why government secrets need proof of harm to the public interest, the narrow public interest defence, information obtained by intrusion, and the statutory tort for serious invasions of privacy.
Learning outcomes
- Decide whether information has lost the necessary quality of confidence through publication, and whether a contractual confidentiality covenant over public information operates as a restraint of trade, applying Commonwealth v John Fairfax and Maggbury v Hafele.
- Apply the public interest test that governs a government’s claim to restrain disclosure of its information.
- State the limited scope of the public interest defence to a claim for breach of confidence as Mason J described it.
- Assess a claim about information obtained by intrusion under the equitable action, attributing the reasoning in ABC v Lenah Game Meats correctly, and identify when the statutory tort in Schedule 2 to the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) is available instead.
Equity’s protection of confidential information has no registration, no fixed term and no statutory list of exceptions, so its limits come from the cases. The action is part of the general law rather than a statute. Maggbury and Lenah Game Meats are decisions of the High Court, which bind lower Australian courts, although the High Court can reconsider its own decisions; Commonwealth v John Fairfax records the reasons of a single Justice on an interlocutory application, not a decision of the Full Court. Once the elements of the action are identified, a student must ask a second question: even if the information was once confidential and was received in confidence, is there a reason equity will not restrain its use or disclosure now? The usual reasons are that the information has become public, that the confider is a government that cannot show harm to the public interest, or that disclosure is justified in the public interest.
When the information has become public
The action requires information that has the necessary quality of confidence, so the extent of any publication matters. In Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1980] HCA 44; (1980) 147 CLR 39, newspapers proposed to serialise a book reproducing classified defence and foreign affairs documents.1 Mason J, sitting alone on an interlocutory application, refused to restrain publication on the ground of confidence, partly because copies of the book had already been sold, including to the two countries most likely to be affected, and the first instalment had appeared, so that an injunction would not avoid the detriment the Commonwealth feared (at 54). His Honour accepted that in other circumstances the circulation of about 100 copies might not be enough to deny protection, so the inquiry is about how far the information has spread and whether restraint would still achieve anything.
Contract cannot simply replace the lost confidence. In Maggbury Pty Ltd v Hafele Australia Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 70, the inventor of a foldaway ironing board disclosed it to a prospective commercial partner under agreements by which the partner was “forever” to observe obligations of confidence, and the invention later became public when the inventor’s own international patent application was published.2 Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ said that such obligations would ordinarily be construed as limited to information that was still confidential at the time of the breach, and that a contrary intention must be explicit (at [45]). The agreements here did use explicit words, but once the information was publicly available through the confider’s own disclosures, the covenants operated as restraints of trade and were invalid unless justified as reasonable, which had not been attempted (at [53]–[57]). Their Honours left open whether a restraint for a limited period after public disclosure, as a “head start” handicap, would be reasonable (at [50]). Kirby and Callinan JJ dissented.
Government information: a different test of detriment
The Commonwealth argued in Fairfax that it could protect any information that was not public, as a private person could. Mason J rejected that. Equity was fashioned to protect the personal, private and proprietary interests of the citizen, and when it protects government information it looks at the matter “through different spectacles” (at 51). It is not a relevant detriment to the government that publication will merely expose its actions to public discussion and criticism, so the court determines the government’s claim to confidentiality by reference to the public interest: unless disclosure is likely to injure the public interest, it will not be protected (at 51–52). Disclosure will be restrained if it would prejudice national security, relations with foreign countries or the ordinary business of government, and some cases will be finely balanced (at 52).
The same case shows that confidence and copyright are separate. Mason J refused interim relief on the confidence claim but granted an interlocutory injunction restraining publication of the documents in a way that infringed the Commonwealth’s copyright, while noting that copyright is not infringed by publishing the information or ideas in a document so long as the form of the work is not reproduced (at 58–59).
The public interest defence
Even a private confider’s claim can fail because disclosure is in the public interest. In Fairfax, Mason J said that “the so-called common law defence of public interest” had been accepted as applying to the disclosure of confidential information, but that it is limited in scope (at 57). It makes legitimate the publication of confidential information so as to protect the community from destruction, damage or harm, and it had been acknowledged to apply to disclosure of things done in breach of national security, in breach of the law (including fraud), and of matters involving danger to the public. Considering it as a possible answer to the copyright claim, Mason J observed that applying it to the publication of diplomatic advice in order to expose what was said to be cynical policy would “break new ground”. The defence is therefore narrower than a general claim that the public would be interested in the information.
Information obtained by intrusion, and the statutory privacy tort
The obligation of confidence does not depend on a relationship between the parties. In Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 63, trespassers secretly filmed possum slaughtering at a licensed processing facility and the film reached the ABC.3 Gleeson CJ said that equity may restrain publication of confidential information improperly or surreptitiously obtained, and that a photographic image illegally or surreptitiously obtained may be confidential where what is depicted is private (at [34]). The obligation would bind those who obtained the images and those into whose possession they came if they knew, or ought to have known, how they were obtained (at [39]). But the activities filmed were not shown to be private, and if the information is not confidential, the fact that it was tortiously obtained is not enough to make later use of it unconscientious (at [35], [55]). Those are Gleeson CJ’s own reasons. Gummow and Hayne JJ, with whom Gaudron J agreed, allowed the appeal on a different ground: the injunction could be granted only in protection of a legal or equitable right of Lenah enforceable by final judgment, and Lenah’s reliance on an emerging tort of invasion of privacy was misplaced because any such development would benefit “natural, not artificial, persons” (at [105], [132]). Kirby J also agreed in the orders, and Callinan J dissented.
Parliament has since created a separate cause of action. Since 10 June 2025, Schedule 2 to the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) has given an individual a cause of action in tort where the defendant invaded the plaintiff’s privacy by intruding on their seclusion or misusing information relating to them, a person in the plaintiff’s position would have had a reasonable expectation of privacy, the invasion was intentional or reckless and serious, and the public interest in the plaintiff’s privacy outweighed any countervailing public interest (cl 7(1)).4 It is actionable without proof of damage (cl 7(2)). The cause of action is conferred on an individual, so a corporation in Lenah’s position would have to look to breach of confidence or another cause of action.
Applying this in a problem question
- Establish the elements of the equitable action first, then ask whether any limit applies.
- Ask whether the information is still confidential, and how far and by whom it has been published; if the confider published it, check whether a contractual covenant now operates as a restraint of trade.
- If the confider is a government, ask what harm to the public interest disclosure is likely to cause, not whether it will embarrass the government.
- Test any public interest defence against the categories Mason J described, such as breach of national security, breach of the law including fraud, or danger to the public.
- Where information was obtained by intrusion, decide whether it is private enough to be confidential, then consider whether an individual plaintiff also has a claim under Schedule 2 to the Privacy Act.